Not exploitable (not under an attacker's control), but still a potential
non-security problem. Copied, fixed, and used the grow_size() macro from
pidof.c.
Signed-off-by: Craig Small <csmall@enc.com.au>
We now use the actual terminfo 'max_colors' value with
the 'color mapping' screen, not that hard coded '256'.
Reference(s):
https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/issues/96
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
When not displaying all tasks (the 'i' toggle is off),
the concept of vertical scrolling has no real meaning.
However, only 2 keys (up/down) impacting that vertical
position were currently being disabled with this mode.
This patch will extend such treatment to the following
additional vertical impact keys: pgup,pgdn,home & end.
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This program does a good job of policing that vertical
scrolled position, ensuring that total tasks are never
exceeded. However, during transitions from thread mode
to normal task mode (the 'H' toggle) that wasn't true.
And while there was no real harm done, it did make the
use of up/down arrow keys "appear" disabled especially
if that scroll message was not displayed ('C' toggle).
This patch simply forces a return to row #1 whenever a
user toggles that display between thread & task modes.
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
As it turns out, the very first entry in the 'iokey()'
tinfo_tab was preventing the proper translation of the
simulated PgUp/PgDn keys (ctrl+meta+k/j). Ignoring the
tortured history behind the most recent change to that
entry, this patch restores the previous value and once
again properly translates these particular keystrokes.
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Unlikely to ever happen, since it would imply a very large string, but
better safe than sorry.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. now uses 'xmalloc' vs. unchecked stdlib 'malloc'
. the member 'need' was removed from 'format_node'
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
To avoid an out-of-bounds access at checkoff[tmp]. The strspn() at the
beginning of the function protects against it already, but double-check
this in case of some future change.
Right now, "we _exit() anyway" is not always true: for example, the
default action for SIGURG is to ignore the signal, which means that
"kill(getpid(), signo);" does not terminate the process. Call _exit()
explicitly, in this case (rather than exit(), because the terminating
kill() calls do not call the functions registered with atexit() either).
Before "strlen(outbuf)", if one of the pr_*() functions forgot to do it.
This prevents an out-of-bounds read in strlen(), and an out-of-bounds
write in "outbuf[sz] = '\n'". Another solution would be to replace
strlen() with strnlen(), but this is not used anywhere else in the
code-base and may not exist in all libc's.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. adapted via 'patch' without rejections
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
pr_bsdstart(): Replace "strcpy(outbuf," with "snprintf(outbuf, COLWID,"
(which is used in all surrounding functions). (side note: the fact that
many pr_*() functions simply return "snprintf(outbuf, COLWID," justifies
the "amount" checks added to show_one_proc() by the "ps/output.c:
Replace strcpy() with snprintf() in show_one_proc()." patch)
pr_stime(): Check the return value of strftime() (in case of an error,
"the contents of the array are undefined").
help_pr_sig(): Handle the "len < 8" case, otherwise "sig+len-8" may
point outside the sig string.
pr_context(): Handle the empty string case, or else "outbuf[len-1]"
points outside outbuf.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. logic is quite different with 'stacks' vs. 'proc_t'
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Enforce a maximum max_rightward of OUTBUF_SIZE-1, because it is used in
constructs such as "snprintf(outbuf, max_rightward+1," (we could remove
the extra check at the beginning of forest_helper() now, but we decided
to leave it, as a precaution and reminder).
The minimum max_rightward check is not strictly needed, because it is
unsigned. However, we decided to add it anyway:
- most of the other variables are signed;
- make it visually clear that this case is properly handled;
- ideally, the minimum max_rightward should be 1, not 0 (to prevent
integer overflows such as "max_rightward-1"), but this might change
the behavior/output of ps, so we decided against it, for now.
Instead, we fixed the only function that overflows if max_rightward is
0. Also, enforce the same safe range for max_leftward, although it is
never used throughout the code-base.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. adapted via 'patch' without rejections
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This strcpy() should normally not overflow outbuf, but names can be
overridden (via -o). Also, check "amount" in all cases.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. we don't use that 'likely/unlikely' crap in newlib
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
It is static and not used anywhere.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. limited to whitespace/formatting differences
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
We decided not to check the return value of the mprotect() calls,
because they are not vital to the operation of ps.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. many formatting/whitespace differences
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
1/ Do not go deeper than the size of forest_prefix[], to prevent a
buffer overflow (sizeof(forest_prefix) is roughly 128K, but the maximum
/proc/sys/kernel/pid_max is 4M). (actually, we go deeper, but we stop
adding bytes to forest_prefix[])
2/ Always null-terminate forest_prefix[] at the current level.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. logic is quite different with 'stacks' vs. 'proc_t'
. a commented out 'debug' line was no longer present
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Because there is usually less than OUTBUF_SIZE available at endp.
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. logic is quite different with 'stacks' vs. 'proc_t'
. ps no longer deals with the library 'FILL...' flags
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This patch solves several problems:
1/ Limit the number of characters written (to outbuf) to OUTBUF_SIZE-1
(-1 for the null-terminator).
2/ Always null-terminate outbuf at q.
3/ Move the "rightward" checks *before* the strcpy() calls.
4/ Avoid an integer overflow in these checks (e.g., rightward-4).
May happen if strlen(src) > INT_MAX for example. This patch prevents
escaped_copy() from increasing maxroom and returning -1 (= number of
bytes consumed in dst).
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. formerly applied to proc/escape.c
. function was moved to ps/output.c
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
The SECURE_ESCAPE_ARGS() macro solves several potential problems
(although we found no problematic calls to the escape*() functions in
procps's code-base, but had to thoroughly review every call; and this is
library code):
1/ off-by-one overflows if the size of the destination buffer is 0;
2/ buffer overflows if this size (or "maxroom") is negative;
3/ integer overflows (for example, "*maxcells+1");
4/ always null-terminate the destination buffer (unless its size is 0).
---------------------------- adapted for newlib branch
. formerly applied to proc/escape.c
. function was moved to ps/output.c
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
While the previous patch concerned an essential change
to avoid dereferencing those NULL pointers, this patch
could be considered optional. For consistency, it just
puts all initialization logic after the setREL macros.
[ plus along the way some inter-function spacing was ]
[ standardized with just a single blank line between ]
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Under newlib design, ps must loop though all potential
print functions so as to gather the appropriate enum's
while establishing the 'relative' equivalent. The keys
to the setREL/chkREL macros are a NULL 'outbuf' param.
It's imperative that no other functions be called with
that NULL value. Unfortunately, several instances were
found where this was violated. They are now corrected!
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
With the Qualys security audit, we began to harden our
treatment of the top rcfile. In particular, the values
read were checked so as to prevent some malicious user
from editing it in order to achieve an evil objective.
However when it came to colors I was surprised to find
that at least one user edited the rcfile for 256-color
support. Unfortunately, our new checks prevented this.
So this commit will provide the means to exploit those
extra colors with no need to manually edit the rcfile.
Reference(s):
https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/issues/96
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This guards against rcfile 'Inspect' entries which may
include non-printable characters. While this shouldn't
occur, we have no real control over those crazy users.
[ and, while such data can't be used maliciously, it ]
[ does adversely impact such a user's screen display ]
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
For our master branch, a Qualys patch referenced below
was reverted as being unwarranted. That original patch
was not applied in this branch so there was no revert.
However, there was 1 specific problem their patch had,
in fact, prevented. Thus, this patch now addresses it.
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0109-top-Protect-scat-from-buffer-overflows.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Until the Qualys security audit I had never considered
it a possibility that some malicious person might edit
the top config file to achieve some nefarious results.
And while the Qualys approach tended to concentrate on
the symptoms from such an effort, subsequent revisions
more properly concentrated on startup and that rcfile.
This commit completes those efforts with 1 more field.
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
I've long since forgotten why the attempt to influence
groff line lengths was made. However, I did receive an
email regarding problems formatting postscript output.
Hopefully this patch will eliminate any such problems.
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Following that patch referenced below, the top SUPGRPS
field would produce a segmentation fault and ps SUPGRP
would often show "(null)". Such problems resulted from
some faulty logic in the status2proc() routine dealing
with 'Groups' (supgid) which served as a source field.
For many processes the original code produced an empty
string which prevented conversion to the expected "-".
Moreover, prior to release 3.3.15 such an empty string
will become 0 after strtol() which pwcache_get_group()
translates to 'root' yielding very misleading results.
So, now we'll check for empty '/proc/#/status/Groups:'
fields & consistently provide a "-" value for callers.
[ we'll also protect against future problems in that ]
[ new qualys logic by always ensuring valid 'supgrp' ]
[ pointers - logic which revealed our original flaw! ]
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0071-proc-readproc.c-Harden-supgrps_from_supgids.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This refactor was done in response to the Qualys patch
referenced below, which deals with some 'readeither()'
flaws under the master branch. Under our newlib branch
those flaws mostly disappear since the function is now
private. But without a redesign the #define is broken.
When the #define FALSE_THREADS is active, some special
strings showing "[ duplicate ENUM ]" will appear under
each child thread. Note that the real reason for those
appearing isn't being exercised, only their mechanics.
In reality, they only show when a user duplicates such
enums in a results stack & only 1 instance can own it.
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0084-proc-readproc.c-Work-around-a-design-flaw-in-readeit.patch
. QUICK_THREADS became FALSE_THREADS
commit c546d9dd44
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
The command name for running tasks is displayed by top
in a variable length field, so the increase from 16 to
64 bytes was not a problem. However, there's one place
where top is sensitive to length - insp_view_choice().
So, this patch just bumps a buffer used to display it.
Reference(s):
. master branch increase to 64
commit 2cfdbbe897
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This will protect some remaining rcfile variables from
a possible manual editing of top's configuration file.
[ and correct two #error related boo-boos introduced ]
[ with the system default rcfile in the commit shown ]
Reference(s):
. introduced /etc/topdefaultrc
commit 55a42ae040
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This commit moves some overhead to the Batch mode path
where it's needed. And given the new 'else if' test we
can delete some now redundant logic in the other path.
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0117-top-Prevent-out-of-bounds-writes-in-PUFF.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This patch addresses a potential (but unlikely) buffer
overflow by reducing, if necessary, a memcpy length by
3 bytes to provide for an eol '\0' and 2 unused buffer
positions which also might receive the '\0' character.
[ note to future analysis tool: just because you see ]
[ binary data being manipulated in the routine, that ]
[ doesn't mean such function was passed binary data! ]
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0116-top-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-write-in-show_special.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Whereas an original patch (referenced below) addressed
some symptoms related to manually edited config files,
this solution deals with root causes. And it goes much
beyond any single top field by protecting all of top's
fields. Henceforth, a duplicated field is not allowed.
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0114-top-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-calibrate_fields.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
Rather than validate the window's 'sortindx' each time
it was referenced (as was done in the patch below), we
now ensure the validity just once when the config file
is read. Thereafter, a running top will police bounds.
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0102-top-Check-sortindx.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This patch replaces an original patch referenced below
(omitted under this branch). We now validate variables
'graph_cpus', 'graph_mems' and 'summ_mscale' just once
at startup. Thereafter, top enforces the proper range.
[ we afford the same treatment to that 'task_mscale' ]
[ variable, which was ignored in the original patch. ]
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0099-top-Check-graph_cpus-graph_mems-and-summ_mscale.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
While it's only documented (so far) in commit text and
an occasional email I've tried to maintain some coding
standards primarily for reference/navigation purposes.
They also served, I felt, as useful mental challenges.
Someday I will get around to formerly documenting them
but in the meantime here are the ones for this commit:
. functions are grouped into logical (i hope) sections
. functions & sections are ordered to avoid prototypes
. function names are alphabetical within every section
. all functions & sections must be referenced in top.h
This patch just attempts to honor the above standards,
while also covering this new behavior in the man page.
[ please note that the net result of these 2 patches ]
[ is simply to avoid pathname truncations should our ]
[ limit of 1024 be exceeded. they do not have a role ]
[ in solving the 'local privilege escalation' issue. ]
[ and we can never prevent a user from setting their ]
[ HOME var to a directory writable by some attacker! ]
[ the only real protection for that CVE-2018-1122 is ]
[ those soon to be enhanced rcfile integrity checks, ]
[ achieved through several of the following patches. ]
Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0097-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
In the new library 'cmd' is dynamically allocated just
like 'cmdline'. This will align us with the ref below.
Reference(s):
. master branch increase to 64
commit 2cfdbbe897
Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
This patch prevents three problems:
1/ Because snprintf() returns "the number of characters (excluding the
terminating null byte) which would have been written to the final string
if enough space had been available", _eol may point past the end of _str
and write out-of-bounds (in Batch mode).
2/ _eol is never checked against _str, so "while (*(--_eol) == ' ');"
may point _eol below _str and write out-of-bounds (in Batch mode).
3/ Sanity-check Pseudo_row to protect the strcpy().
- Make sure i is at least 1 before "i - 1" and "--i".
- Initialize endpflg (to 0, as it was originally, since it is static)
before the "for" loop (the "break" may leave endpflg uninitialized,
for example).
The safety of the critical function task_show() depends on the sanity of
Screen_cols. Just copy the tests on w_cols to Screen_cols (from the same
function adj_geometry()).
