Commit Graph

410 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jim Warner
f67127e728 library: adapt readproc for the latest lxc conventions
The merge request shown below prompted (thankfully) an
examination of our lxc containers logic in readproc.c.

As it turns out, the lxc folks changed that eyecatcher
used to identify containers within a task cgroup file.

So this patch, with little extra cost, will enable the
libprocps lxc_containers() guy to handle both strings.

[ additionally, I was shocked to find lxc allows the ]
[ eyecatcher to be changed at ./configure time. such ]
[ a provision has always existed. unfortunately, the ]
[ changed value was only available to root, assuming ]
[ one wished to tackle that undocumented liblxc api. ]

Reference(s):
. what prompted lxc support reevaluation
https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/merge_requests/82
. original lxc support introduced
commit 0557504f9c

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2019-01-22 22:46:53 +11:00
Jan Rybar
36e066df52 Possible segfault in file2strvec introduced by latest CVE fix
'rbuf' used before allocated.
Revealed by static analysis
2018-08-08 20:00:24 +10:00
Jim Warner
3352bddba5 library: tweak that change to 'supgrps_from_supgids()'
It's good that those Qualys folks were looking over my
shoulder. They suggested a change to that commit shown
below. This improvement was obviously a better choice.

Reference(s):
. original change
commit f9a8009e27

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-06-07 21:35:59 +10:00
Jim Warner
f9a8009e27 library: avoid problems involving 'supgid' mishandling
Following that patch referenced below, the top SUPGRPS
field would produce a segmentation fault and ps SUPGRP
would often show "(null)". Such problems resulted from
some faulty logic in the status2proc() routine dealing
with 'Groups' (supgid) which served as a source field.

For many processes the original code produced an empty
string which prevented conversion to the expected "-".
Moreover, prior to release 3.3.15 such an empty string
will become 0 after strtol() which pwcache_get_group()
translates to 'root' yielding very misleading results.

So, now we'll check for empty '/proc/#/status/Groups:'
fields & consistently provide a "-" value for callers.

[ we'll also protect against future problems in that ]
[ new qualys logic by always ensuring valid 'supgrp' ]
[ pointers - logic which revealed our original flaw! ]

Reference(s):
. original qualys patch
0071-proc-readproc.c-Harden-supgrps_from_supgids.patch

Signed-off-by: Jim Warner <james.warner@comcast.net>
2018-05-31 22:02:03 +10:00
Craig Small
2cfdbbe897 library: Increase comm length to 64
For many years, the comm length has been set to 16. Previously to that
it was 8. This means for things like kworkers they all have very cryptic
names. The kernel is now going to increase this size to 64, so the
procps library will follow this length increase.

System tools may also increase their default length to 64, or keep it at
16; there is only so much screen real estate.

References:
 https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/17/16
2018-05-19 08:04:19 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
14758ebc8f proc/readproc.c: Work around a design flaw in readeither().
readeither() caches (in new_p) a pointer to the proc_t of a task-group
leader, but readeither()'s callers can do pretty much anything with the
proc_t structure passed to and/or returned by this function. For
example, they can 1/ free it or 2/ recycle it (by passing it to
readeither() as x).

1/ leads to a use-after-free, and 2/ leads to unexpected behavior when
taskreader()/simple_readtask() is called with new_p equal to x (this is
not a theoretical flaw: 2/ happens in readproctab3() when want_task()
returns false and p is a group leader).

As a workaround, we keep a copy of new_p's first member (tid) in static
storage, and the next times we enter readeither() we check this "canary"
against the tid in new_p: if they differ, we reset new_p to NULL, which
forces the allocation of a new proc_t (the new "leader", or reference).

This always detects 2/ (because free_acquired(x,1) memsets x and hence
new_p); always detects 1/ if freed via free_acquired() and/or freeproc()
(very likely, otherwise memory may be leaked); probably detects 1/ even
if freed directly via free() (because the canary is the first member of
proc_t, likely to be overwritten by free()); but can not detect 1/ if
free() does not write to new_p's chunk at all.

Moreover, accessing new_p->tid to check the canary in case 1/ is itself
a use-after-free, so a better long-term solution should be implemented
at some point (we wanted to avoid intrusive and backward-incompatible
changes in this library function, hence this imperfect workaround).
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
94eebb03b5 proc/readproc.c: Prevent integer overflows in readproctab*().
If an integer overflow is about to be reached, call xalloc_err_handler()
(since it would have been caught by calloc() or reallocarray()) and then
exit(): these integer overflows are far from reachable, with the current
PID_MAX_LIMIT (2^22), so if they are there is something very wrong going
on. Note: we check the n_*alloc variables against INT_MAX even when they
are size_t because they are later stored as int in a struct proc_data_t.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
a013f6e020 proc/readproc.c: Fix double-free()s in readtask().
If QUICK_THREADS is not defined (it is not by default, but most
distributions enable it) and task_dir_missing is true (only on very old
kernels), then readtask() forgets to reset some of the struct proc_t t's
members, which later results in double-free()s in free_acquired().

For now, we simply synchronized the list of members to be reset with the
list of members freed in free_acquired().
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
1539c13507 proc/readproc.c: Fix use-after-free in readproctab2().
The memset() in the PROC_LOOSE_TASKS loop leaves a struct proc_t
uninitialized (the one at data+n_used), which leads to a use-after-free.

ps calls readproctab2(), but only if !TF_loose_tasks, and this U-A-F is
triggered only if PROC_LOOSE_TASKS, so there seems to be no vulnerable
call in the procps package itself (other users of the libprocps may be
vulnerable, though).
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
a4d82a2c2c proc/readproc.c: Harden openproc().
Replace xmalloc() with xcalloc().
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
19849a45e0 proc/readproc.c: Harden get_proc_stats().
Replace sprintf() with snprintf().
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
1b8ec51013 proc/readproc.c: Harden simple_nextpid().
Replace memcpy+strcpy with snprintf.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
263c0ebdd8 proc/readproc.c: Harden fill_cgroup_cvt().
Check the return value of snprintf(), otherwise dst may point
out-of-bounds when it reaches the end of the dst_buffer (the snprintf()
always returns 1 in that case, even if there is not enough space left),
and vMAX becomes negative and is passed to snprintf() as a size_t.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
6939463606 proc/readproc.c: Harden vectorize_this_str().
This detects an integer overflow of "strlen + 1", prevents an integer
overflow of "tot + adj + (2 * pSZ)", and avoids calling snprintf with a
string longer than INT_MAX. Truncate rather than fail, since the callers
do not expect a failure of this function.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
39dcf47bc8 proc/readproc.c: Harden read_unvectored().
1/ Prevent an out-of-bounds write if sz is 0.

2/ Limit sz to INT_MAX, because the return value is an int, not an
unsigned int (and because if INT_MAX is equal to SSIZE_MAX, man 2 read
says "If count is greater than SSIZE_MAX, the result is unspecified.")

3/ Always null-terminate dst (unless sz is 0), because a return value of
0 because of an open() error (for example) is indistinguishable from a
return value of 0 because of an empty file.

4/ Use an unsigned int for i (just like n), not an int.

5/ Check for snprintf() truncation.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
36c350f07c proc/readproc.c: Fix bugs and overflows in file2strvec().
Note: this is by far the most important and complex patch of the whole
series, please review it carefully; thank you very much!

For this patch, we decided to keep the original function's design and
skeleton, to avoid regressions and behavior changes, while fixing the
various bugs and overflows. And like the "Harden file2str()" patch, this
patch does not fail when about to overflow, but truncates instead: there
is information available about this process, so return it to the caller;
also, we used INT_MAX as a limit, but a lower limit could be used.

The easy changes:

- Replace sprintf() with snprintf() (and check for truncation).

- Replace "if (n == 0 && rbuf == 0)" with "if (n <= 0 && tot <= 0)" and
  do break instead of return: it simplifies the code (only one place to
  handle errors), and also guarantees that in the while loop either n or
  tot is > 0 (or both), even if n is reset to 0 when about to overflow.

- Remove the "if (n < 0)" block in the while loop: it is (and was) dead
  code, since we enter the while loop only if n >= 0.

- Rewrite the missing-null-terminator detection: in the original
  function, if the size of the file is a multiple of 2047, a null-
  terminator is appended even if the file is already null-terminated.

- Replace "if (n <= 0 && !end_of_file)" with "if (n < 0 || tot <= 0)":
  originally, it was equivalent to "if (n < 0)", but we added "tot <= 0"
  to handle the first break of the while loop, and to guarantee that in
  the rest of the function tot is > 0.

- Double-force ("belt and suspenders") the null-termination of rbuf:
  this is (and was) essential to the correctness of the function.

- Replace the final "while" loop with a "for" loop that behaves just
  like the preceding "for" loop: in the original function, this would
  lead to unexpected results (for example, if rbuf is |\0|A|\0|, this
  would return the array {"",NULL} but should return {"","A",NULL}; and
  if rbuf is |A|\0|B| (should never happen because rbuf should be null-
  terminated), this would make room for two pointers in ret, but would
  write three pointers to ret).

The hard changes:

- Prevent the integer overflow of tot in the while loop, but unlike
  file2str(), file2strvec() cannot let tot grow until it almost reaches
  INT_MAX, because it needs more space for the pointers: this is why we
  introduced ARG_LEN, which also guarantees that we can add "align" and
  a few sizeof(char*)s to tot without overflowing.

- Prevent the integer overflow of "tot + c + align": when INT_MAX is
  (almost) reached, we write the maximal safe amount of pointers to ret
  (ARG_LEN guarantees that there is always space for *ret = rbuf and the
  NULL terminator).
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
ccf8de0874 proc/readproc.c: Harden file2str().
1/ Replace sprintf() with snprintf() (and check for truncation).

2/ Prevent an integer overflow of ub->siz. The "tot_read--" is needed to
avoid an off-by-one overflow in "ub->buf[tot_read] = '\0'". It is safe
to decrement tot_read here, because we know that tot_read is equal to
ub->siz (and ub->siz is very large).

We believe that truncation is a better option than failure (implementing
failure instead should be as easy as replacing the "tot_read--" with
"tot_read = 0").
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
344f6d3c0e proc/readproc.c: Harden stat2proc().
1/ Use a "size_t num" instead of an "unsigned num" (also, do not store
the return value of sscanf() into num, it was unused anyway).

2/ Check the return value of strchr() and strrchr().

3/ Never jump over the terminating null byte with "S = tmp + 2".
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
20269a4129 proc/readproc.c: Harden supgrps_from_supgids().
1/ Prevent an integer overflow of t.

2/ Avoid an infinite loop if s contains characters other than comma,
spaces, +, -, and digits.

3/ Handle all possible return values of snprintf().
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
6fb2bbaa0d proc/readproc.c: Harden status2proc().
1/ Do not read past the terminating null byte when hashing the name.

2/ S[x] is used as an index, but S is "char *S" (signed) and hence may
index the array out-of-bounds. Bit-mask S[x] with 127 (the array has 128
entries).

3/ Use a size_t for j, not an int (strlen() returns a size_t).

Notes:

- These are (mostly) theoretical problems, because the contents of
  /proc/PID/status are (mostly) trusted.

- The "name" member of the status_table_struct has 8 bytes, and
  "RssShmem" occupies exactly 8 bytes, which means that "name" is not
  null-terminated. This is fine right now, because status2proc() uses
  memcmp(), not strcmp(), but it is worth mentioning.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
27e45cf43b proc/readproc.c: Fix the unhex() function.
This function is unused (SIGNAL_STRING is defined by default, and if it
is not, procps does not compile -- for example, there is no "outbuf" in
help_pr_sig()) but fix it anyway. There are two bugs:

- it accepts non-hexadecimal characters (anything >= 0x30);

- "(c - (c>0x57) ? 0x57 : 0x30)" is always equal to 0x57.
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
920b0ada70 proc/sysinfo.c: Ensure null-termination in getstat().
There was a "buff[BUFFSIZE-1] = 0;" but there may be garbage between
what is read() (less than BUFFSIZE-1 bytes) and this null byte. Reuse
the construct from the preceding getrunners().
2018-05-19 07:32:22 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
62f19dc5df proc/escape.c: Handle negative snprintf() return value.
May happen if strlen(src) > INT_MAX for example. This patch prevents
escaped_copy() from increasing maxroom and returning -1 (= number of
bytes consumed in dst).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
7efa102248 proc/escape.c: Prevent buffer overflows in escape_command().
This solves several problems:

1/ outbuf[1] was written to, but not outbuf[0], which was left
uninitialized (well, SECURE_ESCAPE_ARGS() already fixes this, but do it
explicitly as well); we know it is safe to write one byte to outbuf,
because SECURE_ESCAPE_ARGS() guarantees it.

2/ If bytes was 1, the write to outbuf[1] was an off-by-one overflow.

3/ Do not call escape_str() with a 0 bufsize if bytes == overhead.

4/ Prevent various buffer overflows if bytes <= overhead.
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
37ce162604 proc/escape.c: Prevent integer overflows in escape_str_utf8().
Simply rearrange the old comparisons. The new comparisons are safe,
because we know from previous checks that:

1/ wlen > 0

2/ my_cells < *maxcells (also: my_cells >= 0 and *maxcells > 0)

3/ len > 1

4/ my_bytes+1 < bufsize (also: my_bytes >= 0 and bufsize > 0)
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
8d359b04ab proc/escape.c: Handle negative wcwidth() return value.
This should never happen, because wcwidth() is called only if iswprint()
returns nonzero. But belt-and-suspenders, and make it visually clear
(very important for the next patch).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
47303a3592 proc/escape.c: Make sure all escape*() arguments are safe.
The SECURE_ESCAPE_ARGS() macro solves several potential problems
(although we found no problematic calls to the escape*() functions in
procps's code-base, but had to thoroughly review every call; and this is
library code):

1/ off-by-one overflows if the size of the destination buffer is 0;

2/ buffer overflows if this size (or "maxroom") is negative;

3/ integer overflows (for example, "*maxcells+1");

4/ always null-terminate the destination buffer (unless its size is 0).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
00ab5f0b32 proc/whattime.c: Always initialize buf.
In the human_readable case; otherwise the strcat() that follows may
append bytes to the previous contents of buf.

Also, slightly enlarge buf, as it was a bit too tight.

Could also replace all sprintf()s with snprintf()s, but all the calls
here output a limited number of characters, so they should be safe.
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
7382ac88d5 proc/slab.c: Initialize struct slab_info in get_slabnode().
Especially its "next" member: this is what caused the crash in "slabtop:
Reset slab_list if get_slabinfo() fails." (if parse_slabinfo*() fails in
sscanf(), for example, then curr is set to NULL but it is already linked
into the "list" and its "next" member was never initialized).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
a33be33885 proc/sysinfo.c: Fix off-by-one in get_pid_digits().
At "pidbuf[rc] = '\0';" if "rc = read()" returns "sizeof pidbuf"
(unlikely to ever happen, but still).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
8136a7a664 proc/sysinfo.c: Prevent integer overflow of realloc() size. 2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
5b6ab39c6d proc/slab.c: Check correct number of items after sscanf(). 2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
3ccc6ed262 proc/slab.h: Fix off-by-one overflow in sscanf().
In proc/slab.c, functions parse_slabinfo20() and parse_slabinfo11(),
sscanf() might overflow curr->name, because "String input conversions
store a terminating null byte ('\0') to mark the end of the input; the
maximum field width does not include this terminator."

Add one byte to name[] for this terminator.
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
bf12b14db9 proc/sig.c: Harden print_given_signals().
And signal_name_to_number().
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
3244e7ddb0 proc/devname.c: Never write more than "chop" (part 2).
"chop" is the maximum offset where the null-byte should be written;
respect this even if about to write just one (non-null) character.
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
6b7ceb36a4 proc/devname.c: Never write more than "chop" characters.
This should be guaranteed by "tmp[chop] = '\0';" and "if(!c) break;" but
this patch adds a very easy belt-and-suspenders check.
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
730bdc33e7 proc/devname.c: Prevent off-by-one overflow in dev_to_tty(). 2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
9f59bd5c52 proc/devname.c: Use snprintf() in link_name().
Found no problematic use case at the moment, but better safe than sorry.
Also, return an error on snprintf() or readlink() truncation.
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
59666e6255 proc/version.h: Protect parameter in LINUX_VERSION() macro.
Just in case (no problematic use case at the moment).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
f1077b7a55 proc/alloc.*: Use size_t, not unsigned int.
Otherwise this can truncate sizes on 64-bit platforms, and is one of the
reasons the integer overflows in file2strvec() are exploitable at all.
Also: catch potential integer overflow in xstrdup() (should never
happen, but better safe than sorry), and use memcpy() instead of
strcpy() (faster).

Warnings:

- in glibc, realloc(ptr, 0) is equivalent to free(ptr), but not here,
  because of the ++size;

- here, xstrdup() can return NULL (if str is NULL), which goes against
  the idea of the xalloc wrappers.

We were tempted to call exit() or xerrx() in those cases, but decided
against it, because it might break things in unexpected places; TODO?
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
98b79d1ef1 proc/alloc.c: Use vfprintf(), not fprintf().
This can disclose information from the stack, but is unlikely to have a
security impact in the context of the procps utilities:

user@debian:~$ w 2>&1 | xxd
00000000: a03c 79b7 1420 6661 696c 6564 2074 6f20  .<y.. failed to
00000010: 616c 6c6f 6361 7465 2033 3232 3137 3439  allocate 3221749
00000020: 3738 3020 6279 7465 7320 6f66 206d 656d  780 bytes of mem
00000030: 6f72 79                                  ory
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
7941bb512a proc/readproc.c: Add checks to get_ns_name() and get_ns_id(). 2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Qualys Security Advisory
3ce9f837a3 proc/sig.c: Fix the strtosig() function.
Do not memleak "copy" in case of an error.

Do not use "sizeof(converted)" in snprintf(), since "converted" is a
"char *" (luckily, 8 >= sizeof(char *)). Also, remove "sizeof(char)"
which is guaranteed to be 1 by the C standard, and replace 8 with 12,
which is enough to hold any stringified int and does not consume more
memory (in both cases, the glibc malloc()ates a minimum-sized chunk).
2018-05-19 07:32:21 +10:00
Craig Small
75bd099420 library: check not undef SIGLOST
sig.c had this odd logic where on non-Hurd systems it would undefine
SIGLOST. Fine for Hurd or amd64 Linux systems. Bad for a sparc which
has SIGLOST defined *and* is not Hurd.

Just check its defined, its much simpler.
2018-05-03 21:06:05 +10:00
Craig Small
5576c8e438 library: build on non-glibc systems
Some non-glibc systems didn't have libio.h or __BEGIN_DECLS
Changes to make it more standard.

References:
 issue #88
2018-04-10 21:28:11 +10:00
Craig Small
f46865eaf3 sysctl: fixup build system
Remove the external definition of the procio function.
2018-03-12 13:06:08 +11:00
Craig Small
c9be22a8c0 sysctl: Bring procio functions out of library
The procio functions that were in the library have been
moved into sysctl. sysctl is not linked to libprocps in
newlib and none of the other procps binaries would need
to read/write large data to the procfs.

References:
 be6b048a41
2018-03-01 21:25:04 +11:00
Craig Small
063838a7f5 docs: Change name of fprocopen man page
Add NEWS for sysctl large buffers
Rename manpage to fprocopen

References:
 be6b048a41
 procps-ng/procps!56
2018-02-28 21:24:03 +11:00
Werner Fink
e0ab7cff1f Add flexible buffered I/O based on fopencookie(3)
to be able to read and write large buffers below /proc.
The buffers and file offsets are handled dynamically
on the required buffer size at read, that is lseek(2)
is used to determine this size. Large buffers at
write are split at a delimeter into pieces and also
lseek(2) is used to write each of them.

Signed-off-by: Werner Fink <werner@suse.de>
2018-02-28 20:46:58 +11:00
Sven Eden
776b0791ba Add support for elogind
A session manager similar to logind from systemd.
See https://github.com/elogind/elogind

Signed-off-by: Lars Wendler <polynomial-c@gentoo.org>
2017-12-29 15:57:14 +11:00