busybox/loginutils/login.c
Denys Vlasenko 6331cf059c *: use "can't" instead of "cannot"
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
2009-11-13 09:08:27 +01:00

518 lines
14 KiB
C

/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
/*
* Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this tarball for details.
*/
#include "libbb.h"
#include <syslog.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#if ENABLE_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h> /* for is_selinux_enabled() */
#include <selinux/get_context_list.h> /* for get_default_context() */
#include <selinux/flask.h> /* for security class definitions */
#endif
#if ENABLE_PAM
/* PAM may include <locale.h>. We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */
#undef setlocale
/* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx.
* Apparently they like to confuse people. */
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/pam_misc.h>
static const struct pam_conv conv = {
misc_conv,
NULL
};
#endif
enum {
TIMEOUT = 60,
EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT = 10,
USERNAME_SIZE = 32,
TTYNAME_SIZE = 32,
};
static char* short_tty;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
/* vv Taken from tinylogin utmp.c vv */
/*
* read_or_build_utent - see if utmp file is correct for this process
*
* System V is very picky about the contents of the utmp file
* and requires that a slot for the current process exist.
* The utmp file is scanned for an entry with the same process
* ID. If no entry exists the process exits with a message.
*
* The "picky" flag is for network and other logins that may
* use special flags. It allows the pid checks to be overridden.
* This means that getty should never invoke login with any
* command line flags.
*/
static void read_or_build_utent(struct utmp *utptr, int run_by_root)
{
struct utmp *ut;
pid_t pid = getpid();
setutent();
/* First, try to find a valid utmp entry for this process. */
/* If there is one, just use it. */
while ((ut = getutent()) != NULL)
if (ut->ut_pid == pid && ut->ut_line[0] && ut->ut_id[0]
&& (ut->ut_type == LOGIN_PROCESS || ut->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
) {
*utptr = *ut; /* struct copy */
if (run_by_root) /* why only for root? */
memset(utptr->ut_host, 0, sizeof(utptr->ut_host));
return;
}
// Why? Do we require non-root to exec login from another
// former login process (e.g. login shell)? Some login's have
// login shells as children, so it won't work...
// if (!run_by_root)
// bb_error_msg_and_die("no utmp entry found");
/* Otherwise create a new one. */
memset(utptr, 0, sizeof(*utptr));
utptr->ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
utptr->ut_pid = pid;
strncpy(utptr->ut_line, short_tty, sizeof(utptr->ut_line));
/* This one is only 4 chars wide. Try to fit something
* remotely meaningful by skipping "tty"... */
strncpy(utptr->ut_id, short_tty + 3, sizeof(utptr->ut_id));
strncpy(utptr->ut_user, "LOGIN", sizeof(utptr->ut_user));
utptr->ut_tv.tv_sec = time(NULL);
}
/*
* write_utent - put a USER_PROCESS entry in the utmp file
*
* write_utent changes the type of the current utmp entry to
* USER_PROCESS. the wtmp file will be updated as well.
*/
static void write_utent(struct utmp *utptr, const char *username)
{
utptr->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
strncpy(utptr->ut_user, username, sizeof(utptr->ut_user));
utptr->ut_tv.tv_sec = time(NULL);
/* other fields already filled in by read_or_build_utent above */
setutent();
pututline(utptr);
endutent();
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_WTMP
if (access(bb_path_wtmp_file, R_OK|W_OK) == -1) {
close(creat(bb_path_wtmp_file, 0664));
}
updwtmp(bb_path_wtmp_file, utptr);
#endif
}
#else /* !ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP */
#define read_or_build_utent(utptr, run_by_root) ((void)0)
#define write_utent(utptr, username) ((void)0)
#endif /* !ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP */
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_NOLOGIN
static void die_if_nologin(void)
{
FILE *fp;
int c;
int empty = 1;
fp = fopen_for_read("/etc/nologin");
if (!fp) /* assuming it does not exist */
return;
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF) {
if (c == '\n')
bb_putchar('\r');
bb_putchar(c);
empty = 0;
}
if (empty)
puts("\r\nSystem closed for routine maintenance\r");
fclose(fp);
fflush_all();
/* Users say that they do need this prior to exit: */
tcdrain(STDOUT_FILENO);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#else
static ALWAYS_INLINE void die_if_nologin(void) {}
#endif
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SECURETTY && !ENABLE_PAM
static int check_securetty(void)
{
char *buf = (char*)"/etc/securetty"; /* any non-NULL is ok */
parser_t *parser = config_open2("/etc/securetty", fopen_for_read);
while (config_read(parser, &buf, 1, 1, "# \t", PARSE_NORMAL)) {
if (strcmp(buf, short_tty) == 0)
break;
buf = NULL;
}
config_close(parser);
/* buf != NULL here if config file was not found, empty
* or line was found which equals short_tty */
return buf != NULL;
}
#else
static ALWAYS_INLINE int check_securetty(void) { return 1; }
#endif
#if ENABLE_SELINUX
static void initselinux(char *username, char *full_tty,
security_context_t *user_sid)
{
security_context_t old_tty_sid, new_tty_sid;
if (!is_selinux_enabled())
return;
if (get_default_context(username, NULL, user_sid)) {
bb_error_msg_and_die("can't get SID for %s", username);
}
if (getfilecon(full_tty, &old_tty_sid) < 0) {
bb_perror_msg_and_die("getfilecon(%s) failed", full_tty);
}
if (security_compute_relabel(*user_sid, old_tty_sid,
SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0) {
bb_perror_msg_and_die("security_change_sid(%s) failed", full_tty);
}
if (setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0) {
bb_perror_msg_and_die("chsid(%s, %s) failed", full_tty, new_tty_sid);
}
}
#endif
#if ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS
static void run_login_script(struct passwd *pw, char *full_tty)
{
char *t_argv[2];
t_argv[0] = getenv("LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT");
if (t_argv[0]) {
t_argv[1] = NULL;
xsetenv("LOGIN_TTY", full_tty);
xsetenv("LOGIN_USER", pw->pw_name);
xsetenv("LOGIN_UID", utoa(pw->pw_uid));
xsetenv("LOGIN_GID", utoa(pw->pw_gid));
xsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL", pw->pw_shell);
spawn_and_wait(t_argv); /* NOMMU-friendly */
unsetenv("LOGIN_TTY");
unsetenv("LOGIN_USER");
unsetenv("LOGIN_UID");
unsetenv("LOGIN_GID");
unsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL");
}
}
#else
void run_login_script(struct passwd *pw, char *full_tty);
#endif
static void get_username_or_die(char *buf, int size_buf)
{
int c, cntdown;
cntdown = EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT;
prompt:
print_login_prompt();
/* skip whitespace */
do {
c = getchar();
if (c == EOF)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
if (c == '\n') {
if (!--cntdown)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
goto prompt;
}
} while (isspace(c)); /* maybe isblank? */
*buf++ = c;
if (!fgets(buf, size_buf-2, stdin))
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
if (!strchr(buf, '\n'))
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
while ((unsigned char)*buf > ' ')
buf++;
*buf = '\0';
}
static void motd(void)
{
int fd;
fd = open(bb_path_motd_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
fflush_all();
bb_copyfd_eof(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
close(fd);
}
}
static void alarm_handler(int sig UNUSED_PARAM)
{
/* This is the escape hatch! Poor serial line users and the like
* arrive here when their connection is broken.
* We don't want to block here */
ndelay_on(1);
printf("\r\nLogin timed out after %d seconds\r\n", TIMEOUT);
fflush_all();
/* unix API is brain damaged regarding O_NONBLOCK,
* we should undo it, or else we can affect other processes */
ndelay_off(1);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int login_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
enum {
LOGIN_OPT_f = (1<<0),
LOGIN_OPT_h = (1<<1),
LOGIN_OPT_p = (1<<2),
};
char *fromhost;
char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
const char *tmp;
int run_by_root;
unsigned opt;
int count = 0;
struct passwd *pw;
char *opt_host = opt_host; /* for compiler */
char *opt_user = opt_user; /* for compiler */
char *full_tty;
IF_SELINUX(security_context_t user_sid = NULL;)
IF_FEATURE_UTMP(struct utmp utent;)
#if ENABLE_PAM
int pamret;
pam_handle_t *pamh;
const char *pamuser;
const char *failed_msg;
struct passwd pwdstruct;
char pwdbuf[256];
#endif
username[0] = '\0';
signal(SIGALRM, alarm_handler);
alarm(TIMEOUT);
/* More of suid paranoia if called by non-root: */
/* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
run_by_root = !sanitize_env_if_suid();
/* Mandatory paranoia for suid applet:
* ensure that fd# 0,1,2 are opened (at least to /dev/null)
* and any extra open fd's are closed.
* (The name of the function is misleading. Not daemonizing here.) */
bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE | DAEMON_CLOSE_EXTRA_FDS, NULL);
opt = getopt32(argv, "f:h:p", &opt_user, &opt_host);
if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) {
if (!run_by_root)
bb_error_msg_and_die("-f is for root only");
safe_strncpy(username, opt_user, sizeof(username));
}
argv += optind;
if (argv[0]) /* user from command line (getty) */
safe_strncpy(username, argv[0], sizeof(username));
/* Let's find out and memorize our tty */
if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || !isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) || !isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
return EXIT_FAILURE; /* Must be a terminal */
full_tty = xmalloc_ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
if (!full_tty)
full_tty = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
short_tty = full_tty;
if (strncmp(full_tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
short_tty += 5;
read_or_build_utent(&utent, run_by_root);
if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_h) {
IF_FEATURE_UTMP(safe_strncpy(utent.ut_host, opt_host, sizeof(utent.ut_host));)
fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s' from '%s'", short_tty, opt_host);
} else {
fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s'", short_tty);
}
/* Was breaking "login <username>" from shell command line: */
/*bb_setpgrp();*/
openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTH);
while (1) {
/* flush away any type-ahead (as getty does) */
ioctl(0, TCFLSH, TCIFLUSH);
if (!username[0])
get_username_or_die(username, sizeof(username));
#if ENABLE_PAM
pamret = pam_start("login", username, &conv, &pamh);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "start";
goto pam_auth_failed;
}
/* set TTY (so things like securetty work) */
pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, short_tty);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "set_item(TTY)";
goto pam_auth_failed;
}
pamret = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "authenticate";
goto pam_auth_failed;
/* TODO: or just "goto auth_failed"
* since user seems to enter wrong password
* (in this case pamret == 7)
*/
}
/* check that the account is healthy */
pamret = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "acct_mgmt";
goto pam_auth_failed;
}
/* read user back */
pamuser = NULL;
/* gcc: "dereferencing type-punned pointer breaks aliasing rules..."
* thus we cast to (void*) */
if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void*)&pamuser) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "get_item(USER)";
goto pam_auth_failed;
}
if (!pamuser || !pamuser[0])
goto auth_failed;
safe_strncpy(username, pamuser, sizeof(username));
/* Don't use "pw = getpwnam(username);",
* PAM is said to be capable of destroying static storage
* used by getpwnam(). We are using safe(r) function */
pw = NULL;
getpwnam_r(username, &pwdstruct, pwdbuf, sizeof(pwdbuf), &pw);
if (!pw)
goto auth_failed;
pamret = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "open_session";
goto pam_auth_failed;
}
pamret = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
failed_msg = "setcred";
goto pam_auth_failed;
}
break; /* success, continue login process */
pam_auth_failed:
/* syslog, because we don't want potential attacker
* to know _why_ login failed */
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "pam_%s call failed: %s (%d)", failed_msg,
pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret);
safe_strncpy(username, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(username));
#else /* not PAM */
pw = getpwnam(username);
if (!pw) {
strcpy(username, "UNKNOWN");
goto fake_it;
}
if (pw->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pw->pw_passwd[0] == '*')
goto auth_failed;
if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f)
break; /* -f USER: success without asking passwd */
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && !check_securetty())
goto auth_failed;
/* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */
if (!pw->pw_passwd[0])
break;
fake_it:
/* authorization takes place here */
if (correct_password(pw))
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PAM */
auth_failed:
opt &= ~LOGIN_OPT_f;
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
/* TODO: doesn't sound like correct English phrase to me */
puts("Login incorrect");
if (++count == 3) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for '%s'%s",
username, fromhost);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
username[0] = '\0';
} /* while (1) */
alarm(0);
/* We can ignore /etc/nologin if we are logging in as root,
* it doesn't matter whether we are run by root or not */
if (pw->pw_uid != 0)
die_if_nologin();
write_utent(&utent, username);
IF_SELINUX(initselinux(username, full_tty, &user_sid));
/* Try these, but don't complain if they fail.
* _f_chown is safe wrt race t=ttyname(0);...;chown(t); */
fchown(0, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
fchmod(0, 0600);
/* We trust environment only if we run by root */
if (ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS && run_by_root)
run_login_script(pw, full_tty);
change_identity(pw);
tmp = pw->pw_shell;
if (!tmp || !*tmp)
tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL;
/* setup_environment params: shell, clear_env, change_env, pw */
setup_environment(tmp, !(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p), 1, pw);
motd();
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
syslog(LOG_INFO, "root login%s", fromhost);
/* well, a simple setexeccon() here would do the job as well,
* but let's play the game for now */
IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(user_sid);)
// util-linux login also does:
// /* start new session */
// setsid();
// /* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group */
// if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1)) error_msg...
// BBox login used to do this (see above):
// bb_setpgrp();
// If this stuff is really needed, add it and explain why!
/* Set signals to defaults */
/* Non-ignored signals revert to SIG_DFL on exec anyway */
/*signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);*/
/* Is this correct? This way user can ctrl-c out of /etc/profile,
* potentially creating security breach (tested with bash 3.0).
* But without this, bash 3.0 will not enable ctrl-c either.
* Maybe bash is buggy?
* Need to find out what standards say about /bin/login -
* should we leave SIGINT etc enabled or disabled? */
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */
run_shell(tmp, 1, NULL, NULL);
/* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */
}