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proc/escape.c: Prevent buffer overflows in escape_command().

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This solves several problems:

1/ outbuf[1] was written to, but not outbuf[0], which was left
uninitialized (well, SECURE_ESCAPE_ARGS() already fixes this, but do it
explicitly as well); we know it is safe to write one byte to outbuf,
because SECURE_ESCAPE_ARGS() guarantees it.

2/ If bytes was 1, the write to outbuf[1] was an off-by-one overflow.

3/ Do not call escape_str() with a 0 bufsize if bytes == overhead.

4/ Prevent various buffer overflows if bytes <= overhead.
This commit is contained in:
Qualys Security Advisory 1970-01-01 00:00:00 +00:00 committed by Craig Small
parent 37ce162604
commit 7efa102248
1 changed files with 4 additions and 5 deletions
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9
proc/escape.c
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@ -217,11 +217,10 @@ int escape_command(char *restrict const outbuf, const proc_t *restrict const pp,
if(pp->state=='Z') overhead += 10; // chars in " <defunct>" if(pp->state=='Z') overhead += 10; // chars in " <defunct>"
else flags &= ~ESC_DEFUNCT; else flags &= ~ESC_DEFUNCT;
} }
if(overhead + 1 >= *cells){ // if no room for even one byte of the command name if(overhead + 1 >= *cells || // if no room for even one byte of the command name
// you'd damn well better have _some_ space overhead + 1 >= bytes){
// outbuf[0] = '-'; // Oct23 outbuf[0] = '\0';
outbuf[1] = '\0'; return 0;
return 1;
} }
if(flags & ESC_BRACKETS){ if(flags & ESC_BRACKETS){
outbuf[end++] = '['; outbuf[end++] = '[';