shadow/src/pwck.c

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1992 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 , Michał Moskal
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2011, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include "chkname.h"
#include "commonio.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "pwio.h"
#include "shadowio.h"
#include "getdef.h"
#include "nscd.h"
Flush sssd caches in addition to nscd caches Some distributions, notably Fedora, have the following order of nsswitch modules by default: passwd: sss files group: sss files The advantage of serving local users through SSSD is that the nss_sss module has a fast mmapped-cache that speeds up NSS lookups compared to accessing the disk an opening the files on each NSS request. Traditionally, this has been done with the help of nscd, but using nscd in parallel with sssd is cumbersome, as both SSSD and nscd use their own independent caching, so using nscd in setups where sssd is also serving users from some remote domain (LDAP, AD, ...) can result in a bit of unpredictability. More details about why Fedora chose to use sss before files can be found on e.g.: https://fedoraproject.org//wiki/Changes/SSSDCacheForLocalUsers or: https://docs.pagure.org/SSSD.sssd/design_pages/files_provider.html Now, even though sssd watches the passwd and group files with the help of inotify, there can still be a small window where someone requests a user or a group, finds that it doesn't exist, adds the entry and checks again. Without some support in shadow-utils that would explicitly drop the sssd caches, the inotify watch can fire a little late, so a combination of commands like this: getent passwd user || useradd user; getent passwd user can result in the second getent passwd not finding the newly added user as the racy behaviour might still return the cached negative hit from the first getent passwd. This patch more or less copies the already existing support that shadow-utils had for dropping nscd caches, except using the "sss_cache" tool that sssd ships.
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#include "sssd.h"
#ifdef WITH_TCB
#include "tcbfuncs.h"
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
#include "shadowlog.h"
/*
* Exit codes
*/
/*@-exitarg@*/
#define E_OKAY 0
#define E_SUCCESS 0
#define E_USAGE 1
#define E_BADENTRY 2
#define E_CANTOPEN 3
#define E_CANTLOCK 4
#define E_CANTUPDATE 5
#define E_CANTSORT 6
/*
* Global variables
*/
const char *Prog;
static bool use_system_pw_file = true;
static bool use_system_spw_file = true;
static bool is_shadow = false;
static bool spw_opened = false;
static bool pw_locked = false;
static bool spw_locked = false;
/* Options */
static bool read_only = false;
static bool sort_mode = false;
static bool quiet = false; /* don't report warnings, only errors */
/* local function prototypes */
static void fail_exit (int code);
NORETURN static void usage (int status);
static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
static void open_files (void);
static void close_files (bool changed);
static void check_pw_file (int *errors, bool *changed);
static void check_spw_file (int *errors, bool *changed);
extern int allow_bad_names;
/*
* fail_exit - do some cleanup and exit with the given error code
*/
static void fail_exit (int code)
{
if (spw_locked) {
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
/* continue */
}
}
if (pw_locked) {
if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
if (use_system_pw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s",
pw_dbname ()));
}
/* continue */
}
}
closelog ();
exit (code);
}
/*
* usage - print syntax message and exit
*/
NORETURN
static void
usage (int status)
{
FILE *usageout = (E_SUCCESS != status) ? stderr : stdout;
#ifdef WITH_TCB
if (getdef_bool ("USE_TCB")) {
(void) fprintf (usageout,
_("Usage: %s [options] [passwd]\n"
"\n"
"Options:\n"),
Prog);
} else
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
{
(void) fprintf (usageout,
_("Usage: %s [options] [passwd [shadow]]\n"
"\n"
"Options:\n"),
Prog);
}
(void) fputs (_(" -b, --badname allow bad names\n"), usageout);
(void) fputs (_(" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
(void) fputs (_(" -q, --quiet report errors only\n"), usageout);
(void) fputs (_(" -r, --read-only display errors and warnings\n"
" but do not change files\n"), usageout);
(void) fputs (_(" -R, --root CHROOT_DIR directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
#ifdef WITH_TCB
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if (!getdef_bool ("USE_TCB"))
#endif /* !WITH_TCB */
{
(void) fputs (_(" -s, --sort sort entries by UID\n"), usageout);
}
(void) fputs ("\n", usageout);
exit (status);
}
/*
* process_flags - parse the command line options
*
* It will not return if an error is encountered.
*/
static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
static struct option long_options[] = {
{"badname", no_argument, NULL, 'b'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{"quiet", no_argument, NULL, 'q'},
{"read-only", no_argument, NULL, 'r'},
{"root", required_argument, NULL, 'R'},
{"sort", no_argument, NULL, 's'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
};
/*
* Parse the command line arguments
*/
while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "behqrR:s",
long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'b':
allow_bad_names = true;
break;
case 'h':
usage (E_SUCCESS);
/*@notreached@*/break;
case 'e': /* added for Debian shadow-961025-2 compatibility */
case 'q':
quiet = true;
break;
case 'r':
read_only = true;
break;
case 'R': /* no-op, handled in process_root_flag () */
break;
case 's':
sort_mode = true;
break;
default:
usage (E_USAGE);
}
}
if (sort_mode && read_only) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: -s and -r are incompatible\n"), Prog);
exit (E_USAGE);
}
/*
* Make certain we have the right number of arguments
*/
if (argc > (optind + 2)) {
usage (E_USAGE);
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}
/*
* If there are two left over filenames, use those as the password
* and shadow password filenames.
*/
if (optind != argc) {
pw_setdbname (argv[optind]);
use_system_pw_file = false;
}
if ((optind + 2) == argc) {
#ifdef WITH_TCB
if (getdef_bool ("USE_TCB")) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: no alternative shadow file allowed when USE_TCB is enabled.\n"),
Prog);
usage (E_USAGE);
}
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
spw_setdbname (argv[optind + 1]);
is_shadow = true;
use_system_spw_file = false;
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} else if (optind == argc) {
is_shadow = spw_file_present ();
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}
}
/*
* open_files - open the shadow database
*
* In read-only mode, the databases are not locked and are opened
* only for reading.
*/
static void open_files (void)
{
bool use_tcb = false;
#ifdef WITH_TCB
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use_tcb = getdef_bool ("USE_TCB");
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
/*
* Lock the files if we aren't in "read-only" mode
*/
if (!read_only) {
if (pw_lock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_CANTLOCK);
}
pw_locked = true;
if (is_shadow && !use_tcb) {
if (spw_lock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
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Prog, spw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_CANTLOCK);
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}
spw_locked = true;
}
}
/*
* Open the files. Use O_RDONLY if we are in read_only mode, O_RDWR
* otherwise.
*/
if (pw_open (read_only ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR) == 0) {
* lib/groupio.c, lib/groupio.h, lib/pwio.c, lib/pwio.h, lib/sgroupio.c, lib/sgroupio.h, lib/shadowio.c, lib/shadowio.h: Added *_dbname() functions to retrieve the name of the databases. * lib/groupio.c, lib/groupio.h, lib/pwio.c, lib/pwio.h, lib/sgroupio.c, lib/sgroupio.h, lib/shadowio.c, lib/shadowio.h: *_name() functions renamed *setname(). * src/grpck.c, src/pwck.c: Likewise. * lib/groupio.h, lib/pwio.h, lib/sgroupio.h, lib/shadowio.h: Added the name of the arguments to the prototypes. * src/chage, src/chfn.c, src/chgpasswd.c, src/chpasswd.c, src/chsh.c, src/gpasswd.c, src/groupadd.c, src/groupdel.c, src/groupmod.c, src/grpck.c, src/grpconv.c, src/grpunconv.c, src/newusers.c, src/passwd.c, src/pwck.c, src/pwconv.c, src/pwunconv.c, src/useradd.c, src/userdel.c, src/usermod.c: Harmonize the erro & syslog messages in case of failure of the *_lock(), *_open(), *_close(), *_unlock(), *_remove() functions. * src/chgpasswd.c, src/chpasswd.c, src/usermod.c: Avoid capitalized messages. * src/chpasswd.c, src/useradd.c, src/usermod.c: Harmonize messages in case of inexistent entries. * src/usermod.c: Harmonize messages in case of already existing entries. * src/newusers.c, src/useradd.c: Simplify PAM error handling. * src/useradd.c: Report failures to unlock files (stderr, syslog, and audit). But do not fail (continue). * src/useradd.c (open_files): Do not report to syslog & audit failures to lock or open the databases. This might be harmless, and the logs were not already informed that a change was requested. * src/usermod.c: It's not the account which is unlocked, but its password.
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fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
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if (use_system_pw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", pw_dbname ()));
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}
fail_exit (E_CANTOPEN);
}
if (is_shadow && !use_tcb) {
if (spw_open (read_only ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
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Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
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SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
fail_exit (E_CANTOPEN);
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}
spw_opened = true;
}
}
/*
* close_files - close and unlock the password/shadow databases
*
* If changed is not set, the databases are not closed, and no
* changes are committed in the databases. The databases are
* unlocked anyway.
*/
static void close_files (bool changed)
{
/*
* All done. If there were no change we can just abandon any
* changes to the files.
*/
if (changed) {
if (pw_close () == 0) {
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fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
if (use_system_pw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failure while writing changes to %s",
pw_dbname ()));
}
fail_exit (E_CANTUPDATE);
}
if (spw_opened && (spw_close () == 0)) {
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fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failure while writing changes to %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
fail_exit (E_CANTUPDATE);
}
spw_opened = false;
}
/*
* Don't be anti-social - unlock the files when you're done.
*/
if (spw_locked) {
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
/* continue */
}
}
spw_locked = false;
if (pw_locked) {
if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
if (use_system_pw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s",
pw_dbname ()));
}
/* continue */
}
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}
pw_locked = false;
}
/*
* check_pw_file - check the content of the passwd file
*/
static void check_pw_file (int *errors, bool *changed)
{
struct commonio_entry *pfe, *tpfe;
struct passwd *pwd;
const struct spwd *spw;
uid_t min_sys_id = getdef_ulong ("SYS_UID_MIN", 101UL);
uid_t max_sys_id = getdef_ulong ("SYS_UID_MAX", 999UL);
/*
* Loop through the entire password file.
*/
for (pfe = __pw_get_head (); NULL != pfe; pfe = pfe->next) {
/*
* If this is a NIS line, skip it. You can't "know" what NIS
* is going to do without directly asking NIS ...
*/
if (('+' == pfe->line[0]) || ('-' == pfe->line[0])) {
continue;
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}
/*
* Start with the entries that are completely corrupt. They
* have no (struct passwd) entry because they couldn't be
* parsed properly.
*/
if (NULL == pfe->eptr) {
/*
* Tell the user this entire line is bogus and ask
* them to delete it.
*/
puts (_("invalid password file entry"));
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), pfe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
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if (!yes_or_no (read_only)) {
continue;
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}
/*
* All password file deletions wind up here. This
* code removes the current entry from the linked
* list. When done, it skips back to the top of the
* loop to try out the next list element.
*/
delete_pw:
if (use_system_pw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete passwd line '%s'",
pfe->line));
}
*changed = true;
__pw_del_entry (pfe);
continue;
}
/*
* Password structure is good, start using it.
*/
pwd = pfe->eptr;
/*
* Make sure this entry has a unique name.
*/
for (tpfe = __pw_get_head (); NULL != tpfe; tpfe = tpfe->next) {
const struct passwd *ent = tpfe->eptr;
/*
* Don't check this entry
*/
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if (tpfe == pfe) {
continue;
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}
/*
* Don't check invalid entries.
*/
if (NULL == ent) {
continue;
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}
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if (strcmp (pwd->pw_name, ent->pw_name) != 0) {
continue;
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}
/*
* Tell the user this entry is a duplicate of
* another and ask them to delete it.
*/
puts (_("duplicate password entry"));
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), pfe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
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if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
goto delete_pw;
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}
}
/*
* Check for invalid usernames. --marekm
*/
if (!is_valid_user_name (pwd->pw_name)) {
printf (_("invalid user name '%s': use --badname to ignore\n"),
pwd->pw_name);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Check for invalid user ID.
*/
if (pwd->pw_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
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printf (_("invalid user ID '%lu'\n"), (long unsigned int)pwd->pw_uid);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Make sure the primary group exists
*/
* lib/prototypes.h, configure.in, libmisc/Makefile.am, libmisc/xgetXXbyYY.c, libmisc/xgetpwnam.c, libmisc/xgetpwuid.c, libmisc/xgetgrnam.c, libmisc/xgetgrgid.c, libmisc/xgetspnam.c: Added functions xgetpwnam(), xgetpwuid(), xgetgrnam(), xgetgrgid(), and xgetspnam(). They allocate memory for the returned structure and are more robust to successive calls. They are implemented with the libc's getxxyyy_r() functions if available. * libmisc/limits.c, libmisc/entry.c, libmisc/chowntty.c, libmisc/addgrps.c, libmisc/myname.c, libmisc/rlogin.c, libmisc/pwdcheck.c, src/newgrp.c, src/login_nopam.c, src/userdel.c, src/lastlog.c, src/grpck.c, src/gpasswd.c, src/newusers.c, src/chpasswd.c, src/chfn.c, src/groupmems.c, src/usermod.c, src/expiry.c, src/groupdel.c, src/chgpasswd.c, src/su.c, src/useradd.c, src/groupmod.c, src/passwd.c, src/pwck.c, src/groupadd.c, src/chage.c, src/login.c, src/suauth.c, src/faillog.c, src/groups.c, src/chsh.c, src/id.c: Review all the usage of one of the getpwnam(), getpwuid(), getgrnam(), getgrgid(), and getspnam() functions. It was noticed on http://bugs.debian.org/341230 that chfn and chsh use a passwd structure after calling a pam function, which result in using information from the passwd structure requested by pam, not the original one. It is much easier to use the new xget... functions to avoid these issues. I've checked which call to the original get... functions could be left (reducing the scope of the structure if possible), and I've left comments to ease future reviews (e.g. /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */). Note: the getpwent/getgrent calls should probably be checked also. * src/groupdel.c, src/expiry.c: Fix typos in comments. * src/groupmod.c: Re-indent. * libmisc/Makefile.am, lib/groupmem.c, lib/groupio.c, lib/pwmem.c, lib/pwio.c, lib/shadowmem.c, lib/shadowio.c: Move the __<xx>_dup functions (used by the xget... functions) from the <xx>io.c files to the new <xx>mem.c files. This avoid linking some utils against the SELinux library.
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/* local, no need for xgetgrgid */
if (!quiet && (NULL == getgrgid (pwd->pw_gid))) {
/*
* No primary group, just give a warning
*/
printf (_("user '%s': no group %lu\n"),
pwd->pw_name, (unsigned long) pwd->pw_gid);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* If uid is not system and has a home directory, then check
*/
if (!(pwd->pw_uid >= min_sys_id && pwd->pw_uid <= max_sys_id ) && pwd->pw_dir && pwd->pw_dir[0]) {
/*
* Make sure the home directory exists
*/
if (!quiet && (access (pwd->pw_dir, F_OK) != 0)) {
const char *nonexistent = getdef_str("NONEXISTENT");
/*
* Home directory does not exist, give a warning (unless intentional)
*/
if (NULL == nonexistent || strcmp (pwd->pw_dir, nonexistent) != 0) {
printf (_("user '%s': directory '%s' does not exist\n"),
pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_dir);
*errors += 1;
}
}
}
/*
* Make sure the login shell is executable
*/
if ( !quiet
&& ('\0' != pwd->pw_shell[0])
&& (access (pwd->pw_shell, F_OK) != 0)) {
/*
* Login shell doesn't exist, give a warning
*/
printf (_("user '%s': program '%s' does not exist\n"),
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pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_shell);
*errors += 1;
}
/*
* Make sure this entry exists in the /etc/shadow file.
*/
if (is_shadow) {
#ifdef WITH_TCB
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if (getdef_bool ("USE_TCB")) {
if (shadowtcb_set_user (pwd->pw_name) == SHADOWTCB_FAILURE) {
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printf (_("no tcb directory for %s\n"),
pwd->pw_name);
printf (_("create tcb directory for %s?"),
pwd->pw_name);
*errors += 1;
if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
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if (shadowtcb_create (pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_uid) == SHADOWTCB_FAILURE) {
*errors += 1;
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printf (_("failed to create tcb directory for %s\n"), pwd->pw_name);
continue;
}
} else {
continue;
}
}
if (spw_lock () == 0) {
*errors += 1;
fprintf (stderr,
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_("%s: cannot lock %s.\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
continue;
}
spw_locked = true;
if (spw_open (read_only ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR) == 0) {
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fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
*errors += 1;
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
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fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failed to unlock %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
}
continue;
}
spw_opened = true;
}
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
spw = spw_locate (pwd->pw_name);
if (NULL == spw) {
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printf (_("no matching password file entry in %s\n"),
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spw_dbname ());
printf (_("add user '%s' in %s? "),
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pwd->pw_name, spw_dbname ());
*errors += 1;
if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
struct spwd sp;
struct passwd pw;
sp.sp_namp = pwd->pw_name;
sp.sp_pwdp = pwd->pw_passwd;
sp.sp_min =
getdef_num ("PASS_MIN_DAYS", -1);
sp.sp_max =
getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_DAYS", -1);
sp.sp_warn =
getdef_num ("PASS_WARN_AGE", -1);
sp.sp_inact = -1;
sp.sp_expire = -1;
sp.sp_flag = SHADOW_SP_FLAG_UNSET;
sp.sp_lstchg = gettime () / SCALE;
if (0 == sp.sp_lstchg) {
/* Better disable aging than
* requiring a password change
*/
sp.sp_lstchg = -1;
}
*changed = true;
if (spw_update (&sp) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname (), sp.sp_namp);
fail_exit (E_CANTUPDATE);
}
/* remove password from /etc/passwd */
pw = *pwd;
pw.pw_passwd = SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING; /* XXX warning: const */
if (pw_update (&pw) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname (), pw.pw_name);
fail_exit (E_CANTUPDATE);
}
}
} else {
/* The passwd entry has a shadow counterpart.
* Make sure no passwords are in passwd.
*/
if ( !quiet
&& (strcmp (pwd->pw_passwd,
SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0)) {
printf (_("user %s has an entry in %s, but its password field in %s is not set to 'x'\n"),
pwd->pw_name, spw_dbname (), pw_dbname ());
*errors += 1;
}
}
}
#ifdef WITH_TCB
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if (getdef_bool ("USE_TCB") && spw_locked) {
if (spw_opened && (spw_close () == 0)) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failure while writing changes to %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
} else {
spw_opened = false;
}
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
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fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s",
spw_dbname ()));
}
} else {
spw_locked = false;
}
}
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
}
}
/*
* check_spw_file - check the content of the shadowed password file (shadow)
*/
static void check_spw_file (int *errors, bool *changed)
{
struct commonio_entry *spe, *tspe;
struct spwd *spw;
/*
* Loop through the entire shadow password file.
*/
for (spe = __spw_get_head (); NULL != spe; spe = spe->next) {
/*
* Do not treat lines which were missing in shadow
* and were added earlier.
*/
if (NULL == spe->line) {
continue;
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}
/*
* If this is a NIS line, skip it. You can't "know" what NIS
* is going to do without directly asking NIS ...
*/
if (('+' == spe->line[0]) || ('-' == spe->line[0])) {
continue;
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}
/*
* Start with the entries that are completely corrupt. They
* have no (struct spwd) entry because they couldn't be
* parsed properly.
*/
if (NULL == spe->eptr) {
/*
* Tell the user this entire line is bogus and ask
* them to delete it.
*/
puts (_("invalid shadow password file entry"));
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), spe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
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if (!yes_or_no (read_only)) {
continue;
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}
/*
* All shadow file deletions wind up here. This code
* removes the current entry from the linked list.
* When done, it skips back to the top of the loop
* to try out the next list element.
*/
delete_spw:
if (use_system_spw_file) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete shadow line '%s'",
spe->line));
}
*changed = true;
__spw_del_entry (spe);
continue;
}
/*
* Shadow password structure is good, start using it.
*/
spw = spe->eptr;
/*
* Make sure this entry has a unique name.
*/
for (tspe = __spw_get_head (); NULL != tspe; tspe = tspe->next) {
const struct spwd *ent = tspe->eptr;
/*
* Don't check this entry
*/
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if (tspe == spe) {
continue;
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}
/*
* Don't check invalid entries.
*/
if (NULL == ent) {
continue;
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}
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if (strcmp (spw->sp_namp, ent->sp_namp) != 0) {
continue;
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}
/*
* Tell the user this entry is a duplicate of
* another and ask them to delete it.
*/
puts (_("duplicate shadow password entry"));
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), spe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
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if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
goto delete_spw;
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}
}
/*
* Make sure this entry exists in the /etc/passwd
* file.
*/
if (pw_locate (spw->sp_namp) == NULL) {
/*
* Tell the user this entry has no matching
* /etc/passwd entry and ask them to delete it.
*/
printf (_("no matching password file entry in %s\n"),
pw_dbname ());
printf (_("delete line '%s'? "), spe->line);
*errors += 1;
/*
* prompt the user to delete the entry or not
*/
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if (yes_or_no (read_only)) {
goto delete_spw;
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}
}
/*
* Warn if last password change in the future. --marekm
*/
if (!quiet) {
time_t t = time (NULL);
if ( (t != 0)
&& (spw->sp_lstchg > (long) t / SCALE)) {
printf (_("user %s: last password change in the future\n"),
spw->sp_namp);
*errors += 1;
}
}
}
}
/*
* pwck - verify password file integrity
*/
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
int errors = 0;
bool changed = false;
/*
* Get my name so that I can use it to report errors.
*/
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
log_set_progname(Prog);
log_set_logfd(stderr);
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
OPENLOG ("pwck");
/* Parse the command line arguments */
process_flags (argc, argv);
open_files ();
if (sort_mode) {
if (pw_sort () != 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot sort entries in %s\n"),
Prog, pw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_CANTSORT);
}
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if (is_shadow) {
if (spw_sort () != 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: cannot sort entries in %s\n"),
Prog, spw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_CANTSORT);
}
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}
changed = true;
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} else {
check_pw_file (&errors, &changed);
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if (is_shadow) {
check_spw_file (&errors, &changed);
}
}
close_files (changed);
if (!read_only) {
nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
}
/*
* Tell the user what we did and exit.
*/
if (0 != errors) {
printf (changed ?
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_("%s: the files have been updated\n") :
_("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
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}
closelog ();
return ((0 != errors) ? E_BADENTRY : E_OKAY);
}
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