Commit Graph

550 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alejandro Colomar
0712b236c3 Add bit manipulation functions
We do need the unoptimized version of csrand_uniform() for high values
of `n`, since the optimized version depends on having __int128, and it's
not available on several platforms, including ARMv7, IA32, and MK68k.

This reverts commit 848f53c1d3c1362c86d3baab6906e1e4419d2634; however,
I applied some tweaks to the reverted commit.

Reported-by: Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-30 18:24:15 +01:00
Alejandro Colomar
848f53c1d3 Revert "Add bit manipulation functions"
Now that we optimized csrand_uniform(), we don't need these functions.

This reverts commit 7c8fe291b1260e127c10562bfd7616961013730f.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
1a0e13f94e Optimize csrand_uniform()
Use a different algorithm to minimize rejection.  This is essentially
the same algorithm implemented in the Linux kernel for
__get_random_u32_below(), but written in a more readable way, and
avoiding microopimizations that make it less readable.

Which (the Linux kernel implementation) is itself based on Daniel
Lemire's algorithm from "Fast Random Integer Generation in an Interval",
linked below.  However, I couldn't really understand that paper very
much, so I had to reconstruct the proofs from scratch, just from what I
could understand from the Linux kernel implementation source code.

I constructed some graphical explanation of how it works, and why it
is optimal, because I needed to visualize it to understand it.  It is
published in the GitHub pull request linked below.

Here goes a wordy explanation of why this algorithm based on
multiplication is better optimized than my original implementation based
on masking.

masking:

	It discards the extra bits of entropy that are not necessary for
	this operation.  This works as if dividing the entire space of
	possible csrand() values into smaller spaces of a size that is
	a smaller power of 2.  Each of those smaller spaces has a
	rejection band, so we get as many rejection bands as spaces
	there are.  For smaller values of 'n', the size of each
	rejection band is smaller, but having more rejection bands
	compensates for this, and results in the same inefficiency as
	for large values of 'n'.

multiplication:

	It divides the entire space of possible random numbers in
	chunks of size exactly 'n', so that there is only one rejection
	band that is the remainder of `2^64 % n`.  The worst case is
	still similar to the masking algorithm, a rejection band that is
	almost half the entire space (n = 2^63 + 1), but for lower
	values of 'n', by only having one small rejection band, it is
	much faster than the masking algorithm.

	This algorithm, however, has one caveat: the implementation
	is harder to read, since it relies on several bitwise tricky
	operations to perform operations like `2^64 % n`, `mult % 2^64`,
	and `mult / 2^64`.  And those operations are different depending
	on the number of bits of the maximum possible random number
	generated by the function.  This means that while this algorithm
	could also be applied to get uniform random numbers in the range
	[0, n-1] quickly from a function like rand(3), which only
	produces 31 bits of (non-CS) random numbers, it would need to be
	implemented differently.  However, that's not a concern for us,
	it's just a note so that nobody picks this code and expects it
	to just work with rand(3) (which BTW I tried for testing it, and
	got a bit confused until I realized this).

Finally, here's some light testing of this implementation, just to know
that I didn't goof it.  I pasted this function into a standalone
program, and run it many times to find if it has any bias (I tested also
to see how many iterations it performs, and it's also almost always 1,
but that test is big enough to not paste it here).

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	printf("%lu\n", csrand_uniform(atoi(argv[1])));
}

$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 1 | wc -l
341
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 1 | wc -l
339
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 1 | wc -l
338
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 2 | wc -l
336
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 2 | wc -l
328
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 2 | wc -l
335
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 0 | wc -l
332
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 0 | wc -l
331
$ seq 1 1000 | while read _; do ./a.out 3; done | grep 0 | wc -l
327

This isn't a complete test for a cryptographically-secure random number
generator, of course, but I leave that for interested parties.

Link: <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e9a688bcb19348862afe30d7c85bc37c4c293471>
Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/624#discussion_r1059574358>
Link: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10941>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
[Daniel Lemire: Added link to research paper in source code]
Cc: Daniel Lemire <daniel@lemire.me>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
217b054cf5 Use WIDTHOF() instead of its expansion
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
1db190cb66 Rewrite csrand_interval() as a wrapper around csrand_uniform()
The old code didn't produce very good random numbers.  It had a bias.
And that was from performing some unnecessary floating-point
calculations that overcomplicate the problem.

Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
31375d48ca Add csrand_uniform()
This API is similar to arc4random_uniform(3).  However, for an input of
0, this function is equivalent to csrand(), while arc4random_uniform(0)
returns 0.

This function will be used to reimplement csrand_interval() as a wrapper
around this one.

The current implementation of csrand_interval() doesn't produce very good
random numbers.  It has a bias.  And that comes from performing some
unnecessary floating-point calculations that overcomplicate the problem.

Looping until the random number hits within bounds is unbiased, and
truncating unwanted bits makes the overhead of the loop very small.

We could reduce loop overhead even more, by keeping unused bits of the
random number, if the width of the mask is not greater than
ULONG_WIDTH/2, however, that complicates the code considerably, and I
prefer to be a bit slower but have simple code.

BTW, Björn really deserves the copyright for csrand() (previously known
as read_random_bytes()), since he rewrote it almost from scratch last
year, and I kept most of its contents.  Since he didn't put himself in
the copyright back then, and BSD-3-Clause doesn't allow me to attribute
derived works, I won't add his name, but if he asks, he should be put in
the copyright too.

Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
4a56f2baab Add bit manipulation functions
These functions implement bit manipulation APIs, which will be added to
C23, so that in the far future, we will be able to replace our functions
by the standard ones, just by adding the stdc_ prefix, and including
<stdbit.h>.

However, we need to avoid UB for an input of 0, so slightly deviate from
C23, and use a different name (with _wrap) for distunguishing our API
from the standard one.

Cc: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
be1f4f7972 Move csrand() to a new file csrand.c
A set of APIs similar to arc4random(3) is complex enough to deserve its
own file.

Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
986ef4e69c Use naming consistent with other common functions
arc4random(3) returns a number.
arc4random_buf(3) fills a buffer.
arc4random_uniform(3) returns a number less than a bound.

and I'd add a hypothetical one which we use:

*_interval() should return a number within the interval [min, max].

In reality, the function being called csrand() in this patch is not
really cryptographically secure, since it had a bias, but a subsequent
patch will fix that.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
6d2337d9e8 Fix types of the csrand_interval() API
We were always casting the result to u_long.  Better just use that type
in the function.  Since we're returning u_long, it makes sense to also
specify the input as u_long.  In fact, that'll help for doing bitwise
operations inside this function.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
8f441c9f7a Use a more precise name for a CSPRNG API with an interval
I have plans to split this function in smaller functions that implement
bits of this functionallity, to simplify the implementation.  So, let's
use names that distinguish them.

This one produces a number within an interval, so make that clear.  Also
make clear that the function produces cryptographically-secure numbers.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-27 21:48:37 -06:00
Samanta Navarro
b2d202cb5d libmisc: fix grammar
Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
2023-01-26 22:44:39 -06:00
Christian Göttsche
c99d8d0a08 Avoid comparisons of different signs
Comparisons if different signedness can result in unexpected results.
Add casts to ensure operants are of the same type.

    gettime.c: In function 'gettime':
    gettime.c:58:26: warning: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: 'long long unsigned int' and 'time_t' {aka 'long int'} [-Wsign-compare]
       58 |         } else if (epoch > fallback) {
          |                          ^

Cast to time_t, since epoch is less than ULONG_MAX at this point.

    idmapping.c: In function 'write_mapping':
    idmapping.c:202:48: warning: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: 'int' and 'long unsigned int' [-Wsign-compare]
      202 |                 if ((written <= 0) || (written >= (bufsize - (pos - buf)))) {
          |                                                ^~

    newgidmap.c: In function ‘main’:
    newgidmap.c:178:40: warning: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: ‘int’ and ‘long unsigned int’ [-Wsign-compare]
      178 |         if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
          |                                        ^~
    newuidmap.c: In function ‘main’:
    newuidmap.c:107:40: warning: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: ‘int’ and ‘long unsigned int’ [-Wsign-compare]
      107 |         if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
          |                                        ^~
2023-01-25 12:31:17 +01:00
Christian Göttsche
43508ac476 Drop redundant declaration
environ is exported in <unistd.h>.

    env.c:29:15: warning: redundant redeclaration of 'environ' [-Wredundant-decls]
       29 | extern char **environ;
          |               ^~~~~~~
    login.c:92:15: warning: redundant redeclaration of ‘environ’ [-Wredundant-decls]
       92 | extern char **environ;
          |               ^~~~~~~
    sulogin.c:40:15: warning: redundant redeclaration of ‘environ’ [-Wredundant-decls]
       40 | extern char **environ;
          |               ^~~~~~~
    newgrp.c:32:15: warning: redundant redeclaration of ‘environ’ [-Wredundant-decls]
       32 | extern char **environ;
          |               ^~~~~~~
2023-01-25 12:31:17 +01:00
Christian Göttsche
46d3058341 copydir: fix impl usage
copydir.c: In function 'copy_dir':
    copydir.c:517:32: warning: passing argument 1 of 'copy_tree' from incompatible pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
      517 |             return (copy_tree (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
          |                                ^~~
          |                                |
          |                                const struct path_info *
    In file included from copydir.c:20:
    ../lib/prototypes.h:108:35: note: expected 'const char *' but argument is of type 'const struct path_info *'
      108 | extern int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
          |                       ~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~
    copydir.c:517:37: warning: passing argument 2 of 'copy_tree' from incompatible pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
      517 |             return (copy_tree (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
          |                                     ^~~
          |                                     |
          |                                     const struct path_info *
    ../lib/prototypes.h:108:57: note: expected 'const char *' but argument is of type 'const struct path_info *'
      108 | extern int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
          |                                             ~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~

Fixes: 74c17c71 ("Add support for skeleton files from /usr/etc/skel")
2023-01-25 12:31:17 +01:00
Alejandro Colomar
b2bed465e8 Use getnameinfo(3) instead of our own equivalent
I didn't know getnameinfo(3) existed, so I implemented it, or something
similar to it called inet_sockaddr2str().  Let's use the standard API.

Link: <https://inbox.sourceware.org/libc-alpha/0f25d60f-f183-b518-b6c1-6d46aa63ee57@gmail.com/T/>
Link: <https://stackoverflow.com/a/42190913/6872717>
Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/617>
Link: <https://software.codidact.com/posts/287748>
Cc: Zack Weinberg <zack@owlfolio.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-20 10:23:03 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
ac8b81c2b7 Prefer getrandom(3)/getentropy(3) over arc4random(3bsd)
arc4random(3) without kernel support is unsafe, as it can't know when to
drop the buffer.  Since we depend on libbsd since recently, we have
arc4random(3) functions always available, and thus, this code would have
always called arc4random_buf(3bsd), which is unsafe.  Put it after some
better alternatives, at least until in a decade or so all systems have a
recent enough glibc.

glibc implements arc4random(3) safely, since it's just a wrapper around
getrandom(2).

Link: <https://inbox.sourceware.org/libc-alpha/20220722122137.3270666-1-adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org/>
Link: <https://inbox.sourceware.org/libc-alpha/5c29df04-6283-9eee-6648-215b52cfa26b@cs.ucla.edu/T/>
Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Guillem Jover <guillem@hadrons.org>
Cc: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-16 10:12:31 +01:00
Alejandro Colomar
bb3a89577c Add inet_sockaddr2str() to wrap inet_ntop(3)
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2023-01-02 08:20:43 +01:00
Alejandro Colomar
220b352b70 Use strlcpy(3) instead of its pattern
-  Since strncpy(3) is not designed to write strings, but rather
   (null-padded) character sequences (a.k.a. unterminated strings), we
   had to manually append a '\0'.  strlcpy(3) creates strings, so they
   are always terminated.  This removes dependencies between lines, and
   also removes chances of accidents.

-  Repurposing strncpy(3) to create strings requires calculating the
   location of the terminating null byte, which involves a '-1'
   calculation.  This is a source of off-by-one bugs.  The new code has
   no '-1' calculations, so there's almost-zero chance of these bugs.

-  strlcpy(3) doesn't padd with null bytes.  Padding is relevant when
   writing fixed-width buffers to binary files, when interfacing certain
   APIs (I believe utmpx requires null padding at lease in some
   systems), or when sending them to other processes or through the
   network.  This is not the case, so padding is effectively ignored.

-  strlcpy(3) requires that the input string is really a string;
   otherwise it crashes (SIGSEGV).  Let's check if the input strings are
   really strings:

   -  lib/fields.c:
      -  'cp' was assigned from 'newft', and 'newft' comes from fgets(3).

   -  lib/gshadow.c:
      -  strlen(string) is calculated a few lines above.

   -  libmisc/console.c:
      -  'cons' comes from getdef_str, which is a bit cryptic, but seems
         to generate strings, I guess.1

   -  libmisc/date_to_str.c:
      -  It receives a string literal.  :)

   -  libmisc/utmp.c:
      -  'tname' comes from ttyname(3), which returns a string.

   -  src/su.c:
      -  'tmp_name' has been passed to strcmp(3) a few lines above.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-22 18:03:39 -06:00
Iker Pedrosa
a48d77bdef strtoday.c: remove unused defines.h inclusion
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
2022-12-22 10:39:45 -06:00
Iker Pedrosa
bb0c89d944 strtoday.c: remove USE_GETDATE as it was always used
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
2022-12-22 10:39:45 -06:00
Iker Pedrosa
e4441489bc strtoday.c: remove POSIX 1995 conditional dependency
Since the project is supposed to be POSIX.1-2001 compliant it doesn't
make sense to have that added conditionally.

Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
2022-12-22 10:39:45 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
d96bb2868d Assume struct stat has st_atim and st_mtim fields
That's required by POSIX.1-2008.

Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/600>
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-22 09:49:02 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
e2df287aad Don't redefine errno(3)
It is Undefined Behavior to declare errno (see NOTES in its manual page).
Instead of using the errno dummy declaration, use one that doesn't need
a comment.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-22 11:43:29 +01:00
Alejandro Colomar
b990b167d4 Cosmetic fixes
Previous commits, to keep readability of the diffs, left the code that
was previously wrapped by preprocessor coditionals untouched.  Apply
some minor cosmetic changes to merge it in the surrounding code.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-22 10:31:43 +01:00
Alejandro Colomar
170b76cdd1 Disable utmpx permanently
On Linux, utmpx and utmp are identical.  However, documentation (manual
pages) covers utmp, and just says about utmpx that it's identical to
utmp.  It seems that it's preferred to use utmp, at least by reading the
manual pages.

Moreover, we were defaulting to utmp (utmpx had to be explicitly enabled
at configuration time).  So, it seems safer to just make it permanent,
which should not affect default builds.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-22 10:31:43 +01:00
Michael Vetter
74c17c7167 Add support for skeleton files from /usr/etc/skel
This patch is used by openSUSE to make useradd look for
skeleton files in /usr/etc/skel additionally to /etc/skel
in accordance with
https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/base_directory_specification/
2022-12-19 09:43:03 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
6b6e005ce1 Remove comments that survived the Helicoprion
The OSes that are referred to by these comments, are extinct, but
their comments survived, fossilized in amber.

Reported-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
61299d69ad Assume B[0-9]* macros are defined
All of the macros we're using are required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
f51c6838ac Assume SIGTTOU is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
307502d8b5 Assume SIGTSTP is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
74c8015730 Assume RLIMIT_STACK is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
c916715a6c Assume RLIMIT_NOFILE is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
5ebf28c999 Assume RLIMIT_FSIZE is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
91adf3b8bb Assume RLIMIT_DATA is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
891d8dbedd Assume RLIMIT_CPU is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
7a4906fc75 Assume RLIMIT_AS is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
e1a39e1dfc Assume RLIMIT_CORE is defined
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
cbc363f671 Assume getgrgid_r(3) exists
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
88eb38f4ab Assume getgrnam_r(3) exists
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
e5e5df1966 Assume getpwuid_r(3) exists
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
e788001977 Assume getpwnam_r(3) exists
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
55c62b663f Assume l64a(3) exists
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
b76d9b540a Remove preprocessor conditionals that are always true
Since the last commit, LIMITS is always defined.  Remove the dummy
macro, and all conditionals on it.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
9d695340b4 Assume <sys/resource.h> exists
It is required by POSIX.1-2001.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
cdaa04e460 Remove uses of ulimit(3)
The function is obsolete.  It is recommended to use getrlimit(2) instead
(see the manual page for ulimit(3) or the POSIX manual for it).  Since
getrlimit(2) is required by POSIX.1-2001, we can rely on it.

Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Alejandro Colomar
0527fa677b Add indentation to heavy use of preprocessor conditionals
This clarifies which code is under which conditions,
for further clenaup.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-15 16:22:05 -06:00
Guillem Jover
2a5b8810bb agetpass: Hook into build-system
Signed-off-by: Guillem Jover <guillem@hadrons.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-05 10:47:19 +01:00
Alex Colomar
155c9421b9 libmisc: agetpass(), erase_pass(): Add functions for getting passwords safely
There are several issues with getpass(3).

Many implementations of it share the same issues that the infamous
gets(3).  In glibc it's not so terrible, since it's a wrapper
around getline(3).  But it still has an important bug:

If the password is long enough, getline(3) will realloc(3) memory,
and prefixes of the password will be laying around in some
deallocated memory.

See the getpass(3) manual page for more details, and especially
the commit that marked it as deprecated, which links to a long
discussion in the linux-man@ mailing list.

So, readpassphrase(3bsd) is preferrable, which is provided by
libbsd on GNU systems.  However, using readpassphrase(3) directly
is a bit verbose, so we can write our own wrapper with a simpler
interface similar to that of getpass(3).

One of the benefits of writing our own interface around
readpassphrase(3) is that we can hide there any checks that should
be done always and which would be error-prone to repeat every
time.  For example, check that there was no truncation in the
password.

Also, use malloc(3) to get the buffer, instead of using a global
buffer.  We're not using a multithreaded program (and it wouldn't
make sense to do so), but it's nice to know that the visibility of
our passwords is as limited as possible.

erase_pass() is a clean-up function that handles all clean-up
correctly, including zeroing the entire buffer, and then
free(3)ing the memory.  By using [[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]], we
make sure that we don't leak the buffers in any case, since the
compiler will be able to enforce clean up.

Link: <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit?id=7ca189099d73bde954eed2d7fc21732bcc8ddc6b>
Reported-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
2022-12-05 10:47:19 +01:00
Iker Pedrosa
d324c6776b libmisc: minimum id check for system accounts
The minimum id allocation for system accounts shouldn't be 0 as this is
reserved for root.

Signed-off-by: Tomáš Mráz <tm@t8m.info>
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
2022-10-06 20:09:35 -05:00