lpd: fix OOM vulnerability (was eating arbitrarily large commands)

This commit is contained in:
Denis Vlasenko 2008-03-24 00:04:42 +00:00
parent a79428998d
commit 0b6c6a9c9f
4 changed files with 33 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ extern char *reads(int fd, char *buf, size_t count);
// Read one line a-la fgets. Reads byte-by-byte.
// Useful when it is important to not read ahead.
// Bytes are appended to pfx (which must be malloced, or NULL).
extern char *xmalloc_reads(int fd, char *pfx);
extern char *xmalloc_reads(int fd, char *pfx, size_t *maxsz_p);
extern ssize_t read_close(int fd, void *buf, size_t count);
extern ssize_t open_read_close(const char *filename, void *buf, size_t count);
extern void *xmalloc_open_read_close(const char *filename, size_t *sizep);

View File

@ -152,13 +152,14 @@ char *reads(int fd, char *buffer, size_t size)
// Read one line a-la fgets. Reads byte-by-byte.
// Useful when it is important to not read ahead.
// Bytes are appended to pfx (which must be malloced, or NULL).
char *xmalloc_reads(int fd, char *buf)
char *xmalloc_reads(int fd, char *buf, size_t *maxsz_p)
{
char *p;
int sz = buf ? strlen(buf) : 0;
size_t sz = buf ? strlen(buf) : 0;
size_t maxsz = maxsz_p ? *maxsz_p : MAXINT(size_t);
goto jump_in;
while (1) {
while (sz < maxsz) {
if (p - buf == sz) {
jump_in:
buf = xrealloc(buf, sz + 128);
@ -178,6 +179,8 @@ char *xmalloc_reads(int fd, char *buf)
p++;
}
*p++ = '\0';
if (maxsz_p)
*maxsz_p = p - buf - 1;
return xrealloc(buf, p - buf);
}

View File

@ -58,8 +58,6 @@
*/
#include "libbb.h"
// TODO: xmalloc_reads is vulnerable to remote OOM attack!
// strip argument of bad chars
static char *sane(char *str)
{
@ -75,6 +73,21 @@ static char *sane(char *str)
return str;
}
/* vfork() disables some optimizations. Moving its use
* to minimal, non-inlined function saves bytes */
static NOINLINE void vfork_close_stdio_and_exec(char **argv)
{
if (vfork() == 0) {
// CHILD
// we are the helper. we wanna be silent.
// this call reopens stdio fds to "/dev/null"
// (no daemonization is done)
bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_DEVNULL_STDIO | DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE, NULL);
BB_EXECVP(*argv, argv);
_exit(127);
}
}
static void exec_helper(const char *fname, char **argv)
{
char *p, *q, *file;
@ -103,26 +116,24 @@ static void exec_helper(const char *fname, char **argv)
// next line, plz!
q = p;
}
free(file);
if (vfork() == 0) {
// CHILD
// we are the helper. we wanna be silent
// this call reopens stdio fds to "/dev/null"
// (no daemonization is done)
bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_DEVNULL_STDIO | DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE, NULL);
BB_EXECVP(*argv, argv);
_exit(127);
}
vfork_close_stdio_and_exec(argv);
// PARENT (or vfork error)
// clean up...
free(file);
while (--env_idx >= 0) {
*strchrnul(our_env[env_idx], '=') = '\0';
unsetenv(our_env[env_idx]);
}
}
static char *xmalloc_read_stdin(void)
{
size_t max = 4 * 1024; /* more than enough for commands! */
return xmalloc_reads(STDIN_FILENO, NULL, &max);
}
int lpd_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
int lpd_main(int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char *argv[])
{
@ -130,7 +141,7 @@ int lpd_main(int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char *argv[])
char *s, *queue;
// read command
s = xmalloc_reads(STDIN_FILENO, NULL);
s = xmalloc_read_stdin();
// we understand only "receive job" command
if (2 != *s) {
@ -168,7 +179,7 @@ int lpd_main(int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char *argv[])
write(STDOUT_FILENO, "", 1);
// get subcommand
s = xmalloc_reads(STDIN_FILENO, NULL);
s = xmalloc_read_stdin();
if (!s)
return EXIT_SUCCESS; // probably EOF
// we understand only "control file" or "data file" cmds

View File

@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ static int builtin_read(char **argv)
char *string;
const char *name = argv[1] ? argv[1] : "REPLY";
string = xmalloc_reads(STDIN_FILENO, xasprintf("%s=", name));
string = xmalloc_reads(STDIN_FILENO, xasprintf("%s=", name), NULL);
return set_local_var(string, 0);
}