seedrng: it's not a part of util-linux, move to miscutils
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Denys Vlasenko
239
miscutils/seedrng.c
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239
miscutils/seedrng.c
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* SeedRNG is a simple program made for seeding the Linux kernel random number
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* generator from seed files. It is is useful in light of the fact that the
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* Linux kernel RNG cannot be initialized from shell scripts, and new seeds
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* cannot be safely generated from boot time shell scripts either. It should
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* be run once at init time and once at shutdown time. It can be run at other
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* times on a timer as well. Whenever it is run, it writes existing seed files
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* into the RNG pool, and then creates a new seed file. If the RNG is
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* initialized at the time of creating a new seed file, then that new seed file
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* is marked as "creditable", which means it can be used to initialize the RNG.
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* Otherwise, it is marked as "non-creditable", in which case it is still used
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* to seed the RNG's pool, but will not initialize the RNG. In order to ensure
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* that entropy only ever stays the same or increases from one seed file to the
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* next, old seed values are hashed together with new seed values when writing
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* new seed files.
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*
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* This is based on code from <https://git.zx2c4.com/seedrng/about/>.
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*/
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//config:config SEEDRNG
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//config: bool "seedrng (1.3 kb)"
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//config: default y
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//config: help
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//config: Seed the kernel RNG from seed files, meant to be called
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//config: once during startup, once during shutdown, and optionally
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//config: at some periodic interval in between.
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//applet:IF_SEEDRNG(APPLET(seedrng, BB_DIR_USR_SBIN, BB_SUID_DROP))
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//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_SEEDRNG) += seedrng.o
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//usage:#define seedrng_trivial_usage
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//usage: "[-d DIR] [-n]"
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//usage:#define seedrng_full_usage "\n\n"
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//usage: "Seed the kernel RNG from seed files"
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//usage: "\n"
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//usage: "\n -d DIR Use seed files in DIR (default: /var/lib/seedrng)"
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//usage: "\n -n Do not credit randomness, even if creditable"
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#include "libbb.h"
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <sys/random.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
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#ifndef GRND_INSECURE
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#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004 /* Apparently some headers don't ship with this yet. */
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#endif
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#define DEFAULT_SEED_DIR "/var/lib/seedrng"
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#define CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.credit"
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#define NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.no-credit"
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enum {
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MIN_SEED_LEN = SHA256_OUTSIZE,
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/* kernels < 5.18 could return short reads from getrandom()
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* if signal is pending and length is > 256.
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* Let's limit our reads to 256 bytes.
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*/
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MAX_SEED_LEN = 256,
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};
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static size_t determine_optimal_seed_len(void)
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{
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char poolsize_str[12];
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unsigned poolsize;
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int n;
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n = open_read_close("/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize", poolsize_str, sizeof(poolsize_str) - 1);
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if (n < 0) {
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bb_perror_msg("can't determine pool size, assuming %u bits", MIN_SEED_LEN * 8);
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return MIN_SEED_LEN;
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}
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poolsize_str[n] = '\0';
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poolsize = (bb_strtou(poolsize_str, NULL, 10) + 7) / 8;
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return MAX(MIN(poolsize, MAX_SEED_LEN), MIN_SEED_LEN);
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}
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static bool read_new_seed(uint8_t *seed, size_t len)
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{
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bool is_creditable;
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ssize_t ret;
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ret = getrandom(seed, len, GRND_NONBLOCK);
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if (ret == (ssize_t)len) {
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return true;
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}
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if (ret < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) {
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int fd = xopen("/dev/random", O_RDONLY);
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struct pollfd random_fd;
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random_fd.fd = fd;
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random_fd.events = POLLIN;
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is_creditable = poll(&random_fd, 1, 0) == 1;
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//This is racy. is_creditable can be set to true here, but other process
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//can consume "good" random data from /dev/urandom before we do it below.
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close(fd);
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} else {
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if (getrandom(seed, len, GRND_INSECURE) == (ssize_t)len)
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return false;
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is_creditable = false;
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}
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/* Either getrandom() is not implemented, or
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* getrandom(GRND_INSECURE) did not give us LEN bytes.
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* Fallback to reading /dev/urandom.
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*/
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errno = 0;
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if (open_read_close("/dev/urandom", seed, len) != (ssize_t)len)
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bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't read '%s'", "/dev/urandom");
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return is_creditable;
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}
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static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit, sha256_ctx_t *hash)
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{
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struct {
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int entropy_count;
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int buf_size;
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uint8_t buf[MAX_SEED_LEN];
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} req;
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ssize_t seed_len;
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seed_len = open_read_close(filename, req.buf, sizeof(req.buf));
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if (seed_len < 0) {
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if (errno != ENOENT)
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bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't read '%s'", filename);
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return;
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}
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xunlink(filename);
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if (seed_len != 0) {
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int fd;
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/* We are going to use this data to seed the RNG:
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* we believe it to genuinely containing entropy.
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* If this just-unlinked file survives
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* (e.g. if machine crashes _right now_)
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* and we reuse it after reboot, this assumption
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* would be violated. Fsync the directory to
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* make sure file is gone:
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*/
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fsync(dfd);
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//Length is not random, and taking its address spills variable to stack
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// sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len));
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sha256_hash(hash, req.buf, seed_len);
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req.buf_size = seed_len;
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seed_len *= 8;
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req.entropy_count = credit ? seed_len : 0;
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printf("Seeding %u bits %s crediting\n",
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(unsigned)seed_len, credit ? "and" : "without");
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fd = xopen("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
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xioctl(fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &req);
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if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP)
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close(fd);
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}
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}
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int seedrng_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
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int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
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{
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const char *seed_dir;
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int fd, dfd;
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int i;
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unsigned opts;
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uint8_t new_seed[MAX_SEED_LEN];
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size_t new_seed_len;
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bool new_seed_creditable;
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struct timespec timestamp;
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sha256_ctx_t hash;
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enum {
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OPT_n = (1 << 0), /* must be 1 */
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OPT_d = (1 << 1),
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};
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#if ENABLE_LONG_OPTS
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static const char longopts[] ALIGN1 =
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"skip-credit\0" No_argument "n"
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"seed-dir\0" Required_argument "d"
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;
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#endif
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seed_dir = DEFAULT_SEED_DIR;
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opts = getopt32long(argv, "nd:", longopts, &seed_dir);
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umask(0077);
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if (getuid() != 0)
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bb_simple_error_msg_and_die(bb_msg_you_must_be_root);
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if (mkdir(seed_dir, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
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bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create directory '%s'", seed_dir);
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dfd = xopen(seed_dir, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
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xfchdir(dfd);
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/* Concurrent runs of this tool might feed the same data to RNG twice.
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* Avoid concurrent runs by taking a blocking lock on the directory.
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* Not checking for errors. Looking at manpage,
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* ENOLCK "The kernel ran out of memory for allocating lock records"
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* seems to be the only one which is likely - and if that happens,
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* machine is OOMing (much worse problem than inability to lock...).
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* Also, typically configured Linux machines do not fail GFP_KERNEL
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* allocations (they trigger memory reclaim instead).
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*/
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flock(dfd, LOCK_EX); /* would block while another copy runs */
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sha256_begin(&hash);
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sha256_hash(&hash, "SeedRNG v1 Old+New Prefix", 25);
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clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ×tamp);
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sha256_hash(&hash, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp));
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clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×tamp);
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sha256_hash(&hash, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp));
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for (i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {
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seed_from_file_if_exists(i == 0 ? NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME : CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME,
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dfd,
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/* credit? */ (opts ^ OPT_n) & i, /* 0, then 1 unless -n */
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&hash);
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}
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new_seed_len = determine_optimal_seed_len();
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new_seed_creditable = read_new_seed(new_seed, new_seed_len);
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//Length is not random, and taking its address spills variable to stack
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// sha256_hash(&hash, &new_seed_len, sizeof(new_seed_len));
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sha256_hash(&hash, new_seed, new_seed_len);
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sha256_end(&hash, new_seed + new_seed_len - SHA256_OUTSIZE);
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printf("Saving %u bits of %screditable seed for next boot\n",
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(unsigned)new_seed_len * 8, new_seed_creditable ? "" : "non-");
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fd = xopen3(NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0400);
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xwrite(fd, new_seed, new_seed_len);
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if (new_seed_creditable) {
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/* More paranoia when we create a file which we believe contains
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* genuine entropy: make sure disk is not full, quota isn't exceeded, etc:
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*/
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if (fsync(fd) < 0)
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bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't write '%s'", NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME);
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xrename(NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME, CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME);
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}
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return EXIT_SUCCESS;
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}
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