It is impossible to formulate sane ABI based on
size of ulong because it can be 32-bit or 64-bit.
Basically it means that you cannot portably use
more that 32 option chars in one call anyway...
Make it explicit.
things like xasprintf() into xfuncs.c, remove xprint_file_by_name() (it only
had one user), clean up lots of #includes... General cleanup pass. What I've
been doing for the last couple days.
And it conflicts! I've removed httpd.c from this checkin due to somebody else
touching that file. It builds for me. I have to catch a bus. (Now you know
why I'm looking forward to Mercurial.)
fix than his, and shrank the code a bit on top of that so the net size is
smaller, and added a test to the test suite for this case. Plus I cleaned up
the #includes and removed unnecessary "const"s while I was there.
error: static declaration of 'free_and_close_stuff' follows non-static declaration
Tiny whitespace cleanup while at it,
also make sure that we don't use CONFIG_ anymore.
Rob, hope this is ok w/ you..
This patch implements the 'T' command in sed. This is a GNU extension,
but one of the udev hotplug scripts uses it, so I need it in busybox
anyway.
Includes a test; 'svn add testsuite/sed/sed-branch-conditional-inverted'
after applying.
While the permissions on the temp file are correct to prevent it from being
maliciously mangled by passing strangers, (created with 600, opened O_EXCL,
etc), the permissions on the _directory_ might not be, and we re-open the
file to convert the filehandle to a FILE * (and automatically get an error
message and exit if the directory's read-only or out of space or some such).
This opens a potential race condition if somebody's using dnotify on the
directory, deletes/renames the tempfile, and drops a symlink or something
there. Somebody running sed -i as root in a world writeable directory could
do damage.
I dug up notes on an earlier discussion where we looked at the security
implications of this (unfortunately on the #uclibc channel rather than email;
I don't have a transcript, just notes-to-self) which pointed out that if the
permissions on the directory allow other people's files to be deleted/renamed
then the original file is vulnerable to sabotage anyway. However, there are
two cases that discussion apparently didn't take into account:
1) Using another user's permissions to damage files in other directories you
can't access (standard symlink attack).
2) Reading data another user couldn't otherwise access by having the new file
belong to that other user.
This patch uses fdopen to convert the filehandle into a FILE *, rather than
reopening the file.
