/* * Copyright 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include "rcsid.h" RCSID (PKG_VER "$Id: chsh.c,v 1.30 2005/07/24 15:22:45 kloczek Exp $") #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H #include #endif #include "defines.h" #include "exitcodes.h" #include "getdef.h" #include "nscd.h" #include "prototypes.h" #include "pwauth.h" #include "pwio.h" #ifdef USE_PAM #include "pam_defs.h" #endif #ifndef SHELLS_FILE #define SHELLS_FILE "/etc/shells" #endif /* global variables */ static char *Prog; /* Program name */ static int amroot; /* Real UID is root */ static char loginsh[BUFSIZ]; /* Name of new login shell */ /* external identifiers */ /* local function prototypes */ static void usage (void); static void new_fields (void); static int restricted_shell (const char *); /* * usage - print command line syntax and exit */ static void usage (void) { fprintf (stderr, _("Usage: %s [-s shell] [name]\n"), Prog); exit (E_USAGE); } /* * new_fields - change the user's login shell information interactively * * prompt the user for the login shell and change it according to the * response, or leave it alone if nothing was entered. */ static void new_fields (void) { printf (_("Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default\n")); change_field (loginsh, sizeof loginsh, _("Login Shell")); } /* * restricted_shell - return true if the named shell begins with 'r' or 'R' * * If the first letter of the filename is 'r' or 'R', the shell is * considered to be restricted. */ static int restricted_shell (const char *sh) { /* * Shells not listed in /etc/shells are considered to be restricted. * Changed this to avoid confusion with "rc" (the plan9 shell - not * restricted despite the name starting with 'r'). --marekm */ return !check_shell (sh); } /* * chsh - this command controls changes to the user's shell * * The only supported option is -s which permits the the login shell to * be set from the command line. */ int main (int argc, char **argv) { char *user; /* User name */ int flag; /* Current command line flag */ int sflg = 0; /* -s - set shell from command line */ const struct passwd *pw; /* Password entry from /etc/passwd */ struct passwd pwent; /* New password entry */ sanitize_env (); setlocale (LC_ALL, ""); bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR); textdomain (PACKAGE); /* * This command behaves different for root and non-root users. */ amroot = getuid () == 0; /* * Get the program name. The program name is used as a prefix to * most error messages. */ Prog = Basename (argv[0]); OPENLOG ("chsh"); /* * There is only one option, but use getopt() anyway to * keep things consistent. */ while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "s:")) != EOF) { switch (flag) { case 's': sflg++; STRFCPY (loginsh, optarg); break; default: usage (); } } /* * There should be only one remaining argument at most and it should * be the user's name. */ if (argc > optind + 1) usage (); /* * Get the name of the user to check. It is either the command line * name, or the name getlogin() returns. */ if (optind < argc) { user = argv[optind]; pw = getpwnam (user); if (!pw) { fprintf (stderr, _("%s: unknown user %s\n"), Prog, user); exit (1); } } else { pw = get_my_pwent (); if (!pw) { fprintf (stderr, _ ("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"), Prog); exit (1); } user = xstrdup (pw->pw_name); } #ifdef USE_NIS /* * Now we make sure this is a LOCAL password entry for this user ... */ if (__ispwNIS ()) { char *nis_domain; char *nis_master; fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot change user `%s' on NIS client.\n"), Prog, user); if (!yp_get_default_domain (&nis_domain) && !yp_master (nis_domain, "passwd.byname", &nis_master)) { fprintf (stderr, _ ("%s: `%s' is the NIS master for this client.\n"), Prog, nis_master); } exit (1); } #endif /* * Non-privileged users are only allowed to change the shell if the * UID of the user matches the current real UID. */ if (!amroot && pw->pw_uid != getuid ()) { SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "can't change shell for `%s'", user)); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("You may not change the shell for %s.\n"), user); exit (1); } /* * Non-privileged users are only allowed to change the shell if it * is not a restricted one. */ if (!amroot && restricted_shell (pw->pw_shell)) { SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "can't change shell for `%s'", user)); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("You may not change the shell for %s.\n"), user); exit (1); } #ifdef WITH_SELINUX /* * If the UID of the user does not match the current real UID, * check if the change is allowed by SELinux policy. */ if ((pw->pw_uid != getuid ()) && (checkPasswdAccess (PASSWD__CHSH) != 0)) { SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "can't change shell for `%s'", user)); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("You may not change the shell for %s.\n"), user); exit (1); } #endif #ifndef USE_PAM /* * Non-privileged users are optionally authenticated (must enter * the password of the user whose information is being changed) * before any changes can be made. Idea from util-linux * chfn/chsh. --marekm */ if (!amroot && getdef_bool ("CHSH_AUTH")) passwd_check (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_passwd, "chsh"); #endif /* !USE_PAM */ /* * Now get the login shell. Either get it from the password * file, or use the value from the command line. */ if (!sflg) STRFCPY (loginsh, pw->pw_shell); /* * If the login shell was not set on the command line, let the user * interactively change it. */ if (!sflg) { printf (_("Changing the login shell for %s\n"), user); new_fields (); } /* * Check all of the fields for valid information. The shell * field may not contain any illegal characters. Non-privileged * users are restricted to using the shells in /etc/shells. * The shell must be executable by the user. */ if (valid_field (loginsh, ":,=")) { fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Invalid entry: %s\n"), Prog, loginsh); closelog (); exit (1); } if (!amroot && (!check_shell (loginsh) || access (loginsh, X_OK) != 0)) { fprintf (stderr, _("%s is an invalid shell.\n"), loginsh); closelog (); exit (1); } /* * Before going any further, raise the ulimit to prevent * colliding into a lowered ulimit, and set the real UID * to root to protect against unexpected signals. Any * keyboard signals are set to be ignored. */ if (setuid (0)) { SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "can't setuid(0)")); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot change ID to root.\n")); exit (1); } pwd_init (); /* * The passwd entry is now ready to be committed back to * the password file. Get a lock on the file and open it. */ if (!pw_lock ()) { SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "can't lock /etc/passwd")); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _ ("Cannot lock the password file; try again later.\n")); exit (1); } if (!pw_open (O_RDWR)) { SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "can't open /etc/passwd")); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot open the password file.\n")); pw_unlock (); exit (1); } /* * Get the entry to update using pw_locate() - we want the real * one from /etc/passwd, not the one from getpwnam() which could * contain the shadow password if (despite the warnings) someone * enables AUTOSHADOW (or SHADOW_COMPAT in libc). --marekm */ pw = pw_locate (user); if (!pw) { pw_unlock (); fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s not found in /etc/passwd\n"), Prog, user); exit (1); } /* * Make a copy of the entry, then change the shell field. The other * fields remain unchanged. */ pwent = *pw; pwent.pw_shell = loginsh; /* * Update the passwd file entry. If there is a DBM file, update * that entry as well. */ if (!pw_update (&pwent)) { SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "error updating passwd entry")); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("Error updating the password entry.\n")); pw_unlock (); exit (1); } /* * Changes have all been made, so commit them and unlock the file. */ if (!pw_close ()) { SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "can't rewrite /etc/passwd")); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot commit password file changes.\n")); pw_unlock (); exit (1); } if (!pw_unlock ()) { SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "can't unlock /etc/passwd")); closelog (); fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot unlock the password file.\n")); exit (1); } SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user `%s' shell to `%s'", user, loginsh)); nscd_flush_cache ("passwd"); closelog (); exit (E_SUCCESS); }