Commit Graph

2118 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jim Warner
fe23360520 top: sanitized some potentially corrupt 'Inspect' data
This guards against rcfile 'Inspect' entries which may
include non-printable characters. While this shouldn't
occur, we have no real control over those crazy users.

[ and, while such data can't be used maliciously, it ]
[ does adversely impact such a user's screen display ]

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-31 20:28:32 +10:00
Jim Warner
434530a038 top: prevent buffer overruns in 'inspection_utility()'
When a Qualys patch was reverted as being unwarranted,
1 specific problem their patch had, in fact, prevented
was re-introduced. This patch corrects that oversight.

Reference(s):
. qualys patch revert
commit c502678715

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-31 20:28:32 +10:00
Jim Warner
a42742b0df top: add another field sanity check in 'config_file()'
Until the Qualys security audit I had never considered
it a possibility that some malicious person might edit
the top config file to achieve some nefarious results.

And while the Qualys approach tended to concentrate on
the symptoms from such an effort, subsequent revisions
more properly concentrated on startup and that rcfile.

This commit completes those efforts with 1 more field.

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-31 20:28:32 +10:00
Jim Warner
cc5c9e6c1e top: don't mess with groff line length in man document
I've long since forgotten why the attempt to influence
groff line lengths was made. However, I did receive an
email regarding problems formatting postscript output.

Hopefully this patch will eliminate any such problems.

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-31 20:28:32 +10:00
Craig Small
76b692c440 misc: add asc sign files to ignore 2018-05-31 20:28:20 +10:00
Craig Small
7bb949bcba library: Bump API to 8:0:1
We had two structures change which means another API bump :/
2018-05-20 07:35:37 +10:00
Craig Small
59c5133ff1 misc: Reorder NEWS 2018-05-20 07:34:17 +10:00
Craig Small
14005a371e ps: Increase command selection field to 64
The library now presents command names up to 64 characters, in line with
the kernel changes.  ps command name selection (the -C option) now also
is 64 characters long.

References:
 commit 2cfdbbe897
2018-05-19 22:10:11 +10:00
Craig Small
2fed385ac2 testsuite: Remove pgrep ?15 char test
The referenced commit removed the warning for using pgrep with over
15 characters. The check for this warning needs to also be removed.

References:
 commit c32ab58b94
2018-05-19 21:50:21 +10:00
Jim Warner
c699f2e26d top: just respond to the increased command name length
The command name for running tasks is displayed by top
in a variable length field, so the increase from 16 to
64 bytes was not a problem. However, there's one place
where top is sensitive to length - insp_view_choice().

So, this patch just bumps a buffer used to display it.

Reference(s):
. increased 'comm' length
commit 2cfdbbe897

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:48:13 +10:00
Jim Warner
607edc2064 top: eliminate a couple of warnings of -Wunused-result
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:47:58 +10:00
Jim Warner
de807a639f top: ensure sane rcfile values for the remaining stuff
This will protect some remaining rcfile variables from
a possible manual editing of top's configuration file.

[ and correct two #error related boo-boos introduced ]
[ with the system default rcfile in the commit shown ]

Reference(s):
. introduced /etc/topdefaultrc
commit 3e6a208ae5

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:47:02 +10:00
Jim Warner
129b7e2b44 top: Prevent out-of-bounds writes in PUFF(). __Tweaked
This commit moves some overhead to the Batch mode path
where it's needed. And given the new 'else if' test we
can delete some now redundant logic in the other path.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0117-top-Prevent-out-of-bounds-writes-in-PUFF.patch
commit 059ae8b512

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:46:07 +10:00
Jim Warner
d34c6eb5b4 top: address 'show_special()' o-o-b read/write concern
This patch addresses a potential (but unlikely) buffer
overflow by reducing, if necessary, a memcpy length by
3 bytes to provide for an eol '\0' and 2 unused buffer
positions which also might receive the '\0' character.

[ note to future analysis tool: just because you see ]
[ binary data being manipulated in the routine, that ]
[ doesn't mean such function was passed binary data! ]

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0116-top-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-write-in-show_special.patch
commit ed8f6d9cc6

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:45:36 +10:00
Jim Warner
2fb269a5b0 top: Fix out-of-bounds read/write in show_... REVERTED
I'm reverting this patch to prepare for some alternate
solution. In that solution I will address point #1 but
point #2 is based on a wrong assumption. There will be
no binary data ever found in the 'glob' passed to this
show_special() function. It is now always simple text.

------------------------------------------------ original commit message
This patch fixes two problems:

1/ In the switch case 0, if sub_end is at the very end of lin[], the two
null-byte writes are off-by-two (a stack-based buffer overflow). Replace
this end-of-string "emulation" with an equivalent test on ch (and then
goto/break out of the loop).

2/ "sub_end += 2" jumps over the null-byte terminator in lin[] if the
line contains a raw (without a tilde) \001-\010 character. Detect such a
null-byte terminator and goto/break out of the loop.

Note: in the case of a raw \001-\010 character, the character at
"sub_end + 1" is never processed (it is skipped/jumped over); this is
not a security problem anymore (since 2/ was fixed), so we decided not
to change this behavior, for backward-compatibility.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0116-top-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-write-in-show_special.patch
commit ed8f6d9cc6

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:44:35 +10:00
Jim Warner
fdb58974e2 top: prevent buffer overflow potential in all routines
Whereas that original patch (since reversed) addressed
some symptoms related to manually edited config files,
this solution deals with root causes. And it goes much
beyond any single top field by protecting all of top's
fields. Henceforth, a duplicated field is not allowed.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0114-top-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-calibrate_fields.patch
commit c424a64331

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:44:11 +10:00
Jim Warner
72ddc1c33d top: Prevent buffer overflow in calibrate_... REVERTED
Here, again, we have an example of attacking a problem
by addressing the symptoms. And that assertion made in
the original commit message is true if only if someone
had manually (maliciously) edited the top config file.

So let's reverse the original patch & thus prepare for
a proper solution addressing the cause, not a symptom.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0114-top-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-calibrate_fields.patch
commit c424a64331

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:43:08 +10:00
Jim Warner
c502678715 top: Protect scat() from buffer overflows. ___REVERTED
The whole idea was to make top's 'scat' function small
and very quick, unlike that standard 'strcat' routine.

To achieve that end we ignore the potential for buffer
overruns and trust callers to provide adequate dest's.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0109-top-Protect-scat-from-buffer-overflows.patch
commit 9c745975b2

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:42:36 +10:00
Jim Warner
59f39da852 top: concede integer overflow risks in procs_refresh()
This is as far as we need go with respect to the issue
of integer overflow addressed in that reference below.

That patch, of course, was reversed to prepare for us.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0105-top-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-procs_refresh.patch
commit 131e5e2fe6

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:38:19 +10:00
Jim Warner
c9dfcdebdc top: Prevent integer overflows in procs_re... REVERTED
That patch referenced below is being reverted because:

. By design, no other top macro looks like a function.
Instead, they all contain some minimal capitalization.
The 'grow_by_size' macro stands out like a sore thumb.

. We would need to approach 400+ million tasks for for
the 1st addressed problem to produce integer overflow.

. And a 2nd check against SSIZE_MAX remains a mystery.

Me thinks a system on which top is running will suffer
ENOMEM before we need to worry about integer overflow.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0105-top-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-procs_refresh.patch
commit 131e5e2fe6

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:37:29 +10:00
Jim Warner
3b2235c266 top: check sortindx risk exposure (not treat symptoms)
Rather than validate the window's 'sortindx' each time
it was referenced (as was done in the patch below), we
now ensure the validity just once when the config file
is read. Thereafter, a running top will police bounds.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0102-top-Check-sortindx.patch
commit d5b8ac7139

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:24:36 +10:00
Jim Warner
fb8cee585f top: Check sortindx. _________________________REVERTED
Here's yet another example of dealing with a potential
problem at the symptom level, instead of addressing it
at the source. So, we will reverse that original patch
referenced below in preparation for a proper solution.

[ at the least, this ugly code should have used that ]
[ existing MAXTBL macro, making it a little prettier ]

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0102-top-Check-sortindx.patch
commit d5b8ac7139

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:23:57 +10:00
Jim Warner
53e2654726 top: other graph_cpus, graph_mems, and summ_mscale fix
This patch replaces an original patch referenced below
which has now been reversed. We now validate variables
'graph_cpus', 'graph_mems' and 'summ_mscale' just once
at startup. Thereafter, top enforces the proper range.

[ we afford the same treatment to that 'task_mscale' ]
[ variable, which was ignored in the original patch. ]

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0099-top-Check-graph_cpus-graph_mems-and-summ_mscale.patch
commit cd8ba5670e

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:22:56 +10:00
Jim Warner
d1fbc5fbd4 top: Check graph_cpus, graph_mems, and sum... REVERTED
The variables graph_cpus, graph_mems & summ_mscale are
all well managed in a running top. They were, however,
each vulnerable to tampering via the rcfile. So rather
than continually addressing the symptoms, we'll attack
the root cause just once at startup in the next patch.

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0099-top-Check-graph_cpus-graph_mems-and-summ_mscale.patch
commit cd8ba5670e

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:19:35 +10:00
Jim Warner
e531c78140 top: Do not default to the cwd in configs_r... Tweaked
While it's only documented (so far) in commit text and
an occasional email I've tried to maintain some coding
standards primarily for reference/navigation purposes.
They also served, I felt, as useful mental challenges.

Someday I will get around to formerly documenting them
but in the meantime here are the ones for this commit:

. functions are grouped into logical (i hope) sections
. functions & sections are ordered to avoid prototypes
. function names are alphabetical within every section
. all functions & sections must be referenced in top.h

This patch just attempts to honor the above standards,
while also covering this new behavior in the man page.

[ please note that the net result of these 2 patches ]
[ is simply to avoid pathname truncations should our ]
[ limit of 1024 be exceeded. they do not have a role ]
[ in solving the 'local privilege escalation' issue. ]

[ and we can never prevent a user from setting their ]
[ HOME var to a directory writable by some attacker! ]

[ the only real protection for that CVE-2018-1122 is ]
[ those soon to be enhanced rcfile integrity checks, ]
[ achieved through several of the following patches. ]

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0097-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
commit b45c4803dd

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-19 21:17:59 +10:00
Craig Small
c32ab58b94 pgrep: Remove >15 warning
As comm length can be longer than 15 characters with newer kernels, it
doesn't make sense to have a warning when you make the match string
longer than this.

As a side-effect, it removes the false-positive you got when you used
long regex matches (see issue #92 )

References:
 commit 2cfdbbe897
 procps-ng/procps#92
2018-05-19 08:14:06 +10:00
Craig Small
52dc8dcdea misc: Update NEWS with CVE and library changes 2018-05-19 08:11:23 +10:00
Craig Small
2cfdbbe897 library: Increase comm length to 64
For many years, the comm length has been set to 16. Previously to that
it was 8. This means for things like kworkers they all have very cryptic
names. The kernel is now going to increase this size to 64, so the
procps library will follow this length increase.

System tools may also increase their default length to 64, or keep it at
16; there is only so much screen real estate.

References:
 https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/17/16
2018-05-19 08:04:19 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
0151441e15 w: Check return values in print_logintime(). 2018-05-19 07:33:16 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
ed3cf6988a w: Replace printf() with fprintf(fout) in print_time_ival7().
This has currently no impact, because print_time_ival7() is always
called with fout = stdout, but fix it anyway.
2018-05-19 07:33:16 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
059ae8b512 top: Prevent out-of-bounds writes in PUFF().
This patch prevents three problems:

1/ Because snprintf() returns "the number of characters (excluding the
terminating null byte) which would have been written to the final string
if enough space had been available", _eol may point past the end of _str
and write out-of-bounds (in Batch mode).

2/ _eol is never checked against _str, so "while (*(--_eol) == ' ');"
may point _eol below _str and write out-of-bounds (in Batch mode).

3/ Sanity-check Pseudo_row to protect the strcpy().
2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
ed8f6d9cc6 top: Fix out-of-bounds read/write in show_special().
This patch fixes two problems:

1/ In the switch case 0, if sub_end is at the very end of lin[], the two
null-byte writes are off-by-two (a stack-based buffer overflow). Replace
this end-of-string "emulation" with an equivalent test on ch (and then
goto/break out of the loop).

2/ "sub_end += 2" jumps over the null-byte terminator in lin[] if the
line contains a raw (without a tilde) \001-\010 character. Detect such a
null-byte terminator and goto/break out of the loop.

Note: in the case of a raw \001-\010 character, the character at
"sub_end + 1" is never processed (it is skipped/jumped over); this is
not a security problem anymore (since 2/ was fixed), so we decided not
to change this behavior, for backward-compatibility.
2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
6b8b102cf2 top: Harden calibrate_fields().
- Make sure i is at least 1 before "i - 1" and "--i".

- Initialize endpflg (to 0, as it was originally, since it is static)
  before the "for" loop (the "break" may leave endpflg uninitialized,
  for example).
2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
c424a64331 top: Prevent buffer overflow in calibrate_fields().
pflgsall[] can contain PFLAGSSIZ = 100 elements, each iteration of the
loop can write 3 elements to pflgsall[], and there are EU_MAXPFLGS = 58
iterations: a buffer overflow (it can be triggered via the configuration
file, for example, by filling "fieldscur" with the "sortindx" flag).
2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
a71ac048e6 top: Impose a minimum on Screen_cols.
The safety of the critical function task_show() depends on the sanity of
Screen_cols. Just copy the tests on w_cols to Screen_cols (from the same
function adj_geometry()).
2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
b4d068e624 top: Prevent integer overflow in adj_geometry(). 2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
23baeb1175 top: Limit Width_mode to SCREENMAX.
adj_geometry() limits to SCREENMAX too, but belt and suspenders, and
might as well tell the user about it.
2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
8ab8c1a469 top: Prevent integer overflows in config_file() and other_selection(). 2018-05-19 07:33:15 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
9c745975b2 top: Protect scat() from buffer overflows.
Several of these buffer overflows can actually be triggered (through the
configuration file for example): in config_file(), inspection_utility(),
and show_special().
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
0847390b83 top: Always exit from sig_abexit().
The default action for SIGURG is to ignore the signal, for example.
This is very similar to the patch "ps/display.c: Always exit from
signal_handler()."
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
7fc7062127 top: Initialize struct sigaction in before(). 2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
d69966962c top: Fix snprintf() call in capsmk().
Replace "snprintf(msg, sizeof(pmt)" with "snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg)".
Luckily sizeof(pmt) == sizeof(msg), but fix it anyway.
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
131e5e2fe6 top: Prevent integer overflows in procs_refresh().
This is very similar to our patch against integer overflows in
readproctab*().
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
b6be15d3cb top: Initialize cp in task_show().
Found no problematic case at the moment, but this is a cheap
just-in-case.
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
713381b10d top: Protect macro parameters. 2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
d5b8ac7139 top: Check sortindx.
Every time sortindx is used as an index, or loaded from the
configuration file. Otherwise it leads to out-of-bounds reads and
arbitrary code execution.
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
bbe58d7e0a top: Check width and col.
Otherwise they may lead to out-of-bounds writes (snprintf() returns the
number of characters which would have been written if enough space had
been available).

Also, make sure buf is null-terminated after COLPLUSCH has been written.
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
97a989cbcd top: Check Rc.fixed_widest.
Otherwise it leads to crashes (for example, setting it to 2147483600 in
the configuration file segfaults top).
2018-05-19 07:32:34 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
cd8ba5670e top: Check graph_cpus, graph_mems, and summ_mscale.
Otherwise they lead to out-of-bounds reads and format-string bugs.

Since these variables are set/written to in several places (for example,
config_file()), check them in the only place where they are read/used.

Also, constify the static gtab[]s.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
bd91bbf7f1 top: Check i when setting Curwin in config_file().
Otherwise it leads to out-of-bounds reads (and maybe writes).
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00