checkpath: security fix for -m and -o options
Do not change permissions on the target if it is a file and has multiple hard links. This is necessary because a hard link can be an attack vector to gain privilege escalation. X-Gentoo-Bug: 540006 X-Gentoo-Bug-URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=540006
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		@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ static int do_check(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode,
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	}
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	if (mode && (st.st_mode & 0777) != mode) {
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		if ((type != inode_dir) && (st.st_nlink != 1)) {
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			eerror("%s: chown: %s %s", applet, "Too many hard links to", path);
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			return -1;
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		}
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		einfo("%s: correcting mode", path);
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		if (chmod(path, mode)) {
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			eerror("%s: chmod: %s", applet, strerror(errno));
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@@ -141,6 +145,10 @@ static int do_check(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode,
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	}
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	if (chowner && (st.st_uid != uid || st.st_gid != gid)) {
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		if ((type != inode_dir) && (st.st_nlink != 1)) {
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			eerror("%s: chown: %s %s", applet, "Too many hard links to", path);
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			return -1;
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		}
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		einfo("%s: correcting owner", path);
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		if (chown(path, uid, gid)) {
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			eerror("%s: chown: %s", applet, strerror(errno));
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