All of the macros we're using are required by POSIX.1-2001.
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The function is obsolete. It is recommended to use getrlimit(2) instead
(see the manual page for ulimit(3) or the POSIX manual for it). Since
getrlimit(2) is required by POSIX.1-2001, we can rely on it.
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
There are several issues with getpass(3).
Many implementations of it share the same issues that the infamous
gets(3). In glibc it's not so terrible, since it's a wrapper
around getline(3). But it still has an important bug:
If the password is long enough, getline(3) will realloc(3) memory,
and prefixes of the password will be laying around in some
deallocated memory.
See the getpass(3) manual page for more details, and especially
the commit that marked it as deprecated, which links to a long
discussion in the linux-man@ mailing list.
So, readpassphrase(3bsd) is preferrable, which is provided by
libbsd on GNU systems. However, using readpassphrase(3) directly
is a bit verbose, so we can write our own wrapper with a simpler
interface similar to that of getpass(3).
One of the benefits of writing our own interface around
readpassphrase(3) is that we can hide there any checks that should
be done always and which would be error-prone to repeat every
time. For example, check that there was no truncation in the
password.
Also, use malloc(3) to get the buffer, instead of using a global
buffer. We're not using a multithreaded program (and it wouldn't
make sense to do so), but it's nice to know that the visibility of
our passwords is as limited as possible.
erase_pass() is a clean-up function that handles all clean-up
correctly, including zeroing the entire buffer, and then
free(3)ing the memory. By using [[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]], we
make sure that we don't leak the buffers in any case, since the
compiler will be able to enforce clean up.
Link: <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit?id=7ca189099d73bde954eed2d7fc21732bcc8ddc6b>
Reported-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The minimum id allocation for system accounts shouldn't be 0 as this is
reserved for root.
Signed-off-by: Tomáš Mráz <tm@t8m.info>
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
glibc, musl, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD define the MAX() and MIN()
macros in <sys/param.h> with the same definition that we use.
Let's not redefine it here and use the system one, as it's
effectively the same as we define (modulo whitespace).
See:
shadow (previously):
alx@asus5775:~/src/shadow/shadow$ grepc -ktm MAX
./lib/defines.h:318:#define MAX(x,y) (((x) > (y)) ? (x) : (y))
glibc:
alx@asus5775:~/src/gnu/glibc$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./misc/sys/param.h:103:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
musl:
alx@asus5775:~/src/musl/musl$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./include/sys/param.h:19:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
OpenBSD:
alx@asus5775:~/src/bsd/openbsd/src$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./sys/sys/param.h:193:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
FreeBSD:
alx@asus5775:~/src/bsd/freebsd/freebsd-src$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./sys/sys/param.h:333:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
free(3) accepts NULL, since the oldest ISO C. I guess the
paranoid code was taking care of prehistoric implementations of
free(3). I've never known of an implementation that doesn't
conform to this, so let's simplify this.
Remove xfree(3), which was effectively an equivalent of free(3).
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The setuid, setgid, and sticky bits are not copied during copy_tree.
Also start with very restrictive permissions before setting ownerships.
This prevents situations in which users in a group with less permissions
than others could win a race in opening the file before permissions are
removed again.
Proof of concept:
$ echo $HOME
/home/uwu
$ install -o uwu -g fandom -m 604 /dev/null /home/uwu/owo
$ ls -l /home/uwu/owo
-rw----r-- 1 uwu fandom 0 Sep 4 00:00 /home/uwu/owo
If /tmp is on another filesystem, then "usermod -md /tmp/uwu uwu" leads
to this temporary situation:
$ ls -l /tmp/uwu/owo
-rw----r-- 1 root root 0 Sep 4 00:00 /tmp/uwu/owo
This means that between openat and chownat_if_needed a user of group
fandom could open /tmp/uwu/owo and read the content when it is finally
written into the file.
Fixes regression introduced in faeab50e71.
If a directory contains fifos, then openat blocks until the other side
of the fifo is connected as well.
This means that users can prevent "usermod -m" from completing if their
home directories contain at least one fifo.
The groupadd from shadow does not allow upper case group names, the
same is true for the upstream shadow. But distributions like
Debian/Ubuntu/CentOS has their own way to cope with this problem,
this patch is picked up from Fedora [1] to relax the usernames
restrictions to allow the upper case group names, and the relaxation is
POSIX compliant because POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of
characters from the portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-].
[1] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/shadow-utils/blob/rawhide/f/shadow-4.8-goodname.patch
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
privileged files.
Introduce a path_info struct with the full path and dirfd and name
information for *at() functions, since the full path is needed for link
resolution, SELinux label lookup and ACL attributes.
Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
privileged files.
Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
privileged files.
Allow the compiler to verify the format string against the supplied
arguments.
chage.c:239:51: warning: format not a string literal, format string not checked [-Wformat-nonliteral]
239 | (void) strftime (buf, sizeof buf, format, tp);
| ^~~~~~
salt.c:102:22: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
102 | static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long SHA_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds);
| ^~~~~
salt.c:110:22: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
110 | static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long YESCRYPT_get_salt_cost (/*@null@*/int *prefered_cost);
| ^~~~~
subordinateio.c:160:8: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
160 | static const bool range_exists(struct commonio_db *db, const char *owner)
| ^~~~~
Compilers are free to ignore the indented hint and modern optimizations
should create good code by themself.
(As such it is for example deprecated in C++17.)
On systems with Linux kernel < 3.17, getentropy() and getrandom() may
exist but return ENOSYS. Use /dev/urandom as a fallback to avoid a hard
requirement on Linux kernel version.
Fixes#512.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
In order to remove some of the FIXMEs it was necessary to change the
code and call getulong() instead of getlong().
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
C89 and POSIX.1-2001 define signal(2) as returning a pointer to a
function returning 'void'. K&R C signal(2) signature is obsolete.
Use 'void' directly.
Also, instead of writing the function pointer type explicitly, use
POSIX's 'sighandler_t'.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
