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shadow/src/su.c

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2013, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/* Some parts substantially derived from an ancestor of:
su for GNU. Run a shell with substitute user and group IDs.
Copyright (C) 1992-2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA. */
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <getopt.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifndef USE_PAM
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "pwauth.h"
#include "getdef.h"
#ifdef USE_PAM
#include "pam_defs.h"
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*@-exitarg@*/
#include "exitcodes.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
/*
* Global variables
*/
const char *Prog;
static /*@observer@*/const char *caller_tty = NULL; /* Name of tty SU is run from */
static bool caller_is_root = false;
static uid_t caller_uid;
#ifndef USE_PAM
static bool caller_on_console = false;
#ifdef SU_ACCESS
static /*@only@*/char *caller_pass;
#endif
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
static bool doshell = false;
static bool fakelogin = false;
static /*@observer@*/const char *shellstr;
static /*@null@*/char *command = NULL;
/* not needed by sulog.c anymore */
static char name[BUFSIZ];
static char caller_name[BUFSIZ];
/* If nonzero, change some environment vars to indicate the user su'd to. */
static bool change_environment = true;
#ifdef USE_PAM
static char kill_msg[256];
static char wait_msg[256];
static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
static int caught = 0;
/* PID of the child, in case it needs to be killed */
static pid_t pid_child = 0;
#endif
/*
* External identifiers
*/
extern char **newenvp; /* libmisc/env.c */
extern size_t newenvc; /* libmisc/env.c */
/* local function prototypes */
static void execve_shell (const char *shellname,
char *args[],
char *const envp[]);
#ifdef USE_PAM
static void kill_child (int unused(s));
static void prepare_pam_close_session (void);
#else /* !USE_PAM */
static void die (int);
static bool iswheel (const char *);
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
static bool restricted_shell (const char *shellname);
NORETURN static void su_failure (const char *tty, bool su_to_root);
static /*@only@*/struct passwd * check_perms (void);
#ifdef USE_PAM
static void check_perms_pam (const struct passwd *pw);
#else /* !USE_PAM */
static void check_perms_nopam (const struct passwd *pw);
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
static void save_caller_context (char **argv);
static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
static void set_environment (struct passwd *pw);
#ifndef USE_PAM
/*
* die - set or reset termio modes.
*
* die() is called before processing begins. signal() is then called
* with die() as the signal handler. If signal later calls die() with a
* signal number, the terminal modes are then reset.
*/
static void die (int killed)
{
static TERMIO sgtty;
if (killed != 0) {
STTY (0, &sgtty);
} else {
GTTY (0, &sgtty);
}
if (killed != 0) {
_exit (128+killed);
}
}
static bool iswheel (const char *username)
{
struct group *grp;
grp = getgrnam ("wheel"); /* !USE_PAM, no need for xgetgrnam */
if ( (NULL ==grp)
|| (NULL == grp->gr_mem)) {
return false;
}
return is_on_list (grp->gr_mem, username);
}
#else /* USE_PAM */
static void kill_child (int unused(s))
{
if (0 != pid_child) {
(void) kill (-pid_child, SIGKILL);
(void) write (STDERR_FILENO, kill_msg, strlen (kill_msg));
} else {
(void) write (STDERR_FILENO, wait_msg, strlen (wait_msg));
}
_exit (255);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* borrowed from GNU sh-utils' "su.c" */
static bool restricted_shell (const char *shellname)
{
/*@observer@*/const char *line;
setusershell ();
while ((line = getusershell ()) != NULL) {
if (('#' != *line) && (strcmp (line, shellname) == 0)) {
endusershell ();
return false;
}
}
endusershell ();
return true;
}
NORETURN
static void
su_failure (const char *tty, bool su_to_root)
{
sulog (tty, false, caller_name, name); /* log failed attempt */
if (getdef_bool ("SYSLOG_SU_ENAB")) {
SYSLOG ((su_to_root ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO,
"- %s %s:%s", tty,
('\0' != caller_name[0]) ? caller_name : "???",
('\0' != name[0]) ? name : "???"));
}
closelog ();
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_fd = audit_open ();
audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd,
AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
NULL, /* Prog. name */
"su",
('\0' != caller_name[0]) ? caller_name : "???",
AUDIT_NO_ID,
"localhost",
NULL, /* addr */
tty,
0); /* result */
close (audit_fd);
#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
exit (1);
}
/*
* execve_shell - Execute a shell with execve, or interpret it with
* /bin/sh
*/
static void execve_shell (const char *shellname,
char *args[],
char *const envp[])
{
int err;
(void) execve (shellname, args, envp);
err = errno;
if (access (shellname, R_OK|X_OK) == 0) {
/*
* Assume this is a shell script (with no shebang).
* Interpret it with /bin/sh
*/
size_t n_args = 0;
char **targs;
while (NULL != args[n_args]) {
n_args++;
}
targs = (char **) xmalloc ((n_args + 3) * sizeof (args[0]));
targs[0] = "sh";
targs[1] = "-";
targs[2] = xstrdup (shellname);
targs[n_args+2] = NULL;
while (1 != n_args) {
targs[n_args+1] = args[n_args - 1];
n_args--;
}
(void) execve (SHELL, targs, envp);
} else {
errno = err;
}
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* Signal handler for parent process later */
static void catch_signals (int sig)
{
caught = sig;
}
/*
* prepare_pam_close_session - Fork and wait for the child to close the session
*
* Only the child returns. The parent will wait for the child to
* terminate and exit.
*/
static void prepare_pam_close_session (void)
{
sigset_t ourset;
int status;
int ret;
struct sigaction action;
/* reset SIGCHLD handling to default */
action.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
sigemptyset (&action.sa_mask);
action.sa_flags = 0;
if (0 == caught && sigaction (SIGCHLD, &action, NULL) != 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"),
Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Will not execute %s", shellstr));
closelog ();
exit (1);
/* Only the child returns. See above. */
}
pid_child = fork ();
if (pid_child == 0) { /* child shell */
return; /* Only the child will return from pam_create_session */
} else if ((pid_t)-1 == pid_child) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: Cannot fork user shell\n"),
Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Cannot execute %s", shellstr));
closelog ();
exit (1);
/* Only the child returns. See above. */
}
/* parent only */
sigfillset (&ourset);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL) != 0) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: signal malfunction\n"),
Prog);
caught = SIGTERM;
}
if (0 == caught) {
action.sa_handler = catch_signals;
sigemptyset (&ourset);
if ( (sigaddset (&ourset, SIGTERM) != 0)
|| (sigaddset (&ourset, SIGALRM) != 0)
|| (sigaction (SIGTERM, &action, NULL) != 0)
|| ( !doshell /* handle SIGINT (Ctrl-C), SIGQUIT
* (Ctrl-\), and SIGTSTP (Ctrl-Z)
* since the child will not control
* the tty.
*/
&& ( (sigaddset (&ourset, SIGINT) != 0)
|| (sigaddset (&ourset, SIGQUIT) != 0)
|| (sigaddset (&ourset, SIGTSTP) != 0)
|| (sigaction (SIGINT, &action, NULL) != 0)
|| (sigaction (SIGQUIT, &action, NULL) != 0)
|| (sigaction (SIGTSTP, &action, NULL) != 0)))
|| (sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL) != 0)
) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"),
Prog);
caught = SIGTERM;
}
}
if (0 == caught) {
bool stop = true;
do {
pid_t pid;
stop = true;
do {
pid = waitpid (-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
} while (pid != -1 && pid != pid_child);
/* When interrupted by signal, the signal will be
* forwarded to the child, and termination will be
* forced later.
*/
if ( ((pid_t)-1 == pid)
&& (EINTR == errno)
&& (SIGTSTP == caught)) {
caught = 0;
/* Except for SIGTSTP, which request to
* stop the child.
* We will SIGSTOP ourself on the next
* waitpid round.
*/
kill (pid_child, SIGSTOP);
stop = false;
} else if ( ((pid_t)-1 != pid)
&& (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) {
/* The child (shell) was suspended.
* Suspend su. */
kill (getpid (), SIGSTOP);
/* wake child when resumed */
kill (pid, SIGCONT);
stop = false;
} else if ( (pid_t)-1 != pid) {
pid_child = 0;
}
} while (!stop);
}
if (0 != caught && 0 != pid_child) {
(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
(void) fputs (_("Session terminated, terminating shell..."),
stderr);
(void) kill (-pid_child, caught);
snprintf (kill_msg, sizeof kill_msg, _(" ...killed.\n"));
snprintf (wait_msg, sizeof wait_msg, _(" ...waiting for child to terminate.\n"));
/* Any signals other than SIGCHLD and SIGALRM will no longer have any effect,
* so it's time to block all of them. */
sigfillset (&ourset);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL) != 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"), Prog);
kill_child (0);
/* Never reach (_exit called). */
}
/* Send SIGKILL to the child if it doesn't
* exit within 2 seconds (after SIGTERM) */
(void) signal (SIGALRM, kill_child);
(void) signal (SIGCHLD, catch_signals);
(void) alarm (2);
(void) sigdelset (&ourset, SIGALRM);
(void) sigdelset (&ourset, SIGCHLD);
while (0 == waitpid (pid_child, &status, WNOHANG)) {
sigsuspend (&ourset);
}
pid_child = 0;
(void) fputs (_(" ...terminated.\n"), stderr);
}
ret = pam_close_session (pamh, 0);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_close_session: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s\n"), Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
}
(void) pam_setcred (pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
(void) pam_end (pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status)
: WTERMSIG (status) + 128);
/* Only the child returns. See above. */
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*
* usage - print command line syntax and exit
*/
static void usage (int status)
{
(void)
fputs (_("Usage: su [options] [-] [username [args]]\n"
"\n"
"Options:\n"
" -c, --command COMMAND pass COMMAND to the invoked shell\n"
" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"
" -, -l, --login make the shell a login shell\n"
" -m, -p,\n"
" --preserve-environment do not reset environment variables, and\n"
" keep the same shell\n"
" -s, --shell SHELL use SHELL instead of the default in passwd\n"
"\n"
"If no username is given, assume root.\n"), (E_SUCCESS != status) ? stderr : stdout);
exit (status);
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
static void check_perms_pam (const struct passwd *pw)
{
int ret;
ret = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG (((pw->pw_uid != 0)? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_WARN, "pam_authenticate: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s\n"), Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
(void) pam_end (pamh, ret);
su_failure (caller_tty, 0 == pw->pw_uid);
}
ret = pam_acct_mgmt (pamh, 0);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
if (caller_is_root) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: %s\n(Ignored)\n"),
Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
} else if (PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD == ret) {
ret = pam_chauthtok (pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_chauthtok: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: %s\n"),
Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
(void) pam_end (pamh, ret);
su_failure (caller_tty, 0 == pw->pw_uid);
}
} else {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_acct_mgmt: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: %s\n"),
Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
(void) pam_end (pamh, ret);
su_failure (caller_tty, 0 == pw->pw_uid);
}
}
}
#else /* !USE_PAM */
static void check_perms_nopam (const struct passwd *pw)
{
/*@observer@*/const struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
/*@observer@*/const char *password = pw->pw_passwd;
sighandler_t oldsig;
if (caller_is_root) {
return;
}
if (strcmp (pw->pw_passwd, "") == 0) {
const char *prevent_no_auth = getdef_str("PREVENT_NO_AUTH");
if (prevent_no_auth == NULL) {
prevent_no_auth = "superuser";
}
if (strcmp(prevent_no_auth, "yes") == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Password field is empty, this is forbidden for all accounts.\n"));
exit(1);
} else if ((pw->pw_uid == 0)
&& (strcmp(prevent_no_auth, "superuser") == 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Password field is empty, this is forbidden for super-user.\n"));
exit(1);
}
}
/*
* BSD systems only allow "wheel" to SU to root. USG systems don't,
* so we make this a configurable option.
*/
/* The original Shadow 3.3.2 did this differently. Do it like BSD:
*
* - check for UID 0 instead of name "root" - there are systems with
* several root accounts under different names,
*
* - check the contents of /etc/group instead of the current group
* set (you must be listed as a member, GID 0 is not sufficient).
*
* In addition to this traditional feature, we now have complete su
* access control (allow, deny, no password, own password). Thanks
* to Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>.
*/
if ( (0 == pw->pw_uid)
&& getdef_bool ("SU_WHEEL_ONLY")
&& !iswheel (caller_name)) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("You are not authorized to su %s\n"),
name);
exit (1);
}
spwd = getspnam (name); /* !USE_PAM, no need for xgetspnam */
#ifdef SU_ACCESS
if (strcmp (pw->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) {
if (NULL != spwd) {
password = spwd->sp_pwdp;
}
}
switch (check_su_auth (caller_name, name, 0 == pw->pw_uid)) {
case 0: /* normal su, require target user's password */
break;
case 1: /* require no password */
password = ""; /* XXX warning: const */
break;
case 2: /* require own password */
(void) puts (_("(Enter your own password)"));
password = caller_pass;
break;
default: /* access denied (-1) or unexpected value */
fprintf (stderr,
_("You are not authorized to su %s\n"),
name);
exit (1);
}
#endif /* SU_ACCESS */
/*
* Set up a signal handler in case the user types QUIT.
*/
die (0);
oldsig = signal (SIGQUIT, die);
/*
* See if the system defined authentication method is being used.
* The first character of an administrator defined method is an '@'
* character.
*/
if (pw_auth (password, name, PW_SU, NULL) != 0) {
SYSLOG (((pw->pw_uid != 0)? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_WARN,
"Authentication failed for %s", name));
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Authentication failure\n"), Prog);
su_failure (caller_tty, 0 == pw->pw_uid);
}
(void) signal (SIGQUIT, oldsig);
/*
* Check to see if the account is expired. root gets to ignore any
* expired accounts, but normal users can't become a user with an
* expired password.
*/
if (NULL != spwd) {
(void) expire (pw, spwd);
}
/*
* Check to see if the account permits "su". root gets to ignore any
* restricted accounts, but normal users can't become a user if
* there is a "SU" entry in the /etc/porttime file denying access to
* the account.
*/
if (!isttytime (name, "SU", time (NULL))) {
SYSLOG (((0 != pw->pw_uid) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_CRIT,
"SU by %s to restricted account %s",
caller_name, name));
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: You are not authorized to su at that time\n"),
Prog);
su_failure (caller_tty, 0 == pw->pw_uid);
}
}
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
/*
* check_perms - check permissions to switch to the user 'name'
*
* In case of subsystem login, the user is first authenticated in the
* caller's root subsystem, and then in the user's target subsystem.
*/
static /*@only@*/struct passwd * check_perms (void)
{
#ifdef USE_PAM
const void *tmp_name;
int ret;
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
/*
* The password file entries for the user is gotten and the account
* validated.
*/
struct passwd *pw = xgetpwnam (name);
if (NULL == pw) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,
_("No passwd entry for user '%s'\n"), name);
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE, "No passwd entry for user '%s'", name));
su_failure (caller_tty, true);
}
(void) signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
(void) signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
#ifdef USE_PAM
check_perms_pam (pw);
/* PAM authentication can request a change of account */
ret = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &tmp_name);
if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
SYSLOG((LOG_ERR, "pam_get_item: internal PAM error\n"));
(void) fprintf (stderr,
"%s: Internal PAM error retrieving username\n",
Prog);
(void) pam_end (pamh, ret);
su_failure (caller_tty, 0 == pw->pw_uid);
}
if (strcmp (name, tmp_name) != 0) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
"Change user from '%s' to '%s' as requested by PAM",
name, tmp_name));
strlcpy (name, tmp_name, sizeof(name));
pw = xgetpwnam (name);
if (NULL == pw) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,
_("No passwd entry for user '%s'\n"),
name);
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
"No passwd entry for user '%s'", name));
su_failure (caller_tty, true);
}
}
#else /* !USE_PAM */
check_perms_nopam (pw);
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
(void) signal (SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
(void) signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
/*
* Even if --shell is specified, the subsystem login test is based on
* the shell specified in /etc/passwd (not the one specified with
* --shell, which will be the one executed in the chroot later).
*/
if ('*' == pw->pw_shell[0]) { /* subsystem root required */
subsystem (pw); /* change to the subsystem root */
endpwent (); /* close the old password databases */
endspent ();
pw_free (pw);
return check_perms (); /* authenticate in the subsystem */
}
return pw;
}
/*
* save_caller_context - save information from the call context
*
* Save the program's name (Prog), caller's UID (caller_uid /
* caller_is_root), name (caller_name), and password (caller_pass),
* the TTY (ttyp), and whether su was called from a console
* (is_console) for further processing and before they might change.
*/
static void save_caller_context (char **argv)
{
struct passwd *pw = NULL;
#ifndef USE_PAM
#ifdef SU_ACCESS
const char *password = NULL;
#endif /* SU_ACCESS */
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
/*
* Get the program name. The program name is used as a prefix to
* most error messages.
*/
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
log_set_progname(Prog);
log_set_logfd(stderr);
caller_uid = getuid ();
caller_is_root = (caller_uid == 0);
/*
* Get the tty name. Entries will be logged indicating that the user
* tried to change to the named new user from the current terminal.
*/
caller_tty = ttyname (0);
if ((isatty (0) != 0) && (NULL != caller_tty)) {
#ifndef USE_PAM
caller_on_console = console (caller_tty);
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
} else {
/*
* Be more paranoid, like su from SimplePAMApps. --marekm
*/
if (!caller_is_root) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: must be run from a terminal\n"),
Prog);
exit (1);
}
caller_tty = "???";
}
/*
* Get the user's real name. The current UID is used to determine
* who has executed su. That user ID must exist.
*/
pw = get_my_pwent ();
if (NULL == pw) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
Prog);
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
(unsigned long) caller_uid));
su_failure (caller_tty, true); /* unknown target UID*/
}
STRFCPY (caller_name, pw->pw_name);
#ifndef USE_PAM
#ifdef SU_ACCESS
/*
* Sort out the password of user calling su, in case needed later
* -- chris
*/
password = pw->pw_passwd;
if (strcmp (pw->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) {
const struct spwd *spwd = getspnam (caller_name);
if (NULL != spwd) {
password = spwd->sp_pwdp;
}
}
free (caller_pass);
caller_pass = xstrdup (password);
#endif /* SU_ACCESS */
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
pw_free (pw);
}
/*
* process_flags - Process the command line arguments
*
* process_flags() interprets the command line arguments and sets
* the values that the user will be created with accordingly. The
* values are checked for sanity.
*/
static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
static struct option long_options[] = {
{"command", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{"login", no_argument, NULL, 'l'},
{"preserve-environment", no_argument, NULL, 'p'},
{"shell", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
};
while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "c:hlmps:",
long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'c':
command = optarg;
break;
case 'h':
usage (E_SUCCESS);
break;
case 'l':
fakelogin = true;
break;
case 'm':
case 'p':
/* This will only have an effect if the target
* user do not have a restricted shell, or if
* su is called by root.
*/
change_environment = false;
break;
case 's':
shellstr = optarg;
break;
default:
usage (E_USAGE); /* NOT REACHED */
}
}
if ((optind < argc) && (strcmp (argv[optind], "-") == 0)) {
fakelogin = true;
optind++;
}
if (optind < argc) {
STRFCPY (name, argv[optind++]); /* use this login id */
}
if ('\0' == name[0]) { /* use default user */
struct passwd *root_pw = getpwnam ("root");
if ((NULL != root_pw) && (0 == root_pw->pw_uid)) {
(void) strcpy (name, "root");
} else {
root_pw = getpwuid (0);
if (NULL == root_pw) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "There is no UID 0 user."));
su_failure (caller_tty, true);
}
(void) strcpy (name, root_pw->pw_name);
}
}
doshell = (argc == optind); /* any arguments remaining? */
if (NULL != command) {
doshell = false;
}
}
static void set_environment (struct passwd *pw)
{
const char *cp;
/*
* If a new login is being set up, the old environment will be
* ignored and a new one created later on.
*/
if (change_environment && fakelogin) {
/*
* The terminal type will be left alone if it is present in
* the environment already.
*/
cp = getenv ("TERM");
if (NULL != cp) {
addenv ("TERM", cp);
}
/*
* For some terminals COLORTERM seems to be the only way
* for checking for that specific terminal. For instance,
* gnome-terminal sets its TERM as "xterm" but its
* COLORTERM as "gnome-terminal". The COLORTERM variable
* is also of use when running GNU screen since it sets
* TERM to "screen" but doesn't touch COLORTERM.
*/
cp = getenv ("COLORTERM");
if (NULL != cp) {
addenv ("COLORTERM", cp);
}
#ifndef USE_PAM
cp = getdef_str ("ENV_TZ");
if (NULL != cp) {
addenv (('/' == *cp) ? tz (cp) : cp, NULL);
}
/*
* The clock frequency will be reset to the login value if required
*/
cp = getdef_str ("ENV_HZ");
if (NULL != cp) {
addenv (cp, NULL); /* set the default $HZ, if one */
}
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
/*
* Also leave DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY if present, else
* pam_xauth will not work.
*/
cp = getenv ("DISPLAY");
if (NULL != cp) {
addenv ("DISPLAY", cp);
}
cp = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
if (NULL != cp) {
addenv ("XAUTHORITY", cp);
}
} else {
char **envp = environ;
while (NULL != *envp) {
addenv (*envp, NULL);
envp++;
}
}
cp = getdef_str ((pw->pw_uid == 0) ? "ENV_SUPATH" : "ENV_PATH");
if (NULL == cp) {
addenv ((pw->pw_uid == 0) ? "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin" : "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin", NULL);
} else if (strchr (cp, '=') != NULL) {
addenv (cp, NULL);
} else {
addenv ("PATH", cp);
}
if (getenv ("IFS") != NULL) { /* don't export user IFS ... */
addenv ("IFS= \t\n", NULL); /* ... instead, set a safe IFS */
}
environ = newenvp; /* make new environment active */
if (change_environment) {
if (fakelogin) {
if (shellstr != pw->pw_shell) {
free (pw->pw_shell);
pw->pw_shell = xstrdup (shellstr);
}
setup_env (pw);
} else {
addenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
addenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
addenv ("LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
addenv ("SHELL", shellstr);
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* we need to setup the environment *after* pam_open_session(),
* else the UID is changed before stuff like pam_xauth could
* run, and we cannot access /etc/shadow and co
*/
/* update environment with all pam set variables */
char **envcp = pam_getenvlist (pamh);
if (NULL != envcp) {
while (NULL != *envcp) {
addenv (*envcp, NULL);
envcp++;
}
}
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
}
}
/*
* su - switch user id
*
* su changes the user's ids to the values for the specified user. if
* no new user name is specified, "root" or UID 0 is used by default.
*
* Any additional arguments are passed to the user's shell. In
* particular, the argument "-c" will cause the next argument to be
* interpreted as a command by the common shell programs.
*/
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *cp;
struct passwd *pw = NULL;
#ifdef USE_PAM
int ret;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
save_caller_context (argv);
OPENLOG ("su");
process_flags (argc, argv);
initenv ();
#ifdef USE_PAM
ret = pam_start ("su", name, &conv, &pamh);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_start: error %d", ret);
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: pam_start: error %d\n"),
Prog, ret));
exit (1);
}
ret = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, caller_tty);
if (PAM_SUCCESS == ret) {
ret = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller_name);
}
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_set_item: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s\n"), Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
pam_end (pamh, ret);
exit (1);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
pw = check_perms ();
/* If the user do not want to change the environment,
* use the current SHELL.
* (unless another shell is required by the command line)
*/
if ((NULL == shellstr) && !change_environment) {
shellstr = getenv ("SHELL");
}
/* If su is not called by root, and the target user has a
* restricted shell, the environment must be changed and the shell
* must be the one specified in /etc/passwd.
*/
if ( !caller_is_root
&& restricted_shell (pw->pw_shell)) {
shellstr = NULL;
change_environment = true;
}
/* If the shell is not set at this time, use the shell specified
* in /etc/passwd.
*/
if (NULL == shellstr) {
shellstr = pw->pw_shell;
}
/*
* Set the default shell.
*/
if ((NULL == shellstr) || ('\0' == shellstr[0])) {
shellstr = SHELL;
}
sulog (caller_tty, true, caller_name, name); /* save SU information */
if (getdef_bool ("SYSLOG_SU_ENAB")) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "+ %s %s:%s", caller_tty,
('\0' != caller_name[0]) ? caller_name : "???",
('\0' != name[0]) ? name : "???"));
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* set primary group id and supplementary groups */
if (setup_groups (pw) != 0) {
pam_end (pamh, PAM_ABORT);
exit (1);
}
/*
* pam_setcred() may do things like resource limits, console groups,
* and much more, depending on the configured modules
*/
ret = pam_setcred (pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_setcred: %s", pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s\n"), Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
(void) pam_end (pamh, ret);
exit (1);
}
ret = pam_open_session (pamh, 0);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != ret) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "pam_open_session: %s",
pam_strerror (pamh, ret)));
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s\n"), Prog, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
pam_setcred (pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
(void) pam_end (pamh, ret);
exit (1);
}
prepare_pam_close_session ();
/* become the new user */
if (change_uid (pw) != 0) {
exit (1);
}
#else /* !USE_PAM */
/* no limits if su from root (unless su must fake login's behavior) */
if (!caller_is_root || fakelogin) {
setup_limits (pw);
}
if (setup_uid_gid (pw, caller_on_console) != 0) {
exit (1);
}
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_fd = audit_open ();
audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd,
AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
NULL, /* Prog. name */
"su",
('\0' != caller_name[0]) ? caller_name : "???",
AUDIT_NO_ID,
"localhost",
NULL, /* addr */
caller_tty,
1); /* result */
close (audit_fd);
#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
set_environment (pw);
if (!doshell) {
/* There is no need for a controlling terminal.
* This avoids the callee to inject commands on
* the caller's tty. */
int err = -1;
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* When PAM is used, we are on the child */
err = setsid ();
#else
/* Otherwise, we cannot use setsid */
int fd = open ("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
if (fd >= 0) {
err = ioctl (fd, TIOCNOTTY, (char *) NULL);
(void) close (fd);
} else if (ENXIO == errno) {
/* There are no controlling terminal already */
err = 0;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
if (-1 == err) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: Cannot drop the controlling terminal\n"),
Prog);
exit (1);
}
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
(void) pam_end (pamh, PAM_SUCCESS | PAM_DATA_SILENT);
#endif
endpwent ();
endspent ();
/*
* This is a workaround for Linux libc bug/feature (?) - the
* /dev/log file descriptor is open without the close-on-exec flag
* and used to be passed to the new shell. There is "fcntl(LogFile,
* F_SETFD, 1)" in libc/misc/syslog.c, but it is commented out (at
* least in 5.4.33). Why? --marekm
*/
closelog ();
/*
* See if the user has extra arguments on the command line. In that
* case they will be provided to the new user's shell as arguments.
*/
if (fakelogin) {
char *arg0;
cp = getdef_str ("SU_NAME");
if (NULL == cp) {
cp = Basename (shellstr);
}
arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (cp) + 2);
arg0[0] = '-';
strcpy (arg0 + 1, cp);
cp = arg0;
} else {
cp = Basename (shellstr);
}
if (!doshell) {
int err;
/* Position argv to the remaining arguments */
argv += optind;
if (NULL != command) {
argv -= 2;
argv[0] = "-c";
argv[1] = command;
}
/*
* Use the shell and create an argv
* with the rest of the command line included.
*/
argv[-1] = cp;
execve_shell (shellstr, &argv[-1], environ);
err = errno;
(void) fprintf (stderr,
_("Cannot execute %s\n"), shellstr);
errno = err;
} else {
(void) shell (shellstr, cp, environ);
}
pw_free (pw);
return (errno == ENOENT ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
}
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