From 79035579887cdc4284080a9167a3b8a4ffd08f24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Ferreira?= Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2021 17:23:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] treewide: remove trailing whitespaces MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Luís Ferreira --- src/chfn.c | 4 ++-- src/chgpasswd.c | 2 +- src/expiry.c | 4 ++-- src/groupdel.c | 2 +- src/groupmems.c | 6 +++--- src/grpck.c | 2 +- src/login_nopam.c | 4 ++-- src/logoutd.c | 2 +- src/newgrp.c | 18 +++++++++--------- src/newuidmap.c | 2 +- src/newusers.c | 2 +- src/passwd.c | 4 ++-- src/suauth.c | 2 +- src/sulogin.c | 2 +- 14 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chfn.c b/src/chfn.c index fc529c0b..323fd43f 100644 --- a/src/chfn.c +++ b/src/chfn.c @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv) {NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'} }; - /* + /* * The remaining arguments will be processed one by one and executed * by this command. The name is the last argument if it does not * begin with a "-", otherwise the name is determined from the @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static void check_perms (const struct passwd *pw) /* * Non-privileged users are optionally authenticated (must enter the * password of the user whose information is being changed) before - * any changes can be made. Idea from util-linux chfn/chsh. + * any changes can be made. Idea from util-linux chfn/chsh. * --marekm */ if (!amroot && getdef_bool ("CHFN_AUTH")) { diff --git a/src/chgpasswd.c b/src/chgpasswd.c index 56f3e882..25dfc246 100644 --- a/src/chgpasswd.c +++ b/src/chgpasswd.c @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) newgr.gr_passwd = cp; } - /* + /* * The updated group file entry is then put back and will * be written to the group file later, after all the * other entries have been updated as well. diff --git a/src/expiry.c b/src/expiry.c index 1d200716..79db32ff 100644 --- a/src/expiry.c +++ b/src/expiry.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv) } } -/* +/* * expiry - check and enforce password expiration policy * * expiry checks (-c) the current password expiration and forces (-f) @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) sanitize_env (); - /* + /* * Start by disabling all of the keyboard signals. */ (void) signal (SIGHUP, catch_signals); diff --git a/src/groupdel.c b/src/groupdel.c index 5c893128..364cac8d 100644 --- a/src/groupdel.c +++ b/src/groupdel.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv) * main - groupdel command * * The syntax of the groupdel command is - * + * * groupdel group * * The named group will be deleted. diff --git a/src/groupmems.c b/src/groupmems.c index 654a8f3a..c2b25583 100644 --- a/src/groupmems.c +++ b/src/groupmems.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static bool sgr_locked = false; static char *whoami (void); static void add_user (const char *user, const struct group *grp); -static void remove_user (const char *user, +static void remove_user (const char *user, const struct group *grp); static void purge_members (const struct group *grp); static void display_members (const char *const *members); @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static void add_user (const char *user, /* * remove_user - Remove an user from a given group */ -static void remove_user (const char *user, +static void remove_user (const char *user, const struct group *grp) { struct group *newgrp; @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ static void close_files (void) #endif } -int main (int argc, char **argv) +int main (int argc, char **argv) { char *name; const struct group *grp; diff --git a/src/grpck.c b/src/grpck.c index b594851b..69bef036 100644 --- a/src/grpck.c +++ b/src/grpck.c @@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ static void check_sgr_file (int *errors, bool *changed) } /* - * All shadow group file deletions wind up here. + * All shadow group file deletions wind up here. * This code removes the current entry from the * linked list. When done, it skips back to the top * of the loop to try out the next list element. diff --git a/src/login_nopam.c b/src/login_nopam.c index 68a37755..241b77a5 100644 --- a/src/login_nopam.c +++ b/src/login_nopam.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted * provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such -* copies. +* copies. * * This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied * warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ * control based on login names and on host (or domain) names, internet * addresses (or network numbers), or on terminal line names in case of * non-networked logins. Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * + * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ #include diff --git a/src/logoutd.c b/src/logoutd.c index 780c29f8..02935a91 100644 --- a/src/logoutd.c +++ b/src/logoutd.c @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) */ while (true) { - /* + /* * Attempt to re-open the utmpx/utmp file. The file is only * open while it is being used. */ diff --git a/src/newgrp.c b/src/newgrp.c index 2b9293b4..730f47e8 100644 --- a/src/newgrp.c +++ b/src/newgrp.c @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) initflag = true; } if (!is_newgrp) { - /* + /* * Do the command line for everything that is * not "newgrp". */ @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) group = argv[0]; } else { /* - * get the group file entry for her login group id. + * get the group file entry for her login group id. * the entry must exist, simply to be annoying. * * Perhaps in the past, but the default behavior now depends on the @@ -595,17 +595,17 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) * now we put her in the new group. The password file entry for her * current user id has been gotten. If there was no optional group * argument she will have her real and effective group id set to the - * set to the value from her password file entry. + * set to the value from her password file entry. * * If run as newgrp, or as sg with no command, this process exec's - * an interactive subshell with the effective GID of the new group. + * an interactive subshell with the effective GID of the new group. * If run as sg with a command, that command is exec'ed in this * subshell. When this process terminates, either because the user * exits, or the command completes, the parent of this process * resumes with the current GID. * * If a group is explicitly specified on the command line, the - * interactive shell or command is run with that effective GID. + * interactive shell or command is run with that effective GID. * Access will be denied if no entry for that group can be found in * /etc/group. If the current user name appears in the members list * for that group, access will be granted immediately; if not, the @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) } #endif /* HAVE_SETGROUPS */ /* - * For splitted groups (due to limitations of NIS), check all + * For splitted groups (due to limitations of NIS), check all * groups of the same GID like the requested group for * membership of the current user. */ @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) #ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS /* * I am going to try to add her new group id to her concurrent group - * set. If the group id is already present i'll just skip this part. + * set. If the group id is already present i'll just skip this part. * If the group doesn't fit, i'll complain loudly and skip this * part. */ @@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) /* * The previous code, when run as newgrp, re-exec'ed the shell in - * the current process with the original gid on error conditions. + * the current process with the original gid on error conditions. * See the comment above. This historical behavior now has the * effect of creating unlogged extraneous shell layers when the * command line has an error or there is an authentication failure. @@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) if (NULL != group) { snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), "changing new-group=%s", group); - audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog, + audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog, audit_buf, NULL, (unsigned int) getuid (), 0); } else { diff --git a/src/newuidmap.c b/src/newuidmap.c index bdd9cadf..c9a92155 100644 --- a/src/newuidmap.c +++ b/src/newuidmap.c @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) (unsigned long) getuid ())); return EXIT_FAILURE; } - + /* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */ if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"), diff --git a/src/newusers.c b/src/newusers.c index 16bf7229..edbb4010 100644 --- a/src/newusers.c +++ b/src/newusers.c @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int add_user (const char *name, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) } #ifndef USE_PAM -/* +/* * update_passwd - update the password in the passwd entry * * Return 0 if successful. diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c index 9d33d25e..044bb51a 100644 --- a/src/passwd.c +++ b/src/passwd.c @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw) /* * If enabled, warn about weak passwords even if you are - * root (enter this password again to use it anyway). + * root (enter this password again to use it anyway). * --marekm */ if (amroot && !warned && getdef_bool ("PASS_ALWAYS_WARN") @@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) STRFCPY (crypt_passwd, cp); /* - * See if the user is permitted to change the password. + * See if the user is permitted to change the password. * Otherwise, go ahead and set a new password. */ check_password (pw, sp); diff --git a/src/suauth.c b/src/suauth.c index 619a593b..90e1807e 100644 --- a/src/suauth.c +++ b/src/suauth.c @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ #ifdef SU_ACCESS -/* Really, I could do with a few const char's here defining all the +/* Really, I could do with a few const char's here defining all the * strings output to the user or the syslog. -- chris */ static int applies (const char *, char *); diff --git a/src/sulogin.c b/src/sulogin.c index 8f181505..a5a150c1 100644 --- a/src/sulogin.c +++ b/src/sulogin.c @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static RETSIGTYPE catch_signals (unused int sig) /* * XXX - can't enter single user mode if root password is * empty. I think this doesn't happen very often :-). But - * it will work with standard getpass() (no NULL on EOF). + * it will work with standard getpass() (no NULL on EOF). * --marekm */ if ((NULL == cp) || ('\0' == *cp)) {