hush: fix potential buffer overflow on NOMMU
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
This commit is contained in:
		| @@ -2919,7 +2919,9 @@ static void re_execute_shell(char ***to_free, const char *s, | ||||
| 		char *g_argv0, char **g_argv, | ||||
| 		char **builtin_argv) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	char param_buf[sizeof("-$%x:%x:%x:%x:%x") + sizeof(unsigned) * 2]; | ||||
| #define NOMMU_HACK_FMT ("-$%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%llx" IF_HUSH_LOOPS(":%x")) | ||||
| 	/* delims + 2 * (number of bytes in printed hex numbers) */ | ||||
| 	char param_buf[sizeof(NOMMU_HACK_FMT) + 2 * (sizeof(int)*6 + sizeof(long long)*1)]; | ||||
| 	char *heredoc_argv[4]; | ||||
| 	struct variable *cur; | ||||
| # if ENABLE_HUSH_FUNCTIONS | ||||
| @@ -2953,7 +2955,7 @@ static void re_execute_shell(char ***to_free, const char *s, | ||||
| 		} | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|  | ||||
| 	sprintf(param_buf, "-$%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%llx" IF_HUSH_LOOPS(":%x") | ||||
| 	sprintf(param_buf, NOMMU_HACK_FMT | ||||
| 			, (unsigned) G.root_pid | ||||
| 			, (unsigned) G.root_ppid | ||||
| 			, (unsigned) G.last_bg_pid | ||||
| @@ -2962,7 +2964,8 @@ static void re_execute_shell(char ***to_free, const char *s, | ||||
| 			, empty_trap_mask | ||||
| 			IF_HUSH_LOOPS(, G.depth_of_loop) | ||||
| 			); | ||||
| 	/* 1:hush 2:-$<pid>:<pid>:<exitcode>:<depth> <vars...> <funcs...> | ||||
| #undef NOMMU_HACK_FMT | ||||
| 	/* 1:hush 2:-$<pid>:<pid>:<exitcode>:<etc...> <vars...> <funcs...> | ||||
| 	 * 3:-c 4:<cmd> 5:<arg0> <argN...> 6:NULL | ||||
| 	 */ | ||||
| 	cnt += 6; | ||||
|   | ||||
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