shadow/src/login.c

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/*
* Copyright 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include "rcsid.h"
RCSID(PKG_VER "$Id: login.c,v 1.18 2000/09/02 18:40:44 marekm Exp $")
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#if HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#else
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#if HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#else
#include "lastlog_.h"
#endif
#include "faillog.h"
#include "failure.h"
#include "pwauth.h"
#include "getdef.h"
#include "dialchk.h"
#ifdef SVR4_SI86_EUA
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sysi86.h>
#endif
#ifdef RADIUS
/*
* Support for RADIUS authentication based on a hacked util-linux login
* source sent to me by Jon Lewis. Not tested. You need to link login
* with the radauth.c file (not included here - it doesn't have a clear
* copyright statement, and I don't want to have problems with Debian
* putting the whole package in non-free because of this). --marekm
*/
#include "radlogin.h"
#endif
#ifdef UT_ADDR
#include <netdb.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
#include "pam_defs.h"
static const struct pam_conv conv = {
misc_conv,
NULL
};
static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
#define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
fprintf(stderr,"\n%s\n",PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode)); \
syslog(LOG_ERR,"%s",PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode)); \
pam_end(pamh, retcode); exit(1); \
}
#define PAM_END { retcode = pam_close_session(pamh,0); \
pam_end(pamh,retcode); }
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*
* Needed for MkLinux DR1/2/2.1 - J.
*/
#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
#define LASTLOG_FILE "/var/log/lastlog"
#endif
const char *hostname = "";
struct passwd pwent;
#if HAVE_UTMPX_H
struct utmpx utxent, failent;
struct utmp utent;
#else
struct utmp utent, failent;
#endif
struct lastlog lastlog;
static int pflg = 0;
static int fflg = 0;
#ifdef RLOGIN
static int rflg = 0;
#else
#define rflg 0
#endif
static int hflg = 0;
static int preauth_flag = 0;
/*
* Global variables.
*/
static char *Prog;
static int amroot;
static int timeout;
/*
* External identifiers.
*/
extern char **newenvp;
extern size_t newenvc;
extern void dolastlog(struct lastlog *, const struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
extern char **environ;
extern int login_access(const char *, const char *);
extern void login_fbtab(const char *, uid_t, gid_t);
#ifndef ALARM
#define ALARM 60
#endif
#ifndef RETRIES
#define RETRIES 3
#endif
static struct faillog faillog;
#define NO_SHADOW "no shadow password for `%s'%s\n"
#define BAD_PASSWD "invalid password for `%s'%s\n"
#define BAD_DIALUP "invalid dialup password for `%s' on `%s'\n"
#define BAD_TIME "invalid login time for `%s'%s\n"
#define BAD_ROOT_LOGIN "ILLEGAL ROOT LOGIN%s\n"
#define ROOT_LOGIN "ROOT LOGIN%s\n"
#define FAILURE_CNT "exceeded failure limit for `%s'%s\n"
#define REG_LOGIN "`%s' logged in%s\n"
#define LOGIN_REFUSED "LOGIN `%s' REFUSED%s\n"
#define REENABLED2 \
"login `%s' re-enabled after temporary lockout (%d failures).\n"
#define MANY_FAILS "REPEATED login failures%s\n"
/* local function prototypes */
static void usage(void);
static void setup_tty(void);
static void bad_time_notify(void);
static void check_flags(int, char * const *);
#ifndef USE_PAM
static void check_nologin(void);
#endif
static void init_env(void);
static RETSIGTYPE alarm_handler(int);
/*
* usage - print login command usage and exit
*
* login [ name ]
* login -r hostname (for rlogind)
* login -h hostname (for telnetd, etc.)
* login -f name (for pre-authenticated login: datakit, xterm, etc.)
*/
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [-p] [name]\n"), Prog);
if (!amroot)
exit(1);
fprintf(stderr, _(" %s [-p] [-h host] [-f name]\n"), Prog);
#ifdef RLOGIN
fprintf(stderr, _(" %s [-p] -r host\n"), Prog);
#endif
exit(1);
}
static void
setup_tty(void)
{
TERMIO termio;
GTTY(0, &termio); /* get terminal characteristics */
/*
* Add your favorite terminal modes here ...
*/
termio.c_lflag |= ISIG|ICANON|ECHO|ECHOE;
termio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
#if defined(ECHOKE) && defined(ECHOCTL)
termio.c_lflag |= ECHOKE|ECHOCTL;
#endif
#if defined(ECHOPRT) && defined(NOFLSH) && defined(TOSTOP)
termio.c_lflag &= ~(ECHOPRT|NOFLSH|TOSTOP);
#endif
#ifdef ONLCR
termio.c_oflag |= ONLCR;
#endif
#ifdef SUN4
/*
* Terminal setup for SunOS 4.1 courtesy of Steve Allen
* at UCO/Lick.
*/
termio.c_cc[VEOF] = '\04';
termio.c_cflag &= ~CSIZE;
termio.c_cflag |= (PARENB|CS7);
termio.c_lflag |= (ISIG|ICANON|ECHO|IEXTEN);
termio.c_iflag |= (BRKINT|IGNPAR|ISTRIP|IMAXBEL|ICRNL|IXON);
termio.c_iflag &= ~IXANY;
termio.c_oflag |= (XTABS|OPOST|ONLCR);
#endif
#if 0
termio.c_cc[VERASE] = getdef_num("ERASECHAR", '\b');
termio.c_cc[VKILL] = getdef_num("KILLCHAR", '\025');
#else
/* leave these values unchanged if not specified in login.defs */
termio.c_cc[VERASE] = getdef_num("ERASECHAR", termio.c_cc[VERASE]);
termio.c_cc[VKILL] = getdef_num("KILLCHAR", termio.c_cc[VKILL]);
#endif
/*
* ttymon invocation prefers this, but these settings won't come into
* effect after the first username login
*/
STTY(0, &termio);
}
/*
* Tell the user that this is not the right time to login at this tty
*/
static void
bad_time_notify(void)
{
#ifdef HUP_MESG_FILE
FILE *mfp;
if ((mfp = fopen(HUP_MESG_FILE, "r")) != NULL) {
int c;
while ((c = fgetc(mfp)) != EOF) {
if (c == '\n')
putchar('\r');
putchar(c);
}
fclose(mfp);
} else
#endif
printf(_("Invalid login time\n"));
fflush(stdout);
}
static void
check_flags(int argc, char * const *argv)
{
int arg;
/*
* Check the flags for proper form. Every argument starting with
* "-" must be exactly two characters long. This closes all the
* clever rlogin, telnet, and getty holes.
*/
for (arg = 1; arg < argc; arg++) {
if (argv[arg][0] == '-' && strlen(argv[arg]) > 2)
usage();
}
}
#ifndef USE_PAM
static void
check_nologin(void)
{
char *fname;
/*
* Check to see if system is turned off for non-root users.
* This would be useful to prevent users from logging in
* during system maintenance. We make sure the message comes
* out for root so she knows to remove the file if she's
* forgotten about it ...
*/
fname = getdef_str("NOLOGINS_FILE");
if (fname != NULL && access(fname, F_OK) == 0) {
FILE *nlfp;
int c;
/*
* Cat the file if it can be opened, otherwise just
* print a default message
*/
if ((nlfp = fopen (fname, "r"))) {
while ((c = getc (nlfp)) != EOF) {
if (c == '\n')
putchar ('\r');
putchar (c);
}
fflush (stdout);
fclose (nlfp);
} else
printf(_("\nSystem closed for routine maintenance\n"));
/*
* Non-root users must exit. Root gets the message, but
* gets to login.
*/
if (pwent.pw_uid != 0) {
closelog();
exit(0);
}
printf(_("\n[Disconnect bypassed -- root login allowed.]\n"));
}
}
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
static void
init_env(void)
{
char *cp, *tmp;
if ((tmp = getenv("LANG"))) {
addenv("LANG", tmp);
}
/*
* Add the timezone environmental variable so that time functions
* work correctly.
*/
if ((tmp = getenv("TZ"))) {
addenv("TZ", tmp);
} else if ((cp = getdef_str("ENV_TZ")))
addenv(*cp == '/' ? tz(cp) : cp, NULL);
/*
* Add the clock frequency so that profiling commands work
* correctly.
*/
if ((tmp = getenv("HZ"))) {
addenv("HZ", tmp);
} else if ((cp = getdef_str("ENV_HZ")))
addenv(cp, NULL);
}
static RETSIGTYPE
alarm_handler(int sig)
{
fprintf(stderr, _("\nLogin timed out after %d seconds.\n"), timeout);
exit(0);
}
/*
* login - create a new login session for a user
*
* login is typically called by getty as the second step of a
* new user session. getty is responsible for setting the line
* characteristics to a reasonable set of values and getting
* the name of the user to be logged in. login may also be
* called to create a new user session on a pty for a variety
* of reasons, such as X servers or network logins.
*
* the flags which login supports are
*
* -p - preserve the environment
* -r - perform autologin protocol for rlogin
* -f - do not perform authentication, user is preauthenticated
* -h - the name of the remote host
*/
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char username[32];
char tty[BUFSIZ];
#ifdef RLOGIN
char term[128] = "";
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
char ptime[80];
#endif
int reason = PW_LOGIN;
int delay;
int retries;
int failed;
int flag;
int subroot = 0;
int is_console;
const char *cp;
char *tmp;
char fromhost[512];
struct passwd *pwd;
char **envp = environ;
static char temp_pw[2];
static char temp_shell[] = "/bin/sh";
#ifdef USE_PAM
int retcode;
pid_t child;
char *pam_user;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef SHADOWPWD
struct spwd *spwd=NULL;
#endif
#ifdef RADIUS
RAD_USER_DATA rad_user_data;
int is_rad_login;
#endif
#if defined(RADIUS) || defined(DES_RPC) || defined(KERBEROS)
/* from pwauth.c */
extern char *clear_pass;
extern int wipe_clear_pass;
/*
* We may need the password later, don't want pw_auth() to wipe it
* (we do it ourselves when it is no longer needed). --marekm
*/
wipe_clear_pass = 0;
#endif
/*
* Some quick initialization.
*/
sanitize_env();
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
initenv();
username[0] = '\0';
amroot = (getuid() == 0);
Prog = Basename(argv[0]);
check_flags(argc, argv);
while ((flag = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:h:pr:")) != EOF) {
switch (flag) {
case 'p':
pflg++;
break;
case 'f':
/*
* username must be a separate token
* (-f root, *not* -froot). --marekm
*/
if (optarg != argv[optind - 1])
usage();
fflg++;
STRFCPY(username, optarg);
break;
#ifdef RLOGIN
case 'r':
rflg++;
hostname = optarg;
reason = PW_RLOGIN;
break;
#endif
case 'h':
hflg++;
hostname = optarg;
reason = PW_TELNET;
break;
case 'd':
/* "-d device" ignored for compatibility */
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
#ifdef RLOGIN
/*
* Neither -h nor -f should be combined with -r.
*/
if (rflg && (hflg || fflg))
usage();
#endif
/*
* Allow authentication bypass only if real UID is zero.
*/
if ((rflg || fflg || hflg) && !amroot) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: permission denied\n"), Prog);
exit(1);
}
if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2))
exit(1); /* must be a terminal */
#if 0
/*
* Get the utmp file entry and get the tty name from it. The
* current process ID must match the process ID in the utmp
* file if there are no additional flags on the command line.
*/
checkutmp(!rflg && !fflg && !hflg);
#else
/*
* Be picky if run by normal users (possible if installed setuid
* root), but not if run by root. This way it still allows logins
* even if your getty is broken, or if something corrupts utmp,
* but users must "exec login" which will use the existing utmp
* entry (will not overwrite remote hostname). --marekm
*/
checkutmp(!amroot);
#endif
STRFCPY(tty, utent.ut_line);
is_console = console(tty);
if (rflg || hflg) {
#ifdef UT_ADDR
struct hostent *he;
/*
* Fill in the ut_addr field (remote login IP address).
* XXX - login from util-linux does it, but this is not
* the right place to do it. The program that starts
* login (telnetd, rlogind) knows the IP address, so it
* should create the utmp entry and fill in ut_addr.
* gethostbyname() is not 100% reliable (the remote host
* may be unknown, etc.). --marekm
*/
if ((he = gethostbyname(hostname))) {
utent.ut_addr = *((int32_t *)(he->h_addr_list[0]));
#endif
#ifdef UT_HOST
strncpy(utent.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(utent.ut_host));
#endif
#if HAVE_UTMPX_H
strncpy(utxent.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(utxent.ut_host));
#endif
/*
* Add remote hostname to the environment. I think
* (not sure) I saw it once on Irix. --marekm
*/
addenv("REMOTEHOST", hostname);
}
#ifdef __linux__
/* workaround for init/getty leaving junk in ut_host at least in some
version of RedHat. --marekm */
else if (amroot)
memzero(utent.ut_host, sizeof utent.ut_host);
#endif
if (hflg && fflg) {
reason = PW_RLOGIN;
preauth_flag++;
}
#ifdef RLOGIN
if (rflg && do_rlogin(hostname, username, sizeof username, term, sizeof term))
preauth_flag++;
#endif
OPENLOG("login");
setup_tty();
umask(getdef_num("UMASK", 077));
{
/*
* Use the ULIMIT in the login.defs file, and if
* there isn't one, use the default value. The
* user may have one for themselves, but otherwise,
* just take what you get.
*/
long limit = getdef_long("ULIMIT", -1L);
if (limit != -1)
set_filesize_limit(limit);
}
/*
* The entire environment will be preserved if the -p flag
* is used.
*/
if (pflg)
while (*envp) /* add inherited environment, */
addenv(*envp++, NULL); /* some variables change later */
#ifdef RLOGIN
if (term[0] != '\0')
addenv("TERM", term);
else
#endif
/* preserve TERM from getty */
if (!pflg && (tmp = getenv("TERM")))
addenv("TERM", tmp);
init_env();
if (optind < argc) { /* get the user name */
if (rflg || fflg)
usage();
#ifdef SVR4
/*
* The "-h" option can't be used with a command-line username,
* because telnetd invokes us as: login -h host TERM=...
*/
if (! hflg)
#endif
{
STRFCPY(username, argv[optind]);
strzero(argv[optind]);
++optind;
}
}
#ifdef SVR4
/*
* check whether ttymon has done the prompt for us already
*/
{
char *ttymon_prompt;
if ((ttymon_prompt = getenv("TTYPROMPT")) != NULL &&
(*ttymon_prompt != 0)) {
/* read name, without prompt */
login_prompt((char *)0, username, sizeof username);
}
}
#endif /* SVR4 */
if (optind < argc) /* now set command line variables */
set_env(argc - optind, &argv[optind]);
if (rflg || hflg)
cp = hostname;
else
#ifdef UT_HOST
if (utent.ut_host[0])
cp = utent.ut_host;
else
#endif
#if HAVE_UTMPX_H
if (utxent.ut_host[0])
cp = utxent.ut_host;
else
#endif
cp = "";
if (*cp)
snprintf(fromhost, sizeof fromhost,
_(" on `%.100s' from `%.200s'"), tty, cp);
else
snprintf(fromhost, sizeof fromhost, _(" on `%.100s'"), tty);
top:
/* only allow ALARM sec. for login */
signal(SIGALRM, alarm_handler);
timeout = getdef_num("LOGIN_TIMEOUT", ALARM);
if (timeout > 0)
alarm(timeout);
environ = newenvp; /* make new environment active */
delay = getdef_num("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
retries = getdef_num("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
#ifdef USE_PAM
retcode = pam_start("login", username, &conv, &pamh);
if(retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr,"login: PAM Failure, aborting: %s\n",
PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode));
syslog(LOG_ERR,"Couldn't initialize PAM: %s",
PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode));
exit(99);
}
/* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay
to ours. */
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#endif
/* if fflg == 1, then the user has already been authenticated */
if (!fflg || (getuid() != 0)) {
int failcount;
char hostn[256];
char login_prompt[256]; /* That's one hell of a prompt :) */
/* Make the login prompt look like we want it */
if (!gethostname(hostn, sizeof(hostn)))
snprintf(login_prompt, sizeof(login_prompt),
"%s login: ", hostn);
else
snprintf(login_prompt, sizeof(login_prompt),
"login: ");
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER_PROMPT, login_prompt);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
/* if we didn't get a user on the command line,
set it to NULL */
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &pam_user);
if (pam_user[0] == '\0')
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, NULL);
/* there may be better ways to deal with some of these
conditions, but at least this way I don't think we'll
be giving away information... */
/* Perhaps someday we can trust that all PAM modules will
pay attention to failure count and get rid of
MAX_LOGIN_TRIES? */
retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
while ((failcount++ < retries) &&
((retcode == PAM_AUTH_ERR) ||
(retcode == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ||
(retcode == PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT) ||
(retcode == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL))) {
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &pam_user);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,"FAILED LOGIN %d FROM %s FOR %s, %s",
failcount, hostname, pam_user,
PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode));
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "Login incorrect\n\n");
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, NULL);
retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
}
if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &pam_user);
if (retcode == PAM_MAXTRIES)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%d) FROM %s FOR %s, %s",
failcount, hostname, pam_user,
PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode));
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"FAILED LOGIN SESSION FROM %s FOR %s, %s",
hostname, pam_user,
PAM_STRERROR(pamh, retcode));
fprintf(stderr, "\nLogin incorrect\n");
pam_end(pamh, retcode);
exit(0);
}
retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
if(retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
retcode = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
}
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
}
/* Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage
First get the username that we are actually using, though.
*/
retcode = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &pam_user);
setpwent();
pwd = getpwnam(pam_user);
if (!pwd || setup_groups(pwd))
exit(1);
retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#else /* ! USE_PAM */
while (1) { /* repeatedly get login/password pairs */
failed = 0; /* haven't failed authentication yet */
#ifdef RADIUS
is_rad_login = 0;
#endif
if (! username[0]) { /* need to get a login id */
if (subroot) {
closelog ();
exit (1);
}
preauth_flag = 0;
#ifndef LOGIN_PROMPT
#ifdef __linux__ /* hostname login: - like in util-linux login */
login_prompt(_("\n%s login: "), username, sizeof username);
#else
login_prompt(_("login: "), username, sizeof username);
#endif
#else
login_prompt(LOGIN_PROMPT, username, sizeof username);
#endif
continue;
}
#endif /* ! USE_PAM */
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (!(pwd = getpwnam(pam_user))) {
pwent.pw_name = pam_user;
#else
if (!(pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
pwent.pw_name = username;
#endif
strcpy(temp_pw, "!");
pwent.pw_passwd = temp_pw;
pwent.pw_shell = temp_shell;
preauth_flag = 0;
failed = 1;
} else {
pwent = *pwd;
}
#ifndef USE_PAM
#ifdef SHADOWPWD
spwd = NULL;
if (pwd && strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) {
spwd = getspnam(username);
if (spwd)
pwent.pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
else
SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, NO_SHADOW, username, fromhost));
}
#endif /* SHADOWPWD */
/*
* If the encrypted password begins with a "!", the account
* is locked and the user cannot login, even if they have
* been "pre-authenticated."
*/
if (pwent.pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pwent.pw_passwd[0] == '*')
failed = 1;
/*
* The -r and -f flags provide a name which has already
* been authenticated by some server.
*/
if (preauth_flag)
goto auth_ok;
/*
* No password prompt if logging in from listed ttys
* (local console). Passwords don't help much if you
* have physical access to the hardware anyway...
* Suggested by Pavel Machek <pavel@bug.ucw.cz>.
* NOTE: password still required for root logins!
*/
if (pwd && (pwent.pw_uid != 0)
&& is_listed("NO_PASSWORD_CONSOLE", tty, 0)) {
temp_pw[0] = '\0';
pwent.pw_passwd = temp_pw;
}
if (pw_auth(pwent.pw_passwd, username, reason, (char *) 0) == 0)
goto auth_ok;
#ifdef RADIUS
/*
* If normal passwd authentication didn't work, try radius.
*/
if (failed) {
pwd = rad_authenticate(&rad_user_data, username,
clear_pass ? clear_pass : "");
if (pwd) {
is_rad_login = 1;
pwent = *pwd;
failed = 0;
goto auth_ok;
}
}
#endif /* RADIUS */
/*
* Don't log unknown usernames - I mistyped the password for
* username at least once... Should probably use LOG_AUTHPRIV
* for those who really want to log them. --marekm
*/
SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, BAD_PASSWD,
(pwd || getdef_bool("LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB")) ?
username : "UNKNOWN", fromhost));
failed = 1;
auth_ok:
/*
* This is the point where all authenticated users
* wind up. If you reach this far, your password has
* been authenticated and so on.
*/
#if defined(RADIUS) && !(defined(DES_RPC) || defined(KERBEROS))
if (clear_pass) {
strzero(clear_pass);
clear_pass = NULL;
}
#endif
if (getdef_bool("DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB")) {
alarm (30);
if (! dialcheck (tty, pwent.pw_shell[0] ?
pwent.pw_shell:"/bin/sh")) {
SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, BAD_DIALUP, username, tty));
failed = 1;
}
}
if (! failed && pwent.pw_name && pwent.pw_uid == 0 &&
! is_console) {
SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT, BAD_ROOT_LOGIN, fromhost));
failed = 1;
}
#ifdef LOGIN_ACCESS
if (!failed && !login_access(username, *hostname ? hostname : tty)) {
SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, LOGIN_REFUSED, username, fromhost));
failed = 1;
}
#endif
if (pwd && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB") &&
! failcheck (pwent.pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT, FAILURE_CNT, username, fromhost));
failed = 1;
}
if (! failed)
break;
/* don't log non-existent users */
if (pwd && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB"))
failure (pwent.pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
const char *failent_user;
#if HAVE_UTMPX_H
failent = utxent;
gettimeofday(&(failent.ut_tv), NULL);
#else
failent = utent;
time(&failent.ut_time);
#endif
if (pwd) {
failent_user = pwent.pw_name;
} else {
if (getdef_bool("LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB"))
failent_user = username;
else
failent_user = "UNKNOWN";
}
strncpy(failent.ut_user, failent_user, sizeof(failent.ut_user));
#ifdef USER_PROCESS
failent.ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
#endif
failtmp(&failent);
}
memzero(username, sizeof username);
if (--retries <= 0)
SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT, MANY_FAILS, fromhost));
#if 1
/*
* If this was a passwordless account and we get here,
* login was denied (securetty, faillog, etc.). There
* was no password prompt, so do it now (will always
* fail - the bad guys won't see that the passwordless
* account exists at all). --marekm
*/
if (pwent.pw_passwd[0] == '\0')
pw_auth("!", username, reason, (char *) 0);
#endif
/*
* Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
* to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
* before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
*/
if (delay > 0)
sleep(delay);
puts(_("Login incorrect"));
/* allow only one attempt with -r or -f */
if (rflg || fflg || retries <= 0) {
closelog();
exit(1);
}
} /* while (1) */
#endif /* ! USE_PAM */
(void) alarm (0); /* turn off alarm clock */
#ifndef USE_PAM /* PAM does this */
/*
* porttime checks moved here, after the user has been
* authenticated. now prints a message, as suggested
* by Ivan Nejgebauer <ian@unsux.ns.ac.yu>. --marekm
*/
if (getdef_bool("PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB") &&
!isttytime(pwent.pw_name, tty, time ((time_t *) 0))) {
SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, BAD_TIME, username, fromhost));
closelog();
bad_time_notify();
exit(1);
}
check_nologin();
#endif
if (getenv("IFS")) /* don't export user IFS ... */
addenv("IFS= \t\n", NULL); /* ... instead, set a safe IFS */
#ifdef USE_PAM
setutmp(pam_user, tty, hostname); /* make entry in utmp & wtmp files */
#else
setutmp(username, tty, hostname); /* make entry in utmp & wtmp files */
#endif
if (pwent.pw_shell[0] == '*') { /* subsystem root */
subsystem (&pwent); /* figure out what to execute */
subroot++; /* say i was here again */
endpwent (); /* close all of the file which were */
endgrent (); /* open in the original rooted file */
#ifdef SHADOWPWD
endspent (); /* system. they will be re-opened */
#endif
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
endsgent (); /* in the new rooted file system */
#endif
goto top; /* go do all this all over again */
}
#ifndef USE_PAM /* pam_lastlog handles this */
if (getdef_bool("LASTLOG_ENAB")) /* give last login and log this one */
dolastlog(&lastlog, &pwent, utent.ut_line, hostname);
#endif
#ifdef SVR4_SI86_EUA
sysi86(SI86LIMUSER, EUA_ADD_USER); /* how do we test for fail? */
#endif
#ifndef USE_PAM /* PAM handles this as well */
#ifdef AGING
/*
* Have to do this while we still have root privileges, otherwise
* we don't have access to /etc/shadow. expire() closes password
* files, and changes to the user in the child before executing
* the passwd program. --marekm
*/
#ifdef SHADOWPWD
if (spwd) { /* check for age of password */
if (expire (&pwent, spwd)) {
pwd = getpwnam(username);
spwd = getspnam(username);
if (pwd)
pwent = *pwd;
}
}
#else
#ifdef ATT_AGE
if (pwent.pw_age && pwent.pw_age[0]) {
if (expire (&pwent)) {
pwd = getpwnam(username);
if (pwd)
pwent = *pwd;
}
}
#endif /* ATT_AGE */
#endif /* SHADOWPWD */
#endif /* AGING */
#ifdef RADIUS
if (is_rad_login) {
char whofilename[128];
FILE *whofile;
snprintf(whofilename, sizeof whofilename, "/var/log/radacct/%.20s", tty);
whofile = fopen(whofilename, "w");
if (whofile) {
fprintf(whofile, "%s\n", username);
fclose(whofile);
}
}
#endif
setup_limits(&pwent); /* nice, ulimit etc. */
#endif /* ! USE_PAM */
chown_tty(tty, &pwent);
#ifdef LOGIN_FBTAB
/*
* XXX - not supported yet. Change permissions and ownerships of
* devices like floppy/audio/mouse etc. for console logins, based
* on /etc/fbtab or /etc/logindevperm configuration files (Suns do
* this with their framebuffer devices). Problems:
*
* - most systems (except BSD) don't have that nice revoke() system
* call to ensure the previous user didn't leave a process holding
* one of these devices open or mmap'ed. Any volunteers to do it
* in Linux?
*
* - what to do with different users logged in on different virtual
* consoles? Maybe permissions should be changed only on user's
* request, by running a separate (setuid root) program?
*
* - init/telnetd/rlogind/whatever should restore permissions after
* the user logs out.
*
* Try the new CONSOLE_GROUPS feature instead. It adds specified
* groups (like "floppy") to the group set if the user is logged in
* on the console. This still has the first problem (users leaving
* processes with these devices open), but doesn't need to change
* any permissions, just make them 0660 root:floppy etc. --marekm
*
* Warning: users can still gain permanent access to these groups
* unless any user-writable filesystems are mounted with the "nosuid"
* option. Alternatively, the kernel could be modified to prevent
* ordinary users from setting the setgid bit on executables.
*/
login_fbtab(tty, pwent.pw_uid, pwent.pw_gid);
#endif
/* We call set_groups() above because this clobbers pam_groups.so */
#ifndef USE_PAM
if (setup_uid_gid(&pwent, is_console))
#else
if (change_uid(&pwent))
#endif
exit(1);
#ifdef KERBEROS
if (clear_pass)
login_kerberos(username, clear_pass);
#endif
#ifdef DES_RPC
if (clear_pass)
login_desrpc(clear_pass);
#endif
#if defined(DES_RPC) || defined(KERBEROS)
if (clear_pass)
strzero(clear_pass);
#endif
setup_env(&pwent); /* set env vars, cd to the home dir */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{
int i;
const char * const * env;
env = (const char * const *) pam_getenvlist(pamh);
while (env && *env) {
addenv(*env, NULL);
env++;
}
}
#endif
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
if (!hushed(&pwent)) {
addenv("HUSHLOGIN=FALSE", NULL);
/* pam_unix, pam_mail and pam_lastlog should take care of this */
#ifndef USE_PAM
motd(); /* print the message of the day */
if (getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB") && faillog.fail_cnt != 0) {
failprint(&faillog);
/* Reset the lockout times if logged in */
if (faillog.fail_max &&
faillog.fail_cnt >= faillog.fail_max) {
puts(_("Warning: login re-enabled after temporary lockout.\n"));
SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, REENABLED2, username,
(int) faillog.fail_cnt));
}
}
if (getdef_bool("LASTLOG_ENAB") && lastlog.ll_time != 0) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
strftime(ptime, sizeof(ptime),
"%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y",
localtime(&lastlog.ll_time));
printf(_("Last login: %s on %s"),
ptime, lastlog.ll_line);
#else
printf(_("Last login: %.19s on %s"),
ctime(&lastlog.ll_time), lastlog.ll_line);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LL_HOST /* SVR4 || __linux__ || SUN4 */
if (lastlog.ll_host[0])
printf(_(" from %.*s"),
(int) sizeof lastlog.ll_host,
lastlog.ll_host);
#endif
printf(".\n");
}
#ifdef AGING
#ifdef SHADOWPWD
agecheck(&pwent, spwd);
#else
agecheck(&pwent);
#endif
#endif /* AGING */
mailcheck(); /* report on the status of mail */
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
} else
addenv("HUSHLOGIN=TRUE", NULL);
if (getdef_str("TTYTYPE_FILE") != NULL && getenv("TERM") == NULL)
ttytype (tty);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); /* default quit signal */
signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); /* default terminate signal */
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); /* default alarm signal */
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); /* added this. --marekm */
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* We must fork before setuid() because we need to call
* pam_close_session() as root.
*/
/* Note: not true in other (non-Linux) PAM implementations, where
the parent process of login (init, telnetd, ...) is responsible
for calling pam_close_session(). This avoids an extra process
for each login. Maybe we should do this on Linux too? -MM */
/* We let the admin configure whether they need to keep login
around to close sessions */
if (getdef_bool("CLOSE_SESSIONS")) {
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
child = fork();
if (child < 0) {
/* error in fork() */
fprintf(stderr, "login: failure forking: %s",
strerror(errno));
PAM_END;
exit(0);
} else if (child) {
/* parent - wait for child to finish,
then cleanup session */
wait(NULL);
PAM_END;
exit(0);
}
/* child */
}
#endif
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* default interrupt signal */
endpwent(); /* stop access to password file */
endgrent(); /* stop access to group file */
#ifdef SHADOWPWD
endspent(); /* stop access to shadow passwd file */
#endif
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
endsgent(); /* stop access to shadow group file */
#endif
if (pwent.pw_uid == 0)
SYSLOG((LOG_NOTICE, ROOT_LOGIN, fromhost));
else if (getdef_bool("LOG_OK_LOGINS"))
SYSLOG((LOG_INFO, REG_LOGIN, username, fromhost));
closelog();
#ifdef RADIUS
if (is_rad_login) {
printf(_("Starting rad_login\n"));
rad_login(&rad_user_data);
exit(0);
}
#endif
if ((tmp = getdef_str("FAKE_SHELL")) != NULL) {
shell(tmp, pwent.pw_shell); /* fake shell */
}
shell (pwent.pw_shell, (char *) 0); /* exec the shell finally. */
/*NOTREACHED*/
return 0;
}