- Since strncpy(3) is not designed to write strings, but rather
(null-padded) character sequences (a.k.a. unterminated strings), we
had to manually append a '\0'. strlcpy(3) creates strings, so they
are always terminated. This removes dependencies between lines, and
also removes chances of accidents.
- Repurposing strncpy(3) to create strings requires calculating the
location of the terminating null byte, which involves a '-1'
calculation. This is a source of off-by-one bugs. The new code has
no '-1' calculations, so there's almost-zero chance of these bugs.
- strlcpy(3) doesn't padd with null bytes. Padding is relevant when
writing fixed-width buffers to binary files, when interfacing certain
APIs (I believe utmpx requires null padding at lease in some
systems), or when sending them to other processes or through the
network. This is not the case, so padding is effectively ignored.
- strlcpy(3) requires that the input string is really a string;
otherwise it crashes (SIGSEGV). Let's check if the input strings are
really strings:
- lib/fields.c:
- 'cp' was assigned from 'newft', and 'newft' comes from fgets(3).
- lib/gshadow.c:
- strlen(string) is calculated a few lines above.
- libmisc/console.c:
- 'cons' comes from getdef_str, which is a bit cryptic, but seems
to generate strings, I guess.1
- libmisc/date_to_str.c:
- It receives a string literal. :)
- libmisc/utmp.c:
- 'tname' comes from ttyname(3), which returns a string.
- src/su.c:
- 'tmp_name' has been passed to strcmp(3) a few lines above.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Since the project is supposed to be POSIX.1-2001 compliant it doesn't
make sense to have that added conditionally.
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
It is Undefined Behavior to declare errno (see NOTES in its manual page).
Instead of using the errno dummy declaration, use one that doesn't need
a comment.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Previous commits, to keep readability of the diffs, left the code that
was previously wrapped by preprocessor coditionals untouched. Apply
some minor cosmetic changes to merge it in the surrounding code.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
On Linux, utmpx and utmp are identical. However, documentation (manual
pages) covers utmp, and just says about utmpx that it's identical to
utmp. It seems that it's preferred to use utmp, at least by reading the
manual pages.
Moreover, we were defaulting to utmp (utmpx had to be explicitly enabled
at configuration time). So, it seems safer to just make it permanent,
which should not affect default builds.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The OSes that are referred to by these comments, are extinct, but
their comments survived, fossilized in amber.
Reported-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
All of the macros we're using are required by POSIX.1-2001.
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The function is obsolete. It is recommended to use getrlimit(2) instead
(see the manual page for ulimit(3) or the POSIX manual for it). Since
getrlimit(2) is required by POSIX.1-2001, we can rely on it.
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
There are several issues with getpass(3).
Many implementations of it share the same issues that the infamous
gets(3). In glibc it's not so terrible, since it's a wrapper
around getline(3). But it still has an important bug:
If the password is long enough, getline(3) will realloc(3) memory,
and prefixes of the password will be laying around in some
deallocated memory.
See the getpass(3) manual page for more details, and especially
the commit that marked it as deprecated, which links to a long
discussion in the linux-man@ mailing list.
So, readpassphrase(3bsd) is preferrable, which is provided by
libbsd on GNU systems. However, using readpassphrase(3) directly
is a bit verbose, so we can write our own wrapper with a simpler
interface similar to that of getpass(3).
One of the benefits of writing our own interface around
readpassphrase(3) is that we can hide there any checks that should
be done always and which would be error-prone to repeat every
time. For example, check that there was no truncation in the
password.
Also, use malloc(3) to get the buffer, instead of using a global
buffer. We're not using a multithreaded program (and it wouldn't
make sense to do so), but it's nice to know that the visibility of
our passwords is as limited as possible.
erase_pass() is a clean-up function that handles all clean-up
correctly, including zeroing the entire buffer, and then
free(3)ing the memory. By using [[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]], we
make sure that we don't leak the buffers in any case, since the
compiler will be able to enforce clean up.
Link: <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit?id=7ca189099d73bde954eed2d7fc21732bcc8ddc6b>
Reported-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The minimum id allocation for system accounts shouldn't be 0 as this is
reserved for root.
Signed-off-by: Tomáš Mráz <tm@t8m.info>
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
glibc, musl, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD define the MAX() and MIN()
macros in <sys/param.h> with the same definition that we use.
Let's not redefine it here and use the system one, as it's
effectively the same as we define (modulo whitespace).
See:
shadow (previously):
alx@asus5775:~/src/shadow/shadow$ grepc -ktm MAX
./lib/defines.h:318:#define MAX(x,y) (((x) > (y)) ? (x) : (y))
glibc:
alx@asus5775:~/src/gnu/glibc$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./misc/sys/param.h:103:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
musl:
alx@asus5775:~/src/musl/musl$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./include/sys/param.h:19:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
OpenBSD:
alx@asus5775:~/src/bsd/openbsd/src$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./sys/sys/param.h:193:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
FreeBSD:
alx@asus5775:~/src/bsd/freebsd/freebsd-src$ grepc -ktm -x 'sys/param.h$' MAX
./sys/sys/param.h:333:#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
free(3) accepts NULL, since the oldest ISO C. I guess the
paranoid code was taking care of prehistoric implementations of
free(3). I've never known of an implementation that doesn't
conform to this, so let's simplify this.
Remove xfree(3), which was effectively an equivalent of free(3).
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
The setuid, setgid, and sticky bits are not copied during copy_tree.
Also start with very restrictive permissions before setting ownerships.
This prevents situations in which users in a group with less permissions
than others could win a race in opening the file before permissions are
removed again.
Proof of concept:
$ echo $HOME
/home/uwu
$ install -o uwu -g fandom -m 604 /dev/null /home/uwu/owo
$ ls -l /home/uwu/owo
-rw----r-- 1 uwu fandom 0 Sep 4 00:00 /home/uwu/owo
If /tmp is on another filesystem, then "usermod -md /tmp/uwu uwu" leads
to this temporary situation:
$ ls -l /tmp/uwu/owo
-rw----r-- 1 root root 0 Sep 4 00:00 /tmp/uwu/owo
This means that between openat and chownat_if_needed a user of group
fandom could open /tmp/uwu/owo and read the content when it is finally
written into the file.
Fixes regression introduced in faeab50e71.
If a directory contains fifos, then openat blocks until the other side
of the fifo is connected as well.
This means that users can prevent "usermod -m" from completing if their
home directories contain at least one fifo.
The groupadd from shadow does not allow upper case group names, the
same is true for the upstream shadow. But distributions like
Debian/Ubuntu/CentOS has their own way to cope with this problem,
this patch is picked up from Fedora [1] to relax the usernames
restrictions to allow the upper case group names, and the relaxation is
POSIX compliant because POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of
characters from the portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-].
[1] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/shadow-utils/blob/rawhide/f/shadow-4.8-goodname.patch
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
privileged files.
Introduce a path_info struct with the full path and dirfd and name
information for *at() functions, since the full path is needed for link
resolution, SELinux label lookup and ACL attributes.
Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
privileged files.
Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
privileged files.
Allow the compiler to verify the format string against the supplied
arguments.
chage.c:239:51: warning: format not a string literal, format string not checked [-Wformat-nonliteral]
239 | (void) strftime (buf, sizeof buf, format, tp);
| ^~~~~~
salt.c:102:22: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
102 | static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long SHA_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds);
| ^~~~~
salt.c:110:22: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
110 | static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long YESCRYPT_get_salt_cost (/*@null@*/int *prefered_cost);
| ^~~~~
subordinateio.c:160:8: warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
160 | static const bool range_exists(struct commonio_db *db, const char *owner)
| ^~~~~
