busybox/mailutils/sendmail.c
Aaro Koskinen 14285d14a5 sendmail: avoid sending mail to wrong addresses
If we get an address we cannot parse properly, we currently just strip
the unknown characters and still try to send it. This is considered
harmful as the resulting address may still be valid but different from
what the user originally intended.

Instead, skip sending to an address we cannot fully understand and
print the characters what we have scanned so far. Leading and trailing
whitespace is allowed and silently stripped.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
2013-03-18 18:45:13 +01:00

373 lines
12 KiB
C

/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
/*
* bare bones sendmail
*
* Copyright (C) 2008 by Vladimir Dronnikov <dronnikov@gmail.com>
*
* Licensed under GPLv2, see file LICENSE in this source tree.
*/
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_SENDMAIL) += sendmail.o mail.o
//usage:#define sendmail_trivial_usage
//usage: "[OPTIONS] [RECIPIENT_EMAIL]..."
//usage:#define sendmail_full_usage "\n\n"
//usage: "Read email from stdin and send it\n"
//usage: "\nStandard options:"
//usage: "\n -t Read additional recipients from message body"
//usage: "\n -f SENDER Sender (required)"
//usage: "\n -o OPTIONS Various options. -oi implied, others are ignored"
//usage: "\n -i -oi synonym. implied and ignored"
//usage: "\n"
//usage: "\nBusybox specific options:"
//usage: "\n -v Verbose"
//usage: "\n -w SECS Network timeout"
//usage: "\n -H 'PROG ARGS' Run connection helper"
//usage: "\n Examples:"
//usage: "\n -H 'exec openssl s_client -quiet -tls1 -starttls smtp"
//usage: "\n -connect smtp.gmail.com:25' <email.txt"
//usage: "\n [4<username_and_passwd.txt | -auUSER -apPASS]"
//usage: "\n -H 'exec openssl s_client -quiet -tls1"
//usage: "\n -connect smtp.gmail.com:465' <email.txt"
//usage: "\n [4<username_and_passwd.txt | -auUSER -apPASS]"
//usage: "\n -S HOST[:PORT] Server"
//usage: "\n -auUSER Username for AUTH LOGIN"
//usage: "\n -apPASS Password for AUTH LOGIN"
////usage: "\n -amMETHOD Authentication method. Ignored. LOGIN is implied"
//usage: "\n"
//usage: "\nOther options are silently ignored; -oi -t is implied"
//usage: IF_MAKEMIME(
//usage: "\nUse makemime to create emails with attachments"
//usage: )
#include "libbb.h"
#include "mail.h"
// limit maximum allowed number of headers to prevent overflows.
// set to 0 to not limit
#define MAX_HEADERS 256
static void send_r_n(const char *s)
{
if (verbose)
bb_error_msg("send:'%s'", s);
printf("%s\r\n", s);
}
static int smtp_checkp(const char *fmt, const char *param, int code)
{
char *answer;
char *msg = send_mail_command(fmt, param);
// read stdin
// if the string has a form NNN- -- read next string. E.g. EHLO response
// parse first bytes to a number
// if code = -1 then just return this number
// if code != -1 then checks whether the number equals the code
// if not equal -> die saying msg
while ((answer = xmalloc_fgetline(stdin)) != NULL) {
if (verbose)
bb_error_msg("recv:'%.*s'", (int)(strchrnul(answer, '\r') - answer), answer);
if (strlen(answer) <= 3 || '-' != answer[3])
break;
free(answer);
}
if (answer) {
int n = atoi(answer);
if (timeout)
alarm(0);
free(answer);
if (-1 == code || n == code) {
free(msg);
return n;
}
}
bb_error_msg_and_die("%s failed", msg);
}
static int smtp_check(const char *fmt, int code)
{
return smtp_checkp(fmt, NULL, code);
}
// strip argument of bad chars
static char *sane_address(char *str)
{
char *s = str;
char *p = s;
int leading_space = 1;
int trailing_space = 0;
while (*s) {
if (isspace(*s)) {
trailing_space = !leading_space;
} else {
*p++ = *s;
if ((!isalnum(*s) && !strchr("_-.@", *s)) ||
trailing_space) {
*p = '\0';
bb_error_msg("Bad address: %s", str);
*str = '\0';
return str;
}
leading_space = 0;
}
s++;
}
*p = '\0';
return str;
}
static void rcptto(const char *s)
{
if (!*s)
return;
// N.B. we don't die if recipient is rejected, for the other recipients may be accepted
if (250 != smtp_checkp("RCPT TO:<%s>", s, -1))
bb_error_msg("Bad recipient: <%s>", s);
}
int sendmail_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
int sendmail_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
char *opt_connect = opt_connect;
char *opt_from;
char *s;
llist_t *list = NULL;
char *host = sane_address(safe_gethostname());
unsigned nheaders = 0;
int code;
enum {
//--- standard options
OPT_t = 1 << 0, // read message for recipients, append them to those on cmdline
OPT_f = 1 << 1, // sender address
OPT_o = 1 << 2, // various options. -oi IMPLIED! others are IGNORED!
OPT_i = 1 << 3, // IMPLIED!
//--- BB specific options
OPT_w = 1 << 4, // network timeout
OPT_H = 1 << 5, // use external connection helper
OPT_S = 1 << 6, // specify connection string
OPT_a = 1 << 7, // authentication tokens
OPT_v = 1 << 8, // verbosity
};
// init global variables
INIT_G();
// save initial stdin since body is piped!
xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, 3);
G.fp0 = xfdopen_for_read(3);
// parse options
// -v is a counter, -f is required. -H and -S are mutually exclusive, -a is a list
opt_complementary = "vv:f:w+:H--S:S--H:a::";
// N.B. since -H and -S are mutually exclusive they do not interfere in opt_connect
// -a is for ssmtp (http://downloads.openwrt.org/people/nico/man/man8/ssmtp.8.html) compatibility,
// it is still under development.
opts = getopt32(argv, "tf:o:iw:H:S:a::v", &opt_from, NULL,
&timeout, &opt_connect, &opt_connect, &list, &verbose);
//argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
// process -a[upm]<token> options
if ((opts & OPT_a) && !list)
bb_show_usage();
while (list) {
char *a = (char *) llist_pop(&list);
if ('u' == a[0])
G.user = xstrdup(a+1);
if ('p' == a[0])
G.pass = xstrdup(a+1);
// N.B. we support only AUTH LOGIN so far
//if ('m' == a[0])
// G.method = xstrdup(a+1);
}
// N.B. list == NULL here
//bb_info_msg("OPT[%x] AU[%s], AP[%s], AM[%s], ARGV[%s]", opts, au, ap, am, *argv);
// connect to server
// connection helper ordered? ->
if (opts & OPT_H) {
const char *args[] = { "sh", "-c", opt_connect, NULL };
// plug it in
launch_helper(args);
// Now:
// our stdout will go to helper's stdin,
// helper's stdout will be available on our stdin.
// Wait for initial server message.
// If helper (such as openssl) invokes STARTTLS, the initial 220
// is swallowed by helper (and not repeated after TLS is initiated).
// We will send NOOP cmd to server and check the response.
// We should get 220+250 on plain connection, 250 on STARTTLSed session.
//
// The problem here is some servers delay initial 220 message,
// and consider client to be a spammer if it starts sending cmds
// before 220 reached it. The code below is unsafe in this regard:
// in non-STARTTLSed case, we potentially send NOOP before 220
// is sent by server.
// Ideas? (--delay SECS opt? --assume-starttls-helper opt?)
code = smtp_check("NOOP", -1);
if (code == 220)
// we got 220 - this is not STARTTLSed connection,
// eat 250 response to our NOOP
smtp_check(NULL, 250);
else
if (code != 250)
bb_error_msg_and_die("SMTP init failed");
} else {
// vanilla connection
int fd;
// host[:port] not explicitly specified? -> use $SMTPHOST
// no $SMTPHOST? -> use localhost
if (!(opts & OPT_S)) {
opt_connect = getenv("SMTPHOST");
if (!opt_connect)
opt_connect = (char *)"127.0.0.1";
}
// do connect
fd = create_and_connect_stream_or_die(opt_connect, 25);
// and make ourselves a simple IO filter
xmove_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
// Wait for initial server 220 message
smtp_check(NULL, 220);
}
// we should start with modern EHLO
if (250 != smtp_checkp("EHLO %s", host, -1))
smtp_checkp("HELO %s", host, 250);
free(host);
// perform authentication
if (opts & OPT_a) {
smtp_check("AUTH LOGIN", 334);
// we must read credentials unless they are given via -a[up] options
if (!G.user || !G.pass)
get_cred_or_die(4);
encode_base64(NULL, G.user, NULL);
smtp_check("", 334);
encode_base64(NULL, G.pass, NULL);
smtp_check("", 235);
}
// set sender
// N.B. we have here a very loosely defined algorythm
// since sendmail historically offers no means to specify secrets on cmdline.
// 1) server can require no authentication ->
// we must just provide a (possibly fake) reply address.
// 2) server can require AUTH ->
// we must provide valid username and password along with a (possibly fake) reply address.
// For the sake of security username and password are to be read either from console or from a secured file.
// Since reading from console may defeat usability, the solution is either to read from a predefined
// file descriptor (e.g. 4), or again from a secured file.
// got no sender address? -> use system username as a resort
// N.B. we marked -f as required option!
//if (!G.user) {
// // N.B. IMHO getenv("USER") can be way easily spoofed!
// G.user = xuid2uname(getuid());
// opt_from = xasprintf("%s@%s", G.user, domain);
//}
smtp_checkp("MAIL FROM:<%s>", opt_from, 250);
// process message
// read recipients from message and add them to those given on cmdline.
// this means we scan stdin for To:, Cc:, Bcc: lines until an empty line
// and then use the rest of stdin as message body
code = 0; // set "analyze headers" mode
while ((s = xmalloc_fgetline(G.fp0)) != NULL) {
dump:
// put message lines doubling leading dots
if (code) {
// escape leading dots
// N.B. this feature is implied even if no -i (-oi) switch given
// N.B. we need to escape the leading dot regardless of
// whether it is single or not character on the line
if ('.' == s[0] /*&& '\0' == s[1] */)
printf(".");
// dump read line
send_r_n(s);
free(s);
continue;
}
// analyze headers
// To: or Cc: headers add recipients
if (opts & OPT_t) {
if (0 == strncasecmp("To:", s, 3) || 0 == strncasecmp("Bcc:" + 1, s, 3)) {
rcptto(sane_address(s+3));
goto addheader;
}
// Bcc: header adds blind copy (hidden) recipient
if (0 == strncasecmp("Bcc:", s, 4)) {
rcptto(sane_address(s+4));
free(s);
continue; // N.B. Bcc: vanishes from headers!
}
}
if (strchr(s, ':') || (list && isspace(s[0]))) {
// other headers go verbatim
// N.B. RFC2822 2.2.3 "Long Header Fields" allows for headers to occupy several lines.
// Continuation is denoted by prefixing additional lines with whitespace(s).
// Thanks (stefan.seyfried at googlemail.com) for pointing this out.
addheader:
// N.B. we allow MAX_HEADERS generic headers at most to prevent attacks
if (MAX_HEADERS && ++nheaders >= MAX_HEADERS)
goto bail;
llist_add_to_end(&list, s);
} else {
// a line without ":" (an empty line too, by definition) doesn't look like a valid header
// so stop "analyze headers" mode
reenter:
// put recipients specified on cmdline
while (*argv) {
char *t = sane_address(*argv);
rcptto(t);
//if (MAX_HEADERS && ++nheaders >= MAX_HEADERS)
// goto bail;
llist_add_to_end(&list, xasprintf("To: %s", t));
argv++;
}
// enter "put message" mode
// N.B. DATA fails iff no recipients were accepted (or even provided)
// in this case just bail out gracefully
if (354 != smtp_check("DATA", -1))
goto bail;
// dump the headers
while (list) {
send_r_n((char *) llist_pop(&list));
}
// stop analyzing headers
code++;
// N.B. !s means: we read nothing, and nothing to be read in the future.
// just dump empty line and break the loop
if (!s) {
send_r_n("");
break;
}
// go dump message body
// N.B. "s" already contains the first non-header line, so pretend we read it from input
goto dump;
}
}
// odd case: we didn't stop "analyze headers" mode -> message body is empty. Reenter the loop
// N.B. after reenter code will be > 0
if (!code)
goto reenter;
// finalize the message
smtp_check(".", 250);
bail:
// ... and say goodbye
smtp_check("QUIT", 221);
// cleanup
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP)
fclose(G.fp0);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}