91d4ab622b
When uid 0 maps host uid 0 into the child userns newer kernels require CAP_SETFCAP be retained as this allows the caller to create fscaps that are valid in the ancestor userns. This was a security issue (in very rare circumstances). So whenever host uid 0 is mapped, retain CAP_SETFCAP if the caller had it. Userspace won't need to set CAP_SETFCAP on newuidmap as this is really only a scenario that real root should be doing which always has CAP_SETFCAP. And if they don't then they are in a locked-down userns. (LXC sometimes maps host uid 0 during chown operations in a helper userns but will not rely on newuidmap for that. But we don't want to risk regressing callers that want to rely on this behavior.) Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
245 lines
8.0 KiB
C
245 lines
8.0 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2013 Eric Biederman
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
* 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
|
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
|
* specific prior written permission.
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
|
|
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
|
|
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
|
|
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
|
|
* HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
|
|
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
|
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
|
|
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
|
|
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
|
|
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <config.h>
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
|
#include <limits.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include "prototypes.h"
|
|
#include "idmapping.h"
|
|
#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
#include <sys/prctl.h>
|
|
#include <sys/capability.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct map_range *mappings, *mapping;
|
|
int idx, argidx;
|
|
|
|
if (ranges < 0 || argc < 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error calculating number of arguments\n", Prog);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ranges != ((argc + 2) / 3)) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ranges: %u is wrong for argc: %d\n", Prog, ranges, argc);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ranges * 3) > argc) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "ranges: %u argc: %d\n",
|
|
ranges, argc);
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
_( "%s: Not enough arguments to form %u mappings\n"),
|
|
Prog, ranges);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mappings = calloc(ranges, sizeof(*mappings));
|
|
if (!mappings) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Memory allocation failure\n"),
|
|
Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Gather up the ranges from the command line */
|
|
mapping = mappings;
|
|
for (idx = 0, argidx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, argidx += 3, mapping++) {
|
|
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 0], &mapping->upper)) {
|
|
free(mappings);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 1], &mapping->lower)) {
|
|
free(mappings);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 2], &mapping->count)) {
|
|
free(mappings);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ULONG_MAX - mapping->upper <= mapping->count || ULONG_MAX - mapping->lower <= mapping->count) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
if (mapping->upper > UINT_MAX ||
|
|
mapping->lower > UINT_MAX ||
|
|
mapping->count > UINT_MAX) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
if (mapping->lower + mapping->count > UINT_MAX ||
|
|
mapping->upper + mapping->count > UINT_MAX) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
if (mapping->lower + mapping->count < mapping->lower ||
|
|
mapping->upper + mapping->count < mapping->upper) {
|
|
/* this one really shouldn't be possible given previous checks */
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return mappings;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Number of ascii digits needed to print any unsigned long in decimal.
|
|
* There are approximately 10 bits for every 3 decimal digits.
|
|
* So from bits to digits the formula is roundup((Number of bits)/10) * 3.
|
|
* For common sizes of integers this works out to:
|
|
* 2bytes --> 6 ascii estimate -> 65536 (5 real)
|
|
* 4bytes --> 12 ascii estimated -> 4294967296 (10 real)
|
|
* 8bytes --> 21 ascii estimated -> 18446744073709551616 (20 real)
|
|
* 16bytes --> 39 ascii estimated -> 340282366920938463463374607431768211456 (39 real)
|
|
*/
|
|
#define ULONG_DIGITS ((((sizeof(unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT) + 9)/10)*3)
|
|
|
|
#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
static inline bool maps_lower_root(int cap, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
struct map_range *mapping;
|
|
|
|
if (cap != CAP_SETUID)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
mapping = mappings;
|
|
for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
|
|
if (mapping->lower == 0)
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The ruid refers to the caller's uid and is used to reset the effective uid
|
|
* back to the callers real uid.
|
|
* This clutch mainly exists for setuid-based new{g,u}idmap binaries that are
|
|
* called in contexts where all capabilities other than the necessary
|
|
* CAP_SET{G,U}ID capabilities are dropped. Since the kernel will require
|
|
* assurance that the caller holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the target user namespace
|
|
* the only way it can confirm is in this case is if the effective uid is
|
|
* equivalent to the uid owning the target user namespace.
|
|
* Note, we only support this when a) new{g,u}idmap is not called by root and
|
|
* b) if the caller's uid and the uid retrieved via system appropriate means
|
|
* (shadow file or other) are identical. Specifically, this does not support
|
|
* when the root user calls the new{g,u}idmap binary for an unprivileged user.
|
|
* If this is wanted: use file capabilities!
|
|
*/
|
|
void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings,
|
|
const char *map_file, uid_t ruid)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
struct map_range *mapping;
|
|
size_t bufsize;
|
|
char *buf, *pos;
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
int cap;
|
|
struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = {_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0};
|
|
struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2] = {{0}};
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(map_file, "uid_map") == 0) {
|
|
cap = CAP_SETUID;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(map_file, "gid_map") == 0) {
|
|
cap = CAP_SETGID;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Invalid map file %s specified\n"), Prog, map_file);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Align setuid- and fscaps-based new{g,u}idmap behavior. */
|
|
if (geteuid() == 0 && geteuid() != ruid) {
|
|
if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS)\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (seteuid(ruid) < 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not seteuid to %d\n"), Prog, ruid);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Lockdown new{g,u}idmap by dropping all unneeded capabilities. */
|
|
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
data[0].effective = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
|
|
/*
|
|
* When uid 0 from the ancestor userns is supposed to be mapped into
|
|
* the child userns we need to retain CAP_SETFCAP.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (maps_lower_root(cap, ranges, mappings))
|
|
data[0].effective |= CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETFCAP);
|
|
data[0].permitted = data[0].effective;
|
|
if (capset(&hdr, data) < 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not set caps\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
bufsize = ranges * ((ULONG_DIGITS + 1) * 3);
|
|
pos = buf = xmalloc(bufsize);
|
|
|
|
/* Build the mapping command */
|
|
mapping = mappings;
|
|
for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
|
|
/* Append this range to the string that will be written */
|
|
int written = snprintf(pos, bufsize - (pos - buf),
|
|
"%lu %lu %lu\n",
|
|
mapping->upper,
|
|
mapping->lower,
|
|
mapping->count);
|
|
if ((written <= 0) || (written >= (bufsize - (pos - buf)))) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: snprintf failed!\n"), Prog);
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
pos += written;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Write the mapping to the mapping file */
|
|
fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, map_file, O_WRONLY);
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: open of %s failed: %s\n"),
|
|
Prog, map_file, strerror(errno));
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
if (write(fd, buf, pos - buf) != (pos - buf)) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: write to %s failed: %s\n"),
|
|
Prog, map_file, strerror(errno));
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
}
|