2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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/*
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* Copyright 1992 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include "rcsid.h"
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2007-10-07 17:15:23 +05:30
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RCSID("$Id: pwauth.c,v 1.14 2003/05/12 04:58:56 kloczek Exp $")
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include "prototypes.h"
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#include "defines.h"
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#include "pwauth.h"
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#include "getdef.h"
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#ifdef SKEY
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#include <skey.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef OPIE
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#include <opie.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef __linux__ /* standard password prompt by default */
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static const char *PROMPT = gettext_noop("Password: ");
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#else
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2007-10-07 17:14:08 +05:30
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static const char *PROMPT = gettext_noop("%s's Password: ");
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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#endif
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2007-10-07 17:14:08 +05:30
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extern char *getpass();
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extern char *getpass_with_echo();
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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int wipe_clear_pass = 1;
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char *clear_pass = NULL;
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/*
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2007-10-07 17:15:23 +05:30
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* pw_auth - perform getpass/crypt authentication
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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*
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2007-10-07 17:15:23 +05:30
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* pw_auth gets the user's cleartext password and encrypts it
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* using the salt in the encrypted password. The results are
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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* compared.
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*/
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2007-10-07 17:15:23 +05:30
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int
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pw_auth(const char *cipher, const char *user, int reason, const char *input)
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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{
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char prompt[1024];
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char *clear = NULL;
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const char *cp;
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int retval;
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#ifdef SKEY
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int use_skey = 0;
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char challenge_info[40];
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struct skey skey;
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#endif
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#ifdef OPIE
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int use_opie = 0;
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char o_challenge_info[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX + 1];
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struct opie opie;
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/*
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* This implementation is based almost entirely on the SKEY code
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* above. Thus the opie struct is called skey, etc. I am unaware
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* if the system works at the same time, but I cannot imagine why
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* anyone would want to do this....
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* -- A.R.
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* Mod: 5/14/98 A.R.
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* Made the OPIE code separate from the S/Key code. Now
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* (conceivably) both can be compiled in and function apart from
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* one another (assuming a sysadmin really wants to maintain OPIE
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* and an S/Key databases....).
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*
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* Also cleaned up the code a bit. Will be adding second-prompt
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* support (the traditional Echo-on S/Key/OPIE-only prompts to let
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* the users see the one-time passwords they are typing/pasting
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* in....
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* -- A.R.
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*/
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#endif
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/*
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* There are programs for adding and deleting authentication data.
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*/
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if (reason == PW_ADD || reason == PW_DELETE)
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return 0;
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/*
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* There are even programs for changing the user name ...
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*/
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if (reason == PW_CHANGE && input != (char *) 0)
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return 0;
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/*
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* WARNING:
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*
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* When we change a password and we are root, we don't prompt.
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* This is so root can change any password without having to
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* know it. This is a policy decision that might have to be
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* revisited.
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*/
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if (reason == PW_CHANGE && getuid () == 0)
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return 0;
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/*
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* WARNING:
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*
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* When we are logging in a user with no ciphertext password,
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* we don't prompt for the password or anything. In reality
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* the user could just hit <ENTER>, so it doesn't really
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* matter.
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*/
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if (cipher == (char *) 0 || *cipher == '\0')
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return 0;
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#ifdef SKEY
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/*
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* If the user has an S/KEY entry show them the pertinent info
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* and then we can try validating the created cyphertext and the SKEY.
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* If there is no SKEY information we default to not using SKEY.
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*/
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if (skeychallenge (&skey, user, challenge_info) == 0)
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use_skey = 1;
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#endif
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#ifdef OPIE
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/*
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* Ditto above, for OPIE passwords.
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* -- AR
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*/
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o_challenge_info[0] = '\0';
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if (opiechallenge(&opie, user, o_challenge_info) == 0)
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use_opie = 1;
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if (use_opie == 0)
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opieverify(&opie, (char *)NULL);
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/*
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* This call to opieverify is necessary within OPIE's interface:
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* Every call to opiechallenge(), which checks to see if the user
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* has an OPIE password, and if so get the challenge, must be
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* accompanied by exactly one call to opieverify, which clears
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* any outstanding locks, and otherwise cleans up.
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* -- AR
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*/
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#endif
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/*
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* Prompt for the password as required. FTPD and REXECD both
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* get the cleartext password for us.
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*/
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if (reason != PW_FTP && reason != PW_REXEC && !input) {
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if (! (cp = getdef_str ("LOGIN_STRING")))
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2007-10-07 17:14:08 +05:30
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cp = _(PROMPT);
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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#ifdef SKEY
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if (use_skey)
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printf ("[%s]\n", challenge_info);
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#endif
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#ifdef OPIE
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if (use_opie)
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printf("[ %s ]\n", o_challenge_info);
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#endif
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snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, cp, user);
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2007-10-07 17:14:08 +05:30
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clear = getpass(prompt);
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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if (!clear) {
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static char c[1];
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c[0] = '\0';
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clear = c;
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}
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input = clear;
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}
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/*
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* Convert the cleartext password into a ciphertext string.
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* If the two match, the return value will be zero, which is
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* SUCCESS. Otherwise we see if SKEY is being used and check
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* the results there as well.
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*/
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retval = strcmp(pw_encrypt(input, cipher), cipher);
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#ifdef OPIE
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/*
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* This is required because using OPIE, opieverify() MUST be called
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* opiechallenge() above even if OPIE isn't being used in this case,
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* so locks get released, etc.
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* -- AR
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*/
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if ((retval == 0) && use_opie)
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opieverify(&opie, (char *)NULL);
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#endif
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2007-10-07 17:14:08 +05:30
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#if (defined(SKEY) || defined(OPIE))
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/*
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* If (1) The password fails to match, and
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* (2) The password is empty and
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* (3) We are using OPIE or S/Key, then
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* ...Re-prompt, with echo on.
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* -- AR 8/22/1999
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*/
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if (retval && !input[0] &&
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(0
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#ifdef SKEY
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|| use_skey
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#endif
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#ifdef OPIE
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|| use_opie
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#endif
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)) {
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strncat(prompt, _("(Echo on) "),
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(sizeof(prompt) - strlen(prompt)));
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clear = getpass_with_echo(prompt);
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if (!clear) {
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static char c[1];
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c[0] = '\0';
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clear = c;
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}
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input = clear;
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}
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#endif
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2007-10-07 17:14:02 +05:30
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#ifdef SKEY
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if (retval && use_skey) {
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int passcheck = -1;
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if (skeyverify(&skey, input) == 0)
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passcheck = skey.n;
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if (passcheck > 0)
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retval = 0;
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef OPIE
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if (retval && use_opie) {
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if (opieverify(&opie, input) == 0)
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retval = 0;
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}
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#endif /* OPIE */
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/*
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* Things like RADIUS authentication may need the password -
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* if the external variable wipe_clear_pass is zero, we will
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* not wipe it (the caller should wipe clear_pass when it is
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* no longer needed). --marekm
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*/
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clear_pass = clear;
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if (wipe_clear_pass && clear && *clear)
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strzero(clear);
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return retval;
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}
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