Merge pull request #138 from brauner/2018-10-27/setuid_fscaps
new{g,u}idmap: align setuid and fscaps behavior
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commit
42324e5017
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
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#include "idmapping.h"
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
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# include <sys/capability.h>
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#include <sys/capability.h>
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#endif
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struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
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@ -123,58 +123,76 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
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*/
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#define ULONG_DIGITS ((((sizeof(unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT) + 9)/10)*3)
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/*
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* The ruid refers to the caller's uid and is used to reset the effective uid
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* back to the callers real uid.
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* This clutch mainly exists for setuid-based new{g,u}idmap binaries that are
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* called in contexts where all capabilities other than the necessary
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* CAP_SET{G,U}ID capabilities are dropped. Since the kernel will require
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* assurance that the caller holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the target user namespace
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* the only way it can confirm is in this case is if the effective uid is
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* equivalent to the uid owning the target user namespace.
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* Note, we only support this when a) new{g,u}idmap is not called by root and
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* b) if the caller's uid and the uid retrieved via system appropriate means
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* (shadow file or other) are identical. Specifically, this does not support
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* when the root user calls the new{g,u}idmap binary for an unprivileged user.
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* If this is wanted: use file capabilities!
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*/
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void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings,
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const char *map_file, uid_t uid)
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const char *map_file, uid_t ruid)
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{
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int idx;
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struct map_range *mapping;
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size_t bufsize;
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char *buf, *pos;
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int fd;
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#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
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struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = { _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0 };
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struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2] = { { 0 } };
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#endif
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bufsize = ranges * ((ULONG_DIGITS + 1) * 3);
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pos = buf = xmalloc(bufsize);
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#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
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int cap;
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struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = {_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0};
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struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2] = {{0}};
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if (strcmp(map_file, "uid_map") == 0) {
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cap = CAP_SETUID;
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} else if (strcmp(map_file, "gid_map") == 0) {
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cap = CAP_SETGID;
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} else {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Invalid map file %s specified\n"), Prog, map_file);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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if (capget(&hdr, data) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not get capabilities\n"), Prog);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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if (!(data[0].effective & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
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uid != geteuid()) {
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bool uid_map;
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if (strcmp(map_file, "uid_map") == 0) {
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uid_map = true;
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} else if (strcmp(map_file, "gid_map") == 0) {
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uid_map = false;
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} else {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Invalid map file %s specified\n"), Prog, map_file);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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/* Align setuid- and fscaps-based new{g,u}idmap behavior. */
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if (!(data[0].effective & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && ruid != 0 &&
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ruid == getuid() && ruid != geteuid()) {
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if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS)\n"), Prog);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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if (seteuid(uid) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not seteuid to %d\n"), Prog, uid);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
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data[0].effective = data[0].permitted = CAP_TO_MASK(uid_map ? CAP_SETUID : CAP_SETGID);
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if (capset(&hdr, data) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not set caps\n"), Prog);
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if (seteuid(ruid) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not seteuid to %d\n"), Prog, ruid);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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}
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/* Lockdown new{g,u}idmap by dropping all unneeded capabilities. */
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memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
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data[0].effective = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
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data[0].permitted = data[0].effective;
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if (capset(&hdr, data) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not set caps\n"), Prog);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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#endif
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bufsize = ranges * ((ULONG_DIGITS + 1) * 3);
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pos = buf = xmalloc(bufsize);
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/* Build the mapping command */
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mapping = mappings;
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for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ struct map_range {
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extern struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv);
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extern void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges,
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struct map_range *mappings, const char *map_file, uid_t uid);
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struct map_range *mappings, const char *map_file, uid_t ruid);
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#endif /* _ID_MAPPING_H_ */
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